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East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-009
Friday
13 January 1995

Daily Report
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Central European Reactions to EU Summit

95P20360A

[FBIS Media Note] The media reported a wide range of reactions in Central Europe [CE] to the 9-10 December European Union [EU] summit meeting in Essen, Germany, at which the possible admission of the former communist countries was discussed.

Czech Republic

In the Czech Republic, the government and the major media portrayed the summit as a significant step toward EU membership. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, the leader of the Czech delegation, said that the summit "met all of our expectations" (HOSPODARSKE NOVINY, 12 December). Prague is not dismayed, he indicated, that the summit promised little concrete aid to the area and issued no timetable for accession because the Czech Republic is progressing toward membership on its own. It is moving "very fast" to develop a political, economic, and social system "comparable" to that of the EU countries, and, "a few years before the end of this century," it will be "able to cope" with the requirements of EU membership. Stressing that Czech membership would be mutually advantageous for his country and the EU and that Prague can carry its own weight, Klaus declared that the Czechs do not expect to get "more than we give" (Prague RADIOZURNAL RADIO NETWORK, 10 December). Most media commentaries agreed with the government's positive assessment. MLADA FRONTA DNES noted approvingly (12 December) that "Prague considers the Essen strategy the foundation of the Czech rapprochement with the Union." Similarly, HOSPODARSKE NOVINY's commentator wrote on 12 December that, in Essen, the EU "cracked open the door to the East" and on 13 December that the summit was a "historical step" toward a rapprochement between Central Europe and the EU.

At the same time, an article in the PRAGUE POST (13 December) noted that some Czech economists are "skeptical" about EU membership. Some of them see little to be gained beyond the 1993 association agreement, which opened the way for free trade between the EU and the Czech Republic. The association agreement "respects the full sovereignty of the states," but full membership requires giving up "politicial and economic sovereignty," stated Economy Ministry counselor Petr Zahradnik. While the elimination of "unnecessary trade barriers" has been beneficial, he said, "one wonders if it is necessary to go beyond that." Others, like Martin Madela, a professor on the Economic Faculty of Charles University, hold that it is unrealistic to expect that Europe will become financially united, reported the article. "Economic unity is only feasible through a strong federal government and a central bank, and I consider this to be politically impossible," Madela asserted.

Slovakia

In Slovakia, discussion of the Essen summit highlighted disagreement on the desirability of EU membership. While the outgoing government, which represented Slovakia in Essen during the time Vladimir Meciar was forming the new government, portrayed the summit largely in positive terms, some press commentaries noted that key Meciar supporters do not share the view that Slovakia should strive to join the EU. Karol Wolf, the Bratislava correspondent of Prague's MLADA FRONTA DNES, wrote in his 9 December column on the Essen summit that the "circles that will formulate" the Meciar government's foreign policy hold views that are "diametrically opposed" to the outgoing government's on European integration. Wolf reported that Jan Luptak, deputy chairman of the Slovak parliament and chairman of the Association of Workers of Slovakia, which forms a part of the government coalition and has three ministers in the Meciar cabinet, has declared that Slovak workers "are opposed" to Slovakia's entry into the EU because it "would not benefit the people of this country." In a similar vein, Jan Slota, the chairman of the Slovak National Party and another Meciar ally, has chided the EU for its alleged "overbearing" attitude toward Slovakia and has charged that "Europe meddles too often in Slovakia's sovereign affairs," Wolf noted.

Poland

Media reports indicated that the Polish Government was disappointed with the outcome of the Essen summit. While Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak praised the summit as an important "symbolic" event and said it was encouraging that the year 2000 had been mentioned as the possible date of accession, he noted that Poland still cannot expect a "concrete calendar of integration steps" (PAP, 11 December). Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski called the strategy for associate membership "a great success" and said that setting 2000 as a "symbolic date" for accession will allow "the new millenium to start on the basis of a united Europe," but he expressed disappointment that the summit had not produced a "more precise and more complete" timetable for full membership (LIBERATION, 14 December). Because incorporating Central Europe into the EU "will be very difficult," Olechowski stressed, it is all the more important to set "concrete dates" to mobilize both the candidates and the EU members to make the necessary preparations (PAP, 11 December). According to GAZETA WYBOCZA (11 December), Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, the government spokesman for European integration issues, strongly criticized the summit's failure to set a timetable for accession and a date for membership negotiations, asserting that "Polish expectations far surpass" the strategy outlined in Essen.

Commentaries in the leading Polish media indicated that the summit produced some positive results but fell short of Poland's expectations. An 11 December piece in the daily GAZETA WYBORCZA said that the summit went "considerably further" in dealing with political questions than with the economic problems that must be resolved before accession, but on a hopeful note it suggested that perhaps "political integration will stimulate economic integration." Discussing the EU summit to be held this June in Cannes, the article stressed that, on that occasion, the EU is slated to accept the white book outlining the legislation necessary for CE participation in the EU Common Market and that this outline will be a "plan binding us with the West." The paper noted, however, that acceptance of the plan will still not mark the beginning of accession negotiations and that the CE states, contrary to Poland's expectations, will not be allowed to participate in the 1996 conference preceding accession negotiations. A commentary in the daily TRYBUNA (12 December) also mixed positive and negative elements. As a result of the Essen summit, it said, the European market will be more "open" to Poland, and "certain aspects" of Poland's "dumping policies will be regarded with half-shut eyes." However, the commentary repeated German Chancellor Kohl's warning that Poland must not have "false expectations" as a result of the summit.

Hungary

The Hungarian Government portrayed the EU summit far more favorably than the leading Hungarian press. Although Prime Minister Gyula Horn, leader of the delegation to Essen, said that "a long time will elapse" before the associate countries become full members, he declared that he is "satisfied" with the Essen strategy and that the summit's decisions "on very important issues" make the process of joining "practically irreversible" (DUNA TV, 10 December). In contrast, Hungary's leading newspapers portrayed the summit as a big disappointment. NEPSZABADSAG entitled its 12 December report "Essen Summit Brings No Breakthrough," while the caption under a picture showing the German foreign minister helping Horn on with his coat said that, in Essen, "None of the other East European leaders got much more help toward joining the EU." A related commentary said the summit was "stifled in boredom" and dealt only with minor issues, being incapable of dealing with the continent's "deepening crisis" and lacking the will to do anything for its "poor relatives" in Central Europe beyond telling them to "help themselves." The daily MAGYAR HIRLAP (12 December) also said that, in Essen, the CE countries got nothing but "promises" and demands that they "do their homework." However, it asserted, if the West leaves the CE region "to itself," efforts to integrate "could drag on endlessly." At Essen, said the paper, "the era of illusions ended."

Havel: Chechen Warfare Will Change NATO Views

LD1201162495 Berlin DDP/ADN in German 1505 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Dresden/Prague (DDP/ADN)—In the view of Czech President Vaclav Havel, the conflict in Chechnya could prompt Western politicians to revise their position about the accession to NATO by former Eastern bloc states. In the "MDR-Aktuell" television program of Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk this evening, Havel said, with reference to NATO's rather hesitant position regarding Czech membership, that the North Atlantic alliance has taken too much notice of the Russian position. "Perhaps they have been too credulous. Now they may better understand why the Czech Republic wishes to join the alliance", Havel said.

Havel said he does not believe Russia's actions in Chechnya can be compared to the Warsaw Pact troops' intervention in the CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic] in 1968. He said Chechnya is in fact part of the Russian Federation. This is not an attack on a foreign state. Nonetheless, Havel said he considers the intervention to be "very rash and very dangerous." Above all, it is shocking how many civilian casualties the continuing bombardment of Groznyy is claiming, the president said. He is convinced that political negotiations are the only solution, Havel added.

Czechs To Complain to Russia, Ukraine About Oil

LD1301110195 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The current shortfall in supplying the Czech Republic with oil from Russia has been caused by bilateral problems in the talks between Russia and Ukraine about tariffs for the transportation of oil across Ukrainian territory.

(Milan Rada), director general of the Foreign Ministry economic section, told Czech Radio that these talks have not yet been completed and, therefore, the resumption of oil deliveries, in the order of about 108,000 tonnes, is merely temporary. The entire problem will most likely recur.

If the Russian-Ukrainian problem is not solved by 16 January, the Czech side will communicate its dissatisfaction to the ambassadors of both countries because, as Milan Rada stressed, it is inadmissible that a third party should suffer because of bilateral problems between Russia and Ukraine.

CR Ships To Sail in Baltic Sea

95CH0093B Prague PRAGUE POST in English 27 Dec 94 p 7

[Article by Lubomir Sedlak: "Czechs Send Ships Onto High Seas"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As one of the few landlocked countries of Europe, the Czech Republic isn't exactly known as a shipbuilding powerhouse. But that hasn't prevented Ceskoslovenska plavba labska (CSPL) from building a river-going ship that can also ply the oceans waves.

The DM 7 million ($4.4 million) vessel, which is currently making its way down the Labe (Elbe) on its way to Hamburg, is capable of carrying 1,540 metric tons of freight through the often turbulent North and Baltic seas, as well as the calm rivers and canals of Europe.

Known as the Preussen (German for "Prussia"), the ship was made to order for a Hamburg-based shipping company, Wessels Import Export. Equipped with modern German technology, it is more than 70 meters (230 feet) long and weighs 500 tons.

It took two years to build the ship in Chvaletice, an east Bohemian port town on the Labe, in a shipyard owned by CSPL. Tomas Parizek, head of the Chvaletice shipyard, boated that the Preussen "will be able to carry practically anything except people," although he added that its most likely cargo will be either various ores or shipping containers.

It's been about 30 years since European shipmakers built ships able to navigate both rivers and seas, preferring instead to build large sea vessels whose freight can be transferred to small river ships. The Preussen can take its cargo through a river and along a sea coast—or vice versa. It can sail seas as far as 200 miles from coasts and on rivers that are at least 4 meters (13 feet) deep.

"It will probably be sailing in the North and the Baltic seas (calling in Norwegian and Swedish ports) and the Mediterranean, as well as between Britain and the rest of Europe, but also on most of the Continent's canals, such as in Germany," Parizek said.

The Preussen represents a new line of business for CSPL, which had previously specialized in ship repair.

General director Karel Horyna said the company is ready to start producing a series of smaller ships, at a rate of two to three ships a year. It already has an order for two small boats to clean up lakes in Berlin.

Horyna noted that before the breakup of Czechoslovakia, the Slovak town of Komarno, a port on the Danube river, held a monopoly on building large vessels.

Parizek noted that Wessels Import Export is in fact having a 100-meter ship—more than 25 percent larger than the Preussen—built in Komarno.

"A vessel of such size would not be able to sail along the Labe river, because its locks are too small," Parizek said.

Delegation Attends Trade Conference in Cleveland

LD1201214895 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A two-day conference on trade and investment began in Cleveland, Ohio, today. Its purpose is to facilitate direct contact between businessmen from the United States and Central and East Europe. The sizeable Slovak delegation is led by Economy Minister Jan Ducky. Here is our U.S. correspondent Peter Susko with a report on the first day of the international conference:

[Susko] The Cleveland conference opened today with an address by U.S. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown. [passage omitted] At one point Brown said that nobody was perfect and that the United States was interested to hear what the individual delegations thought it was doing badly. I asked Slovak Economy Minister Jan Ducky for his reaction:

[Begin Ducky recording] It is difficult to give a straightforward answer, but, in any case, I think that from our point of view it is not good that U.S. investors are taking such little interest in our market. I am talking about investments as well as normal trade, of course. Our group here is quite large and, I would say, representative. Almost all of our economic ministers are here, and I think we will take advantage of this opportunity to acquaint our future partners, the Americans, with the possibilities Slovakia offers. We want to convince them not to be afraid to come to our country because the conditions there are comparable with any developed country of the world. [end recording]

[Susko] The conference now continues with individual working group sessions.

Third Phase of Army Surplus Hardware Elimination

AU1201142395 Bratislava SME in Slovak 5 Jan 95 p 3

[TA SR report: "Cannons Turned Into Scrap"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kosice—The third and final phase of the disposal of the Slovak Army's surplus military hardware began yesterday in the Military Repair Shop Moldava nad Bodvou state enterprise in the Kosice-Environs District with the physical elimination of 85 100-mm type-53 antitank guns.

Sixty percent of the surplus hardware in Slovakia (tanks, aircraft, and artillery with a caliber of more than 100 mm) was disposed of in the first two phases. Surplus military systems will be disposed of in bimonthly cycles in the third phase. This phase will continue until November. "The Slovak Republic is assiduously fulfilling the international agreements on reducing the size of the Slovak Army's ordnance in accordance with the timetable approved. There have been no shortcomings in Slovakia since the start of the process for disposing of surplus quotas," said Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Valusek, a senior officer from the Defense Ministry's center for verifying the agreement on conventional armed forces. Experts from the Danish, Italian, and German Armies are represented in the international inspection team. The international inspection team will inspect the outcome of the elimination of the 85 cannons in two months' time. According to Imrich Halmi, the director of the Military Repair Shop, the enterprise will sell off the dismantled cannons, which amount to more than 300 tonnes of scrap, by means of a public tender after the inspection.

Briefing on U.S. Visegrad Cooperation Proposal

LD1301142295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The U.S. Government is offering the four Visegrad countries [Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia] $25 million to modernize their military air control centers. At a briefing this morning, Laszlo Borsits, deputy state secretary at the Defense Ministry, pointed out that it will require greater cooperation between the four countries. Peter Marvanyi reports:

[Marvanyi] First, every country must sort out its own airspace, that is, military and civilian control must be coordinated. In our country this has been largely achieved since 1992 when the so-called flexible airspace use was introduced. Thus, military aviation does not restrict civilian aviation more than is necessary.

Another important step was a system to recognize aliens and friends [idegen-barat felismeroe rendszer] which has not yet been introduced in the other Visegrad countries.

The second step of the regional cooperation encouraged by the Americans would be for the neighbors to exchange radar data. [passage omitted]

If the system of identification as well as the system of civilian and military control becomes uniform in the four countries, it will also be a very significant step regarding NATO entry, particularly if the identification systems are manufactured to NATO specifications.

All of this is just an idea and is to be decided by the government and parliament.

Newspaper's New Leadership To Change Tone, Style

AU1201205795 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 10 Jan 95 pp 1, 3

[FBIS Translated Text] Based on the agreement of the members of Nemzeti Sajto Kft [National Press Ltd], which is publishing UJ MAGYARORSZAG as of today, former deputy chief editor Andras Ko has been appointed the newspaper's new chief editor. With the participation of well-known public figures, an editorial committee was set up to form and preserve the newspaper's spirit.

The daily paper UJ MAGYARORSZAG will from henceforth appear with a new heading and outward appearance, to illustrate the change of ownership and the planned change of tone and quality. The cancellation of the editorial that has so far appeared on the front page and the glossary corner called "Fly in the Milk" are some of the more significant content changes. It was mostly these subjective writings that represented the tone that the new leadership wishes to end.

As we learned from Istvan Nagy Igloi, managing chairman of Nemzeti Sajto Kft [National Press Company], nearly 30 people from the former publisher, Publica Rt [Publica Inc.], will not be employed because there is no position for them in the new streamlined structure. (Prior to this, at the end of 1994, Publica Rt had already dismissed 40 workers). Two-thirds of them belong to the technical staff and the rest are journalists and writers—including, for example, Gabor Czako, a member of Publica Rt's board of directors.

The editorial committee includes Rudolf Andorka, rector of Budapest University of Economic Sciences; Piarist Superior Pal Bolberitz; journalist Mihaly L. Kocsis, who is the former program director for Hungarian Television; historian Istvan Nemeskurty; and composer Sandor Szokolay.

According to our information, Nemzeti Sajto Kft's seven members are the following: solicitor Gabor Balintfy, chairman of the Publica Rt and member of the supervisory committee of the Hungarian Credit Bank [MHB]; Piarist Superior Pal Bolberitz; former parliamentary deputy Istvan Borocz, member of the United Smallholders Party; Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] Deputy Gyorgy Csoti, chairman of the Publica Rt's supervisory committee and member of the MHB's Board of Directors; Gyorgy Giczy, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] and managing director of Magyar Penna Kft [Hungarian Quill Ltd], which publishes PESTI HIRLAP; Zsolt Nemeth, deputy chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats; and MDF Administrative Chairman Ivan Szabo.

In reaction to a remark published in a newspaper claiming that Kordax Rt, an enterprise close to the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], is behind Nemzeti Sajto Kft, Media Director [as published] Igloi said: An enterprise on the level of Kordax Rt has to take the political power structure into consideration. However, it does not enter into politics; it takes its steps on the basis of business considerations. Rejecting the accusation that he is a Socialist Party supporter, Igloi said his company supported MSZP candidate Gyorgy Keleti, Alliance of Free Democrats candidate Ferenc Torok, and KDNP candidate Tamas Lukacs at the elections. The newspaper's new chief editor is Andras Ko. The leading editor is Ede Szabo. Editors are: Tibor Franka, Bela Jodal, and Pal Dipold—who according to Hungarian Television's news program is deputy chief editor. Main contributors to the newspaper are Laszlo Fabian and Janos Gy. Kiss, the newspaper's former chief editor and his deputy, respectively.

Decree on Investigative Authority of Police

95CH0077B Budapest MAGYAR KOZLONY in Hungarian No 75, 14 Jul 94 pp 2719,-2723

[Interior Ministry Decree No. 15/1994 on the scope of authority and jurisdiction of police investigative authorities, promulgated on 14 July 1994]

[FBIS Translated Text] Minister of the Interior Decree No. 15.BM of 14 July 1994 on the investigative authority and jurisdiction of the police

Pursuant to Paragraphs 22. and 404.(3) of Law No. 1. of 1973 on criminal procedure (hereinafter Code of Criminal Procedure), in agreement with the chief prosecutor, I order the following regarding the authority and jurisdiction of the investigative authorities of the police:

The investigative authorities of the police

Paragraph 1.

(1) The police, as an investigative authority, shall consist of local, regional, and central investigative authorities, and the various investigative authorities shall consist of investigative organs, corresponding to their professional tasks.

(2) The police commands shall be the local investigative authorities, the police district commands the regional investigative authorities, and the National Police Headquarters Command (hereinafter: ORFK) the central investigative authority.

(3) The organs of local investigative authorities shall be

(a) the investigative organs of police commands,

(b) the organs of police commands charged with the responsibility of persecuting crime,

(c) the organs of police commands charged with the responsibility of protecting the economy,

(d) the traffic enforcement organs of police commands,

(e) the police posts and stations of police commands, and

(f) the Danube Waterway Police Command, the Tisza Waterway Police Command, and the Lake Balaton Police Command.

(4) The organs of regional investigative authorities shall be

(a) the investigative organs of county (Budapest) police district commands,

(b) the organs of police district commands charged with the responsibility of persecuting crime,

(c) the organs of police district commands charged with the responsibility of protecting the economy, and

(d) the traffic enforcement organs of police district commands.

(4) The organs of central investigative authority shall be

(a) the Central Investigations Section of the ORFK Investigations Division,

(b) the Professional Management Section of the ORFK Investigations Division,

(c) the Criminal Investigations Section of the ORFK Criminal Division,

(d) the Economic Crimes Investigations Section of the ORFK Economic Crimes Division,

(e) the Regional Coordination Section of the ORFK Economic Crimes Division,

(f) the ORFK Traffic Enforcement Division,

(g) the ORFK Organized Crime Service, and

(h) the ORFK Airport Security Division.

Scope of authority

Paragraph 2.

(1) Except for criminal acts whose investigation is delegated by separate law to other investigative authorities, the investigation of all criminal acts contained in Law No. 4. of 1978 on the Criminal Code of Laws (hereinafter: Criminal Code of Laws) shall be within the scope of authority of the police investigative authority.

(2) The authority of police commands, the ORFK's Airport Security Directorate, the traffic enforcement units of county and Budapest police district commands, the Danube Waterway Police Command, the Tisza Waterway Police Command, and the Lake Balaton Police Command, shall extend to the investigation of criminal acts not enumerated in the appendixes of this Decree, as commensurate with their respective functions.

(3) The investigation of criminal acts enumerated in *Appendix 1.* of this Decree shall be under the authority of the organs of the county (Budapest) police district commands charged with the responsibility of conducting investigations, persecuting crime, and protecting the economy.

(4) The following shall be under the authority of the Central Investigations Section of the ORFK Investigations Division:

(a) criminal acts enumerated in *Appendix 2.*, and

(b) the investigation of all crimes referred to this office by the National Commander of Police or his criminal enforcement deputy, or by the head of the ORFK Investigations Division.

(5) The authority of the central investigative organs specified in Paragraph 1.(5)(c)-(g) shall extend to criminal acts whose investigation is referred to these organs by the National Commander of Police or his criminal enforcement deputy and by his public safety deputy, as well as criminal acts drawn by division chiefs, and the head of the service under their own authority.

(6) The investigation of criminal acts enumerated in Appendix 2. shall not be assigned to police district commands or to police commands.

Jurisdiction

Paragraph 3.

(1) The following investigative authorities shall be competent to conduct investigations:

(a) the authority in whose area of jurisdiction—defined in separate law—the criminal act was committed, or, in case of serial criminal acts, in whose area of jurisdiction a majority of the criminal acts was committed,

(b) the authority which was first to take action regarding a case (antecedenct action), if a suspect committed crimes within the area of jurisdiction of several investigative authorities, or if the place where the criminal acts were committed cannot be determined,

(c) in cases involving the misdemeanor of drunken driving (Criminal Code Paragraph 188.(1)), the misdemeanor of the prohibited yielding the operation of a vehicle (Criminal Code Paragraph 189.(1)), and the misdemeanor or crime of failing to pay alimony (Criminal Code Paragraph 196.), the authority in whose area of jurisdiction the offender resides, except if it is appropriate to investigate at the place where the offense was committed.

(2) If the identity of the person who committed a crime is unknown, and the place where the crime was committed cannot be determined, the investigative authority in whose jurisdiction the criminal act was discovered shall have jurisdiction.

(3) If a suspect committed a crime abroad, the investigative authority in whose area of jurisdiction the suspect resides or stays shall have jurisdiction.

(4) In the absence of the suspect, the investigative authority having jurisdiction at the suspect's last known place of residence or place of stay shall have jurisdiction.

(5) The jurisdiction of the ORFK Airport Security Directorate:

(a) The public areas, or areas open to public transportation at airports, the internal parking and fenced in areas of airports,

(b) The ticketing, customs, and transit areas of airports, as well as the areas open to traffic in front of airports.

(6) The director of the ORFK Airport Security Directorate may transfer his authority to conduct further investigation to the investigative authority having jurisdiction pursuant to Section (1)(a), with respect to persons suspected of having committed a crime.

(7) The investigative organ having jurisdiction shall determine whether to supplement complaints or to refuse to conduct an investigation.

Examination of authority and jurisdiction

Paragraph 4.

(1) It shall be the ex officio duty of investigative organs to verify their own authority and jurisdiction.

(2) If, in the course of an investigation, an investigative authority discovers that it lacks authority or jurisdiction, it shall transfer the investigation to the investigative authority that has proper authority and jurisdiction based on Paragraph 125.(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by simultaneously notifying all those who participate in the proceeding. In clashes involving authority and jurisdiction following transfers of authority and jurisdiction, action shall be taken without delay, pursuant to Sections (4) and (8).

(3) Regarding criminal cases based on complaints, announcements, or discovery by the police, any investigative authority shall take immediate investigative steps, irrespective of authority and jurisdiction.

After taking these steps, the investigative authority having authority and jurisdiction shall be notified without delay, and the related documents and notes taken relative to the case shall be transferred.

(4) The county (Budapest) police commander shall designate the proceeding investigative authority in case of a clash between investigative organs based on authority and jurisdiction, provided that the clash over authority and jurisdiction occurred between investigative organs operating within the area of the same police district command.

(5) The heads of the ORFK Investigations, Criminal, Economic Crime, and Traffic Enforcement Divisions shall render decisions if clashes stemming from disputes over authority and jurisdiction occur between different county (Budapest) police district commands, or between police commands under different police district commands.

(6) The national commander of police shall designate the proceeding investigative organs in all other clashes stemming from disputes over authority and jurisdiction.

(7) In jurisdictional clashes, the head of the superior police organ, or the heads of the ORFK Investigations, Criminal, Economic Crime, and Traffic Enforcement Divisions may also designate an investigative authority based on the fact that a majority of the evidentiary proceedings to be pursued is within the jurisdiction of the designated investigative authority, or for other reasons.

(8) Documents needed to resolve disputes shall be submitted through official channels by the investigative authority whose lack of authority or jurisdiction was subsequently determined.

Closing provisions

Paragraph 5.

(1) In the interest of greater efficiency in persecuting crimes, the national commander of police may order the

temporary transfer of the investigation of certain categories of crimes under the jurisdiction of police district commands, or the national police command.

(2) The county (Budapest) police district commander shall issue orders regarding the distribution of cases between police district command investigative organs, and cases handled by individual police commands.

(3) In addition to the above, the Budapest police district commander, and the police district commanders of Jasz-Nagykun-Szolnok County, and of Somogy County shall also take action with respect to the authority of the Danube Waterway Police Command, the Tisza Waterway Police Command, and the Lake Balaton Police Command.

(4) As part of action specified in Section (2), county (Budapest) police district commanders may temporarily, or in the long term, transfer investigative authority over certain categories of crime under the authority of police district commands.

(5) If it is appropriate from the standpoint of the investigative acts to be performed or for some other reason, the county (Budapest) police district commander may assign the investigation of crimes enumerated in Appendix 1. to a police command operating in the area of the police district, and further, the county (Budapest) police district commander, and the head of a regional investigative authority described in Paragraph 1.(4)(a)-(d) may draw certain criminal acts under the authority of the police district command.

(6) In regard to criminal acts defined in Paragraph 2.(2) of this Decree under the authority of police commands, the head of the police command may designate a person with regional authority to conduct an investigation and to perform certain investigative acts.

Paragraph 6.

(1) This Decree shall take force on the first day of the month following its proclamation.

(2) Simultaneously, Ministry of the Interior Decree 9.BM of 7 February 1990, and Paragraph 3. of Decree No. 24.BM of 5 September 1990 shall lose force.

[Signed] *Dr. Imre Konya,* minister of the interior.

Appendix 1.
to Decree No. 15.BM of 14 July 1994

Criminal acts under the authority of organs of county (Budapest) police district commands charged with the responsibility of persecuting crimes, protecting the economy and conducting investigations

Criminal Code of Laws Chapter 12.

Crimes against persons

Title I.

Crimes threatening the lives, physical integrity, and health of persons

Paragraph 166. The crime and misdemeanor of felonious homicide

Paragraph 167. The crime of homicide in the heat of passion

Paragraph 168. The crime of involvement in another person's suicide

Paragraph 169. The crime of abortion, resulting in death

Paragraph 170. The crime of physical assault causing death, o bodily damage

Paragraph 171.(2)(b) The misdemeanor of negligent endangerment resulting in death, that occurs in an occupational setting

Paragraph 171.(2)(c) The misdemeanor of negligent endangerment resulting in several deaths (mass catastrophe), that occurs in an occupational setting

Paragraph 171.(3) 3.t. [as published; expansion unknown] The crime of intentional endangerment in an occupational setting, resulting in death

Paragraph 171.(3) 4.t. The crime of negligent endangerment in an occupational setting resulting in multiple deaths (mass catastrophe)

Paragraph 172.(2) The failure to provide aid resulting in death, except if the crime was committed in violation of traffic regulations

Paragraph 172.(3) 2.t. The crime of failure to provide aid by the person causing the emergency situation (required to provide aid anyway), resulting in death, except if the crime was committed in violation of traffic regulations

Title II.

Crimes against freedom and human dignity

Paragraph 174/A. The crime of violating a person's freedom of conscience and religious freedom

Paragraph 175/A. The crime of kidnapping

Criminal Code of Laws Chapter 15.

Crimes against the integrity of state administration, the administration of justice, and of public life

Title I.

Paragraph 211. Crimes against the order of elections, popular referendums and popular initiatives

Title II.

Crimes against law and order

Paragraph 212. The misdemeanor of abusing the right to associate with others

Title IV.

Official crimes [hivatali buncselekmenyek]

Paragraph 228/A. The crime and misdemeanor of violating the freedom to associate and to assemble

Criminal Code of Laws Chapter 16.

Crimes against public order

Title I.

Crimes against public safety

Paragraph 259.(2)(b) The crime of creating a public threat causing a particularly large financial disadvantage

Paragraph 259.(3) The crime of creating a public threat resulting in death

Paragraph 259.(4) 2.t. The misdemeanor of negligently creating a public threat causing particularly large financial disadvantage

Paragraph 259.(4) 3.t. The misdemeanor of negligently creating a public threat resulting in death

Paragraph 260.(2) 2.t. The crime of disturbing the operation of a plant that serves the public, causing particularly large financial disadvantage

Paragraph 260.(3) 2.t. The misdemeanor of negligently disturbing the operation of a plant that serves the public, causing particularly large financial disadvantage

Paragraph 261/A. The crime or misdemeanor of violating international legal obligations

Paragraph 263/B. The crime of smuggling arms

Title II.

Crimes against public peace

Paragraph 268. The crime of inciting against legal requirements or requirements established by the authorities

Paragraph 269. The crime of inciting against a community

Title IV.

Crimes against public health

Paragraph 282. The crime and misdemeanor of narcotics abuse

Criminal Code of Laws Chapter 17.

Economic crimes

Title I.

Crimes violating management duties and the order of management

Paragraph 287. The crime of violating obligations related to the sale of internationally controlled products and technologies

Paragraph 290. The crime of fraudulent bankruptcy

Paragraph 291. Providing illegal advantage to a creditor

Paragraph 300/C.(2)(b) The crime of computer fraud causing particularly large damage

Paragraph 303. The crime or misdemeanor of money laundering

Title II.

Counterfeiting money and stamps

Paragraph 304.(2) The crime of counterfeiting money (in large quantities and large value) as part of a criminal conspiracy

Title III.

Financial crimes

Paragraph 310.(3) The crime of defrauding social security, resulting in a particularly large decrease in revenues

Paragraph 310/A.(3) The crime of violating the requirement to make employer (employee) contributions payable to the Unemployment Solidarity Fund, resulting in a particularly large decrease in revenues

Paragraph 310/B.(3) The crime of violating the requirement to make social security (health insurance) pension contributions resulting in a particularly large decrease in revenues

Paragraph 313/C.(5)(a) The crime of abusing credit cards ["bank cards"] creating particularly large damage

Criminal Code of Laws Chapter 18.

Crimes against property

Paragraph 316.(6)(a) The crime of theft involving particularly large value

Paragraph 317.(6)(a) The crime of embezzlement involving particularly large value

Paragraph 318.(6)(a) The crime of fraud involving particularly large value

Paragraph 319.(3)(c) The crime of breach of trust causing grave financial disadvantage

Paragraph 320.(2) The misdemeanor of negligent management causing particularly large financial disadvantage

Paragraph 321.(3)(a) The crime of armed robbery

Paragraph 321.(4)(a) The crime of robbery involving particularly large value

Paragraph 321.(4)(b) The crime of armed robbery involving particularly large value

Paragraph 323.(2)(a)-(c) The crime of extortion

Paragraph 324.(5) The crime of destructing property causing particularly large damage

Paragraph 326.(5) The crime of receiving stolen goods of particularly large value

Paragraph 329/A.(3) The crime of violating copyright and neighboring rights causing particularly large financial disadvantage

Appendix 2.
to Decree No. 15.BM of 14 July 1994

Crimes under the jurisdiction of the ORFK Investigative Division

Criminal Code of Laws Chapter 10.

Crimes against the state

Criminal Code of Laws Chapter 11.

Crimes against humanity

Criminal Code of Laws Chapter 15.

Crimes against the integrity of state administration, the administration of justice, and of public life

Title III.

Violation of state and official secrets

Paragraph 221. The crime of violating state secrets

Paragraph 222. The crime and misdemeanor of violating official secrets

Paragraph 223. The misdemeanor of failing to report violations of state secrets

Title VI.

Crimes against the administration of justice

Paragraph 224. The crime of being an accessory after the fact to crimes enumerated in the appendix

Criminal Code of Laws Chapter 16.

Title I.

Crimes against public order

Paragraph 261. The crime of committing acts of terror

Paragraph 262. The crime of hijacking an aircraft

Ambassador on Hungary's Importance for Russia

AU1301111395 Budapest BESZELO in Hungarian 5 Jan 95 pp 13,14,15

[Interview with Hungarian Ambassador to Moscow Gyorgy Nanovfszky by Ilona Kiss; place and date not given: "We Are Not the Most Important for Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Kiss] Now that we see the bombing of the Chechen capital every day, everyone is again anxiously wondering whether we should be afraid of the Russians. What are Russian foreign policy's intentions toward us? To what extent does the prospect of our NATO membership upset them?

[Nanovfszky] I recently heard from a Duma representative: I wish the Central European countries would join NATO as soon as possible, because then NATO would finally fall apart in no time at all, would not be able to function—and we would not need to worry any more." More seriously: Obviously, the new Russian doctrine as regards Central Europe is still being drawn up. On 20 December, a hearing entitled "Russia's Eastern Central European Relations" was held in the State Duma, to which ambassadors of 10 Eastern and Central European countries were invited. High-level officials and eminent experts analyzed what place Russia intends for these countries in its foreign policy relations. The more than three-hours-long, tough debate—which was only attended by a few Duma representatives—had a rather depressing result: These countries do not have any priority in Russian foreign policy. The first place is occupied by the so-called near abroad, namely the former Soviet republics, then Ukraine is second, the United States and Canada third, and the former allied states have been pushed back to fourth. In a more pointed formulation: Russia is hardly interested in this region in a foreign political sense.

At the same time, Russia would not like this region to come within the West's sphere of interest (as President Yeltsin explained in Budapest in December) from either a security political or a geopolitical point of view: They do not find it at all desirable for these countries to join NATO, while, at the same time, they are also aware that Russia can no longer prevent it.

While the foreign policy experts made us understand clearly that we are not the most important countries for Russia, the views of the economists somewhat contradict this: They argue that Russia must not lose this region because these countries know, from 40 years of experience, how to maintain relations with Russia. Deputy Foreign Minister Krylov, who is responsible for our region in the Russian Government, and academician Oleg Bogomolov, who chaired the meeting and who used to be a key figure of Soviet economic science as a Council for Mutual Economic Assistance expert, said that Russia should indeed maintain its former relations in this region, at least in bilateral form if not at the former level, because the West no longer shows so much interest in Russia, partly because of the instability and partly because of inflation and the other security problems. Therefore, it seems that a fair amount of tension exists in assessing Central Europe's importance among the architects of Russian foreign, security, and economic policy.

What Can We Do in This Situation?

Russia viewed the Hungarian elections with high expectations because Hungary was the only country in the region that had managed to complete the four-year governmental cycle with one government. Regardless of whether we have positive or negative views on that government, Hungary stood out in the region because of its stability and Russia, which has constant domestic political instability, highly appreciated this. When the Socialists won the elections in May 1994, this understandably caused very positive reactions in Russia. It was felt that it would be possible to establish closer links with the Socialist government than with the previous civic or right-wing, center-right government. It also has to be honestly added here that the results of these expectations cannot be seen. They cannot be seen because very little has actually been done, apart from a few statements that were received positively—for example, our prime minister's announcement on visiting Moscow soon, ministers' statements on the great importance of the Russian market and Eastern politics, how much the emphasis has to be changed and new dimensions have to be opened, and so on. The contrast is especially large if we compare the current cycle with the previous one when almost all the ministers visited Moscow, plus the chairman of the Constitutional Court, the chairman of the Supreme Court, and the leaders of the various specialized services, all in all a great many people. Five months have passed since the inauguration of the new government but only one minister has visited Moscow, namely Industry and Trade Minister Laszlo Pal, who indeed made a very thorough visit. Visits are being postponed, canceled, and rescheduled. The Russian side feels that the number and especially the level of the visits is not the same as they would expect. Therefore, a seeming or real inner contradiction also exists here. I know that certain domestic political issues should take precedence but I believe that we must by all means pay more attention to the Russian issue. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski Resigns

LD1301115595 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1100 GMT 13 Jan 95

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] A news conference by Andrzej Olechowski started at 1200. After yesterday's announcement of the Constitutional Tribunal's ruling on the Clean Hands operation, the minister did not want to say if he intends to resign or stay. His spokesman said the minister will announce his decision at today's news conference. Our reporter Maciej Sojka is there. Has Minister Olechowski's decision been announced?

[Sojka] Minister Andrzej Olechowski has decided to resign. The reason for his resignation is not the Clean Hands operation but lack of coalition approval of his foreign policy. Minister Andrzej Olechowski interpreted the Constitutional Tribunal's ruling and interpretation in his favor, but he thinks the behavior of Prosecutor General Cimoszewicz, who yesterday talked to the media, was disgusting. The minister also said he has already asked the prime minister to release him from his duties. He [words indistinct] talked to the president, who decided to accept his resignation.

This was Maciej Sojka for the news from the Foreign Ministry.

Walesa Accepts Foreign Minister's Resignation

LD1301144095 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1400 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Finally, news just in. Several minutes ago, presidential spokesman Leszek Spalinski told Polish radio that the president will accept the resignation of Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski because he considers, Spalinski said, that Minister Olechowski should not take part in a government like that.

Byczewski To Be Temporarily in Charge of MSZ

LD1301132695 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1300 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Andrzej Olechowski said that, after his resignation from the post of foreign minister, Iwo Byczewski, the under secretary of state in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ], would temporarily be in charge of the ministry. Olechowski also said he would not accompany President Lech Walesa on his visit to the Czech Republic due to start on 17 January.

FM Cites 'Fundamental Differences' for Resigning

LD1301125795 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1245 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 13 Jan—Foreign Minister [FM] Andrzej Olechowski announced at a news conference on Friday that he resigned from Waldemar Pawlak's government. Fundamentally different opinions on foreign policy between him and the coalition and not a "clean hands" operation was the reason for his resignation. Olechowski added that President Lech Walesa has accepted his decision and said that he would not object to it.

Olechowski said that Thursday's ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal cleared him of a charge of acting dishonestly because the Tribunal ruled that officials representing the Treasury in commercial law companies and receiving payments were acting in good faith and in accordance with the commonly accepted at that time interpretation of the law. Despite this, Olechowski was not going to stay in Waldemar Pawlak's government because there were fundamental differences about foreign policy, particularly opinions about security and relations with Russia, between him and the coalition. Olechowski interpreted the lack of any comments from the Democratic Left Alliance on earlier statements by the prime minister on this matter as supportive of this opinion. "This government does not want and will not actively support Polish national interests," Olechowski said.

SLD Spokesman: Real Reason for FM Resignation

LD1301140095 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1300 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] spokesman Zbigniew Siemiatkowski told Polish radio journalists that he disagrees with the explanation given by Andrzej Olechowski, who said that fundamental differences between him and the coalition over foreign policy were the reason for his resignation from the post of foreign minister [FM]. According to Siemiatkowski, the real reason for Olechowski's decision was the forthcoming presidential campaign and his wish to become involved in this campaign as Lech Walesa's supporter or as an independent candidate.

Zbigniew Siemiatkowski admitted that Andrzej Olechowski's decision to leave the government puts Waldemar Pawlak's Cabinet in a difficult position. The SLD spokesman said that he is afraid of the president's destructive activities during another attempt to appoint a new foreign minister. He recalled that two important posts—national defense and foreign affairs ministers—are vacant.

Freedom Union Criticizes Foreign Ministry Debate

WS1201152995 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 11 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by "krzem": "UW on Foreign Policy: The Foreign Ministry Is Not a Ball in a Game"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Freedom Union [UW] appealed yesterday to the president, the prime minister,* *and Minister Olechowski to end the debate on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ].*

"The MSZ cannot be a ball on a playing field. That undermines Poland's image," warned Professor Bronislaw Geremek at a press conference. UW leaders accused the governing coalition of violating an agreement on the priorities of Polish foreign policy, "as defined since 1989 by Krzysztof Skubiszewski and then by Andrzej Olechowski." Geremek called on all parties to declare whether that agreement is still binding.

One day earlier, Andrzej Olechowski wrote to the prime minister: "The situation in which the prime minister publicly questions the policy of his minister is very peculiar in itself. The situation when a prime minister disagrees with the foreign minister on vital and sensitive issues (...) is harmful for the state and cannot continue. There cannot be any lack of clarity on these issues! (...) I believe you have an obligation to formulate your objections precisely."

Newspaper Excerpts Olechowski Letters to Pawlak

WS1201161695 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 Jan 95 p 4

["Olechowski's Letters to Pawlak"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *On Monday, 9 January, Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski sent two letters to Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak. Both were written in reply to critical remarks Pawlak made in a letter dated 5 January and in the television program "Pulse of the Day." GAZETA WYBORCZA obtained copies of both letters and decided to publish extensive excerpts—without the approval of the author or the addressee—because of the importance of public issues they refer to.*

* * *

Letter No. 1 (CC: the president, speakers, Cabinet members, members of the Foreign Affairs Commission, and speakers of both houses of parliament).

Mr. Prime Minister!

I read your letter, dated 4 January of this year (which I received on 5 January), with utmost attention. I regret you decided to disseminate it. I do not believe a public demonstration of substantial differences of opinion serves state interests.

The letter refers to two issues—my resignation and foreign policy. Regarding the first issue, I wish to state that:

—My request to resign was formulated clearly and with responsibility from the very beginning. Since 27 October 1994, the decision lay in your hands. You could have approved it either immediately after I submitted it or once it was suspended (despite claims, it was not withdrawn). You may also do so now. Calling it a "quasi-resignation" is unjust. It is also unjust to claim that the resignation is ambiguous and that I am hiding behind the shield of the president's guarantees. For the purpose of clarification, I wish to assure you that the president has never given me any guarantees. (...)

* * *

Letter No. 2 (CC: the president, speakers, and heads of the Foreign Affairs Commissions of both houses of parliament).

Mr. Prime Minister!

In the television program "Pulse of the Day" on 3 January 1995, you formulated a series of objections to my foreign policy. More criticism followed in your letter dated 4 January. The objections are as follows:

1. Lack of interest and solutions to problems related to the field of transportation infrastructure ("Pulse of the Day");

2. Wasting the opportunity for good trade relations with the East ("Pulse of the Day");

3. Causing "a huge delay on such a simple issue as effectively leading to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's visit" ("Pulse of the Day");

4. Devoting a lot of attention to contacts with the current United States administration while neglecting the Republican Party ("Pulse of the Day");

5. Launching the initiative to deploy Polish troops to Nagorny Karabakh (letter);

6. Introducing inadequate changes in the functioning of the foreign service (letters);

7. Improper proceedings in relations with some of Poland's most important partners (letter);

8. Lack of a concept for "serious involvement of the foreign service in the modernization of our economic activities in the international arena" (letter);

9. Failure to develop contemporary models of international cooperation and economic partnership (letter);

10. Insufficient personal involvement in your "attempts at establishing economic ties and regional cooperation between the states of Central and East Europe, including the Visegrad Group (letter)."

The majority of criticisms are so vague I am unable to reply. The authority of your office demands you be more precise, which I would greatly appreciate. Currently, I would like to refer to two remarks I found particularly disturbing, as to my belief they contradict a statement you had made earlier that "there were no major differences of opinion between us as far as the general objectives of our foreign policy are concerned."

One of our most important goals is to prevent a situation in the world and in Europe in which one state would feel empowered to introduce law and order in another. Poland, with its historical experience, is particularly interested that all international interventions take place only with the approval of international institutions, under their supervision, and with the employment of multinational military forces. This is the type of world order Poland should aspire to. I therefore view your protest to the suggestion that we announce our readiness to join CSCE forces in Nagorny Karabakh pending a coup d'etat as contradictory to the state of Poland and as a huge discord on one of the major objectives of foreign policy.

Mr. Prime Minister!

The situation in which a prime minister publicly undermines the policy of his minister is peculiar in itself. The situation in which the prime minister disagrees with the foreign affairs minister on such vital and important issues as the aforementioned (specifying the remaining objections may reveal further, equally fundamental discords) is harmful for the state and cannot go on. There cannot be any lack of clarity on these issues! I presented my vision of the Polish state in the "Projection of Polish Foreign Policy for 1994," which was passed in a unanimous vote by the Sejm, as well as in numerous important speeches delivered in parliament. To this day it has not been questioned by the president, the parliament, or any other major political forces. Their approval was the foundation and major strength of our foreign policy. Now that it has been undermined, there is a dire need to reach new agreements as soon as possible. I believe you have an obligation to clarify your objections and your stance on the objectives and instruments of foreign policy. A proper forum for the presentation could be, for example, the State Defense Committee.

With due regards,
Andrzej Olechowski

Oleksy: FM Resignation Serious But Not Crisis

LD1301160095 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1432 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 13 Jan (PAP)—According to Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy, it is too early to judge whether the resignation of Foreign Minister [FM] Andrzej Olechowski is a good thing. "The resignation of the foreign ministry chief is a serious matter for the state," the speaker said.

He added that the question of Olechowski's resignation has been on the agenda for at least two months. "If I remember correctly, the issues concerning differences in foreign policy appeared only recently. I could not link this entirely to the resignation," Oleksy told journalists at the Sejm today.

Asked whether there is a crisis in Waldemar Pawlak's Cabinet, he replied: "I do not think so. This is a complication, a problem, not only for the Cabinet but also for the state's foreign relations. The cabinet crisis, however, is something much more serious."

The speaker expressed hope that, with the appointment of Olechowski's successor, there will be no problems similar to those with a new minister of national defense. "It depends on various partners and decisionmakers, including President Lech Walesa, to a considerable extent. I think it would not be good if the situation in the Ministry of National Defense were repeated. It is not important who and where is right, but what complications arise," Oleksy said.

Asked whether the situation in the government could be a pretext for the president to dissolve the Sejm, Oleksy replied: "We have already said that it is not good that there are vacancies in key ministerial posts. It is not good not only internally, inside the state, but also externally. But, if it becomes a pretext for such extreme views, I would not share them. I do not think anybody would recognize it as a reason."

Demonstrators Demand End To Killing in Chechnya

LD1201202295 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Just under 1,000 people have demonstrated in Warsaw against the Russian intervention in Chechnya. They demanded that Boris Yeltsin stop the bloodshed and that the Polish and U.S. Governments condemn the aggression.

[Correspondent Marek Czunkiewicz] Chanting the slogans Freedom for Chechnya and Stop the killing, the demonstrators marched through the streets of Warsaw. They did not succeed in handing in a letter to President Clinton at the U.S. Embassy. No Polish Government representative came out to meet them, either, so KPN Chairman Leszek Moczulski jumped over the enclosure of the Office of the Council of Ministers to take a letter to the prime minister.

Later, at the Russian Embassy, the demonstrators lit candles for those killed in Chechnya.

[Begin Ali Ramzan Ampukajew recording, official representative of the president of Chechnya, identified by caption, in Russian with superimposed Polish translation] Dear brother Poles, the Chechens will never become the slaves of any empire, of any imperialism, I assure you. [end recording]

[Czunkiewicz] The demonstration was organized by the Poland-Chechnya Committee, right-wing parties, and the Independent Union of Students. Solidarity trade unionists also joined the demonstrators.

President Walesa Receives Belgian Prime Minister

LD1301105195 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1005 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 13 Jan—President Lech Walesa on Friday received Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, who is paying an official visit to Poland.

Welcoming the guest, the president spoke of prospects for "one economic Europe" and security on our continent. Lech Walesa said that Poland's "strong wish" is to join the European Union and NATO as soon as possible. He added that Poland is aware of existing differences in standards.

"We want stability in Europe, but we know that there are opportunities that, if not seized, might not happen again", Walesa said.

Walesa Interviewed on Pawlak, Sejm, Election

WS1201144595 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 14 Jan 95 p 3

[Interview with President Lech Walesa, by Janina Paradowska and Jerzy Baczynski; place and date not given: "Someone Else's Mistakes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [POLITYKA] Mr. President, would you like Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak to resign?

[Walesa] We have harmed Prime Minister Pawlak. When he assumed office, I said that the situation in Poland would become too difficult for him to handle. Indeed, it is more difficult than he can handle. Because he is a young politician, he should not be harmed anymore. He should be allowed the possibility of taking some kind of leave. In this period, someone else would be in charge of things in the country. This is my opinion, and there is no malice meant. The situation is simply very complex, and he lacks the necessary experience. If I had the right to recall the prime minister, which I once had, Waldemar Pawlak would not have been prime minister for half a year.

[POLITYKA] Exactly what do you accuse the prime minister of?

[Walesa] There are many things I accuse him of. First and foremost, failure to make decisions, negligence, delays. There are issues that cannot wait, such as the appointment of the police chief. We have not gotten over this affair yet. Services responsible for order are still in disarray, and I doubt whether the situation will change—under the leadership forced by the prime minister. This is only an example. There are many such issues, also economic ones, such as privatization or foreign credits.

[POLITYKA] Do you think Kwasniewski, for instance, would be a better prime minister?

[Walesa] I am not meddling in internal affairs of the coalition, nor am I saying that it should be Kwasniewski. I do know, however, that, within the present coalition, there are people who are more energetic and who could do more for Poland.

[POLITYKA] For a couple of weeks now, we have seen a new war in high places, and a fairly fierce war at that. It was you who declared this war on the governing parties. This is how politicians and observers evaluate it. Has it really turned into a war yet, or are are witnessing only minor skirmishes?

[Walesa] The problem is more profound than your question seems to suggest. I have agreed to lead Poland through a period of the most difficult reforms, even though I realize that many people do not particularly like me as president. I do not always like myself, either. I can see, however, how the reforms are progressing. Therefore, as I have often said, I must provoke, encourage, irritate, and disturb people whenever my view of the situation tells me that things are not going well. For those who have a different vision of the presidency, it is a war in high places. For me it is the necessity of reforming and seeking answers to many questions. What would the situation be now if we already had a new constitution and my place were occupied by a malicious person, someone who is not a reformer? I must make evaluations, point to weak spots, so that we can be safe in the future. There is not enough understanding for that. Everyone believes that I am doing all this just to protect my post and my position before the elections. This is not true. I have devoted the best 25 years of my life to building a new Poland. Whenever I see that this building is not going very well, I try to correct it. I am surprised by great intellectuals who are hollering that we have democracy in Poland today. My practical experience tells me that we can talk about democracy when there is a chance to implement the best ideas. Today we have a strong parliamentary majority and the best ideas are rejected. Is this democracy? It is democracy without results. It can also be called a dictatorship of the majority. This democracy does not make sense, and I am trying to correct it.

[POLITYKA] We do not understand you, Mr. President. This is what the democratically elected Sejm and the governing majority are for. They should implement their programmatic ideas. What is dictatorial about that?

[Walesa] If we follow this line of reasoning, we can say that the minority can peacefully go home, not sit in the parliament, because even if it has good ideas the majority will reject them.

[POLITYKA] In four years' time the minority may win the elections and put its own ideas into effect.

[Walesa] Do we have so much time that we can afford to change the situation every four years and put right what was done badly? Society has the best conditions to develop if there is a balance, if there is a possibility to create various configurations. If there is only one jigsaw puzzle possible, it is a tragedy. Aspirations, group interests, disrespect for the law, lack of real control and real influence—all this can stand in the way of everything that is good. We should also remember that this majority, which is doing so much to seize all of the power, is not representative of the entire society.

[POLITYKA] You call it a tragedy; others call it stabilization. Poland needs it. Can this be done through cooperation, not through continual, as you say, stimulation?

[Walesa] The greatest stability is in the cemeteries. We can choose such stability as well. We all want our time in history, the good situation for Poland, to be used to full advantage, so that reforms will not be undone and tragedies will be averted. I predict that, unless we say no to the present inaction, the evolution, which has been under way since 1989, will have to turn into a revolution. If we continue wasting the effects of economic growth for subsidizing enterprises that can no longer be subsidized, and when we run out of banks for sale, then in three or four years the people who do not benefit from the reforms will start a revolution. I can see this revolution already, and this is why I am protecting the country from a tragedy waiting to happen. Hence my earlier response.

[POLITYKA] Earlier response, meaning what?

[Walesa] I want to show that we are wasting the achievements of the four years of reforms.

[POLITYKA] The accomplishments of the four years of reforms can also be wasted if we implement your proposal: smaller taxes, bigger expenditures. This is what your recent vetoes seem to suggest. I must also mention your declaration that you will pay lower taxes, which you called on others to do as well.

[Walesa] Let us be precise. I did not call on anyone to do that. I merely expressed my attitude toward the way taxes were imposed. I said that people should act in line with the law. As for my vetoes, I said clearly that for the past three years I agreed to decisions that harmed the people because I counted on the reforms, which were to offset those harms. I cannot continue to support harmful decisions if there are no reforms or if reforms are being slowed down. Perhaps it is bad that this has happened now that another political option is in power because this is interpreted as a malicious move. However, this is not malice. This reflects my experience from this presidency.

[POLITYKA] During your meeting with the coalition, Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko often asked you whether in such a situation you would lead the reforms and whether you would want to speed them up. You did not reply. Vetoing laws and sending them to the Constitutional Tribunal will not speed up anything. It will only cause greater disorder.

[Walesa] Here is my reply to Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko: OK, but I am asking for a presidential system. In a situation in which Kolodko wants to use me to settle his own and the coalition's affairs, I cannot allow myself to be used. He offers me solutions that I do not agree with, such as higher taxes. I believe that the taxes should be lower because the lower the taxes, the greater the chance to stimulate people's capabilities and energy. The offered proposals are a continuation, whereas I say that we need a new, strong impetus. Incidentally, please note one thing: I proposed that more money be earmarked for the public sector. The money should guarantee those people a salary increase, in real terms. I constantly heard that this was impossible because there were no funds. Then, all of a sudden, within just a few hours, it turned out that the funds were there and that an agreement was signed with trade unions. Now, this is what I wanted all along. I wanted a real salary increase in this sector.

[POLITYKA] The "Strategy for Poland" envisions steps indispensable for the reforms, such as a change in the method of valorization of pensions. You have already announced that you will defend the old system, which, according to experts, must go bankrupt anyway.

[Walesa] First the people must be persuaded that these new solutions are acceptable. Because this has not been done, it should be remembered that neither Walesa nor Kolodko will impose on the people solutions they will not accept.

[POLITYKA] You can see a chance in your own program of giving national wealth to the people. You returned to this concept recently. Do you intend to present the concept in greater detail, so that everyone will know what it is about and what it may cause?

[Walesa] I have not done this so far. I did not try to set up a political base because I thought it is primarily the government that should work out economic concepts and that all I could do is correct them. However, if things continue the way they are going, I will have to work out a clear program and secure the possibility of implementing it. The people must feel that the reforms are benefiting them.

[POLITYKA] Reverting to your current conflict with the coalition, how long do you think it is possible for a state to function when its supreme authorities are not cooperating with each other?

[Walesa] It would be dangerous if the conflicts destroyed something, if they drove people into the streets. There is no such threat now. Of course, this cannot last too long. Someone is going to make a few mistakes, and they will be used to set things in order. We are waiting for the mistakes. However, nothing dangerous is going to happen, and no one is going to risk the interests of Poland. This will certainly not happen as far as I am concerned. The final moment is drawing near. However, no matter what happens, there will be no danger to the people or to the interests of the state.

[POLITYKA] We gather, then, that you are not worried about the situation, in which respect for the law is decreasing, in which we are becoming accustomed to what is elegantly called "balancing on the border of the law," in which the government has increasingly fewer ministers, and in critical ministries at that, and in which the Sejm has a premonition that it will soon be illegally dissolved.

[Walesa] Let us not get confused. Do we have a legal state right now? Well, we have a state of lawyers, and the key is to interpret the law. The same developments could be interpreted quite differently. When I was talking about moving on the border of the law, I meant interpretations aimed at reforming the state. Others interpret the law to slow down the reforms. Neither of the interpretations violates the law, although not always. Please note how often the Sejm violates the law, which is confirmed by the verdicts announced by the Constitutional Tribunal, which the Sejm then calmly overrides. I submitted a motion requesting that the verdicts be final, so that there could be a credible higher instance whose verdicts would be binding. No one proved to me that I broke the law.

[POLITYKA] If the Sejm were dissolved, what would be your interpretation?

[Walesa] This Sejm is bad for Polish democracy because it has too big a majority. This is not good, even though the Sejm was elected democratically. This should be changed. However, no democratic principles should be violated. This is a huge dilemma for me, and I will try to combine the two.

[POLITYKA] Will you use the budget as an occasion for that?

[Walesa] We are really thinking hard whether or not to sign the budget. Incidentally, it would not be a great tragedy for the state if I did not sign the budget. This must be clearly stated to the people. The economy is run on the basis of an interim budget. The government has more room for maneuvers. It feels more free to make decisions.

[POLITYKA] It looks like you are quite close to the intention of dissolving the Sejm, even though not long ago you said that this did not make sense because the political configuration would not change much anyway.

[Walesa] Still, it would be more balanced than this one. Today the oppositional political scene is split into small portions. However, it will quickly recover and unify if conditions and goals are there.

[POLITYKA] Because you have often spoken about interpreting the law, could we assume that, if you do decide to dissolve the Sejm on the grounds of an interpretation of the law, the parliament will formulate an interpretation protecting its own interests and refuse to disband? That would humiliate us in the eyes of the international community. No one would know whether the Sejm was dissolved or not, whether it assembled on Wiejska [name of street where parliament building is] or elsewhere.

[Walesa] Once the campaign is launched, many deputies—some three-fourths—who stand a chance for reelection anyway, will begin to campaign. Even this type of solution, if only hypothetical, is not dangerous because all reasonable forces and what I tell the nation if the time comes will prove I am right. And if anybody assembles in Sala Kongresowa [largest concert hall in Warsaw], it poses no danger.

[POLITYKA] Because it is currently a common practice to hypothesize about the future, let us deduce the following scenario from what you say. You decide to dissolve the parliament in the hope that some of the deputies will approve of that decision and that it will be impossible to chose their successors from election tickets. Thus, the Sejm no longer meets the constitutional requirement of having 460 deputies and ceases to be legitimate. It may also happen that, for instance, one of the parties decides that all of its deputies will give up their seats, in which case the requirement of 460 seats is also not met.

[Walesa] There are so many solutions to choose from that it would not be difficult to select one. The basic problem is different: What is in the interests of the state? We must first carry out an analysis and then reach a decision. A firm decision. I cannot say I will not make it, but I will certainly not be hasty.

[POLITYKA] We do hear, however, that you are seeking agreement with the coalition. You will not pester it or threaten to dissolve the parliament, and it will give up the so-called presidential ministries in return.

[Walesa] This is no trade deal and no new offer. This was agreed upon earlier. I am constitutionally responsible for internal and foreign security, as well as foreign policy, and I cannot allow these to be paralyzed. We agreed with the coalition that there are certain ministries that cannot be run by parties or become too politicized, but the government must have some influence over them. Thus, both sides agreed that ministers are nominated by the president, the coalition has its deputy ministers, but at the same time there are regulations defining the internal structures of those ministries so that one can differentiate between the political and the nonpolitical. The deputy ministers are there, but there are no statutes. This is typical for the coalition. I cannot tolerate such indecent action. Therefore, the time for making firm decisions has come.

[POLITYKA] What will you do if Longin Pastusiak is nominated as acting head of the Defense Ministry?

[Walesa] That is one of the mistakes I am waiting for.

[POLITYKA] How do you think the problem of appointing a new foreign minister can be solved after what has happened? You said you would not accept Andrzej Olechowski's resignation, and the prime minister has questioned his qualifications. Thus, further cooperation seems impossible.

[Walesa] The prime minister should never have said what he did. This is a scandal, and I do not wish to pursue it. All the political parties spoke about Minister Olechowski and the Polish foreign policy, and I did not hear anyone accuse him of mishandling Polish issues. It has become clearly visible that this chain of events is an element of political struggle and has nothing to do with opinions about the foreign minister's skills. The governing majority has come to the conclusion that it should fight the president and deprive him of his influence on foreign policy and military affairs.

[POLITYKA] You yourself, on the other hand, resort to dictate—either Okonski shall be the defense minister, or no one will.

[Walesa] That is not a dictate. I suggest we return to agreements reached many months ago and clarify problems by passing statutes. In the process of developing them, we can work out specific solutions. We agreed that the government prepare the statutes. I was ready to cooperate.

[POLITYKA] Is this a compromise on your part?

[Walesa] Yes, this is a compromise based on what I consider a very wise principle—that parties should not have control over ministries, that the ministries should remain nonpolitical.

[POLITYKA] How does Prime Minister Pawlak react to that?

[Walesa] Prime Minister Pawlak wants to be prime minister, and work is less important.

[POLITYKA] Prime Minister Pawlak wants to be prime minister, you want to be president.

[Walesa] As a matter of fact I absolutely do not want to be...

[POLITYKA] ... you will probably tell us you have to be president.

[Walesa] That is right. I have been in politics so long and taken so many blows that sometimes I have enough. Yet I devoted 25 years of my life to politics, and we did manage to achieve so much despite many dangers. I am not vain, but I now know a lot better how to handle Polish issues. Under the current conditions, leaving things as they are would be irresponsible, and that is why I will have to run in the elections. If I lose, the burden of responsibility will be lifted off my shoulders. I am convinced, however, that if I lose now I will win in the future. I will leave now to return in glory, and I will have to work for two more terms in office because, by then, a revolution is definitely bound to occur.

[POLITYKA] Do you not think that there may be better candidates for president than Lech Walesa?

[Walesa] I do believe there are better candidates. If they appear, I will vote for them myself. Right now I do not see any.

[POLITYKA] Opinion polls show that Andrzej Olechowski has a strong chance of winning the elections, but he will not run against you. Would it not be better to resign and back Olechowski?

[Walesa] If Olechowski has a strong chance and will not run against me, it is because he knows I have good ideas and solutions. Politics is not a game of mutual courtesies. If he knew I had nothing to suggest, he would probably run himself.

[POLITYKA] You are starting from a very low popularity level in the public opinion polls. If, as you claim, your current moves are not part of the campaign, what will your campaign be like?

[Walesa] First, I have not made a final decision as to whether I will run in the elections. I think I must run, but I will wait and see who the countercandidates are. I will probably start with that low threshold I have in the polls. I can assure you that, without a classic campaign carried out by the book, I am capable of convincing many people to cast their votes for me.

[POLITYKA] You have not managed to convince us in your explanations that what you are currently doing is in no way related to the presidential campaign but is only an attempt at accelerating Polish reforms. Moreover, everyone is convinced that this year will be lost for the reforms because of the presidential elections.

[Walesa] Why do you think so? After all, so much can happen. Perhaps parliamentary elections will be held, which will restore political equilibrium and cause presidential elections to be postponed for a year. There are many other solutions; therefore, one cannot think in those terms. The scenarios may prove different yet.

[POLITYKA] What are your predictions for this year?

[Walesa] Nothing bad will happen as long I am president. There will be some emotions, I will provoke, annoy, coax. I will not allow anyone to disturb the peace in this country, and I have enough strength and ideas to do that. I will stir emotions because we are currently in the process of laying down the Constitution and defining principles for the distribution of power that will be binding when we are no longer here. If we neglect anything now, we will pay a heavy price in the future.

[POLITYKA] There are various ways to learn democracy. You suggest we study it by observing the ring where wrestlers fight. We can, however, learn about democracy through dialogue, meetings, and even heated debates. Would not the second method be better at present?

[Walesa] Of course it is the better method, but you are missing one step. We should first wake people up, educate new political elites, overcome the past. And speed up reforms. Most of all, we have to involve the citizens, which is impossible if they grow more convinced that cards have been dealt from the top, everything has already been set up—for the sake of peace, which is by no means creative.

[POLITYKA] Our society clearly prefers peace to clashes between politicians.

[Walesa] I think people do not like problems to be solved behind their backs and presented only with ready-made solutions. That is my opinion.

[POLITYKA] Thank you for the interview.

Walesa Cited on Reemergence of Left, Economy

MM1201141195 Poznan GAZETA POZNANSKA in Polish 6 Jan 95 p 3

[Interview with Polish President Lech Walesa by correspondent Leszek Luczak; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Luczak] Mr. President, many politicians and many ordinary citizens believe that you are the person most responsible for the low political and economic stability in Poland today. Others, on the other hand, insist that without Lech Walesa we would already have anarchy here.

[Walesa] There are as many diverse opinions as there are people giving us their views, but it is facts that count above all else. So I will ask you to give me facts. After all, even those who are most hostile to me cannot claim that I did not protect the reforms, even though that protection cost me, among other things, my own personal popularity. Nor can anyone deny that I acted effectively to ensure that the West remit such a large part of our debt. Anyway, I will not go on listing my many initiatives here because some people will again say that Walesa is boasting again, and that is not what it is about.

You have spoken of instability. I do not believe our country is unstable, especially when seen against other postcommunist countries. If by this term you mean political skirmishes, which are bound to happen anyway, then they do not signify anything out of the ordinary. All democracies know such things and they accept them as normal. That is natural, especially if the executive power and the parliamentary power derive from the opposing sides of the political stage. Today everything takes place with a raised curtain, and everything reaches society immediately. It was in the previous system that decisions made in advance had to be expressed unanimously in a uniform manner and to a single formula. However, it is important that today, in the final calculation, even with sharp political contestations, Poland and its society should not lose out by it and that they should take place within the bounds of the law. If I make a decision, I am convinced that that decision is correct and that it should serve the good of the country and its citizens. It is normal that not all politicians should want to read it in this way and agree with me. The most important thing is to reach a judicious compromise and meet the overriding interest of the country and society.

And what about the so-called ordinary people? I am still the same man who personified all the longings and dreams the Polish people associated with the changes after 1989. For many, reality has turned out to be painful and difficult to come to terms with. By the nature of things, people tend to look for the underlying reasons. I am now being blamed for everything as the chief author of the existing state of affairs and nowadays as the executor, too—even in these areas that are outside the president's powers. Not everyone has really understood that the system has changed and that I am not like a first secretary, who could sort out and decide things by making just one telephone call. After all, there is a precise system to the separation of powers today. For example, I cannot alter a judgment passed by a court even if someone believes it is unjust. This sort of decision is within the competence of an independent judiciary power. After all, there is still the Sejm, the government, and there are local administrative powers. The letters I receive show how many Poles believe that the president can do everything because, after all, he holds the highest office in the state.

Contrary to appearances, the president's powers, as defined by the small constitution, are not as extensive as all that.

[Luczak] Nevertheless, they are not as small as you present them.

[Walesa] For the state's executive power to be effective, the president would need to have a wider range of competence. And that has nothing to do with restricting democracy. Let us look at the United States or France. Here in Poland, during the interim period, at the time when new structures are being created, the executive power should be able to make decisions more quickly and put them in practice sooner. Prolonging these processes and engaging in disputes over the decisions and the competence of the decisionmakers often serve only to damage or lose many cases that should have been sorted out quickly. I could cite many examples here.

[Luczak] Your relations with the ruling coalition are steadily deteriorating. Did you anticipate such a development of the situation when you were opening the path to power for the Left by dissolving the previous parliament before the end of its term of office?

[Walesa] The way you formulated this question could suggest that I had deliberately planned to dissolve parliament in order to prepare the way for the Left. It was not like that. Let me remind you that the dissolution of parliament was the consequence of the Sejm vote of no confidence in Hanna Suchocka's government. I would also like to recall that I had at the time attempted to persuade the Right to unite before the election. When that did not happen and when the Left entered the election with a bloc vote, the outcome could not have been any different from what it ultimately was. What did I expect at the time? I had no doubt that the main direction of the economic transformations had to be continued. A turning back to socialism is unrealistic. However, I did not foresee that the new coalition would ultimately stem the progress of economic transformations to the extent we are witnessing now, nor that the longing for a return to a centrally controlled económy would be so great. I had thought that, despite ideological differences, our cooperation on matters that are of prime importance for the country would proceed more smoothly, both in general terms and in more specific matters, that it would be possible to reach a compromise more often than actually happens. And it is not true, as some claim, that I veto parliamentary acts as a matter of principle in order to oppose the government coalition. I actually sign most of the acts. The recent ones, whose fate seemed to have affected everyone so deeply, failed to find acceptance in many public or political circles. Let me also remind you that they are at variance with the promises this very coalition made to the public.

[Luczak] You charge the government coalition with reversing the course of the reforms. But a proportion of our society does actually approve that process.

[Walesa] In 1989, carried by the wave of enthusiasm for the transformations we were starting, we perceived everything as much simpler than it really was. But before very long it turned out that difficult problems followed in the wake of the reforms, and we stumbled over them: problems on a large and small scale, problems affecting individuals and social groups who took upon themselves the burden of the transformations. The Balcerowicz Plan was a shock to many. The program of strengthening the currency and stifling inflation resulted in rapid price rises. Unprofitable enterprises were going bankrupt, and unemployment followed as a result. In this way, the price that needed to be paid for the market economy proved too high for many. In those days, I kept repeating that Balcerowicz should have had a twin brother who would have followed in his wake and eased the consequences of his actions for the people. Old structures and mechanisms were disappearing fast and so were our accustomed economic relations—for example, with the East—and the new ones we were setting up in their place, which would have given us a reasonable chance of easing the harsh consequences of the necessary reforms, took far too long to develop. Many people found themselves unprepared for the new reality and could not find their feet in it. We also made mistakes because, as I said, we were the first to take that path. Occasionally it happened that we failed to consider the people on whose behalf we were rebuilding the economy. Now and again we would make decisions that were not properly considered or passed parliamentary acts that did not match the requirements. But I think that, with such a vast scale of changes taking place, these things were inevitable and are still inevitable. Today, with the experience of the past five years, we can see the weak spots so much more clearly. We know that, if the reforms are to succeed to the very end, their sense must be understood by the public. Then people can agree to sacrifices much more easily. That is why reforms must never be introduced regardless of the people they are to affect and with no consideration of their expectations—as it were, above them and in the name of some higher future goals. I also believe that much can be done for the success of the reforms at the lower levels. Not all of the decisions and initiatives that could help people bear the hardships of the necessary changes need be generated centrally. Much depends also, for example, on the local self—government system, so that difficult situations can be eased. I am thinking here about such things as, say, unemployment, the creation of new jobs, and so on.

Generally speaking, I believe that the work of reforming the country should progress faster, but it is necessary that, along the way, safety systems be provided for the weakest. Every decision must be made after much deliberation so that we can avoid situations whereby we swiftly do away with the old schemes before we come up with a concept for the new ones. As an example, we could quote here such things as the state farms.

[Luczak] In any country with a market economy, the most influential and authentic power center is to be found with big business. As recently as two or three years ago, Polish entrepreneurs concentrated around the Liberal group made it obvious that they supported you as president. How would you assess your relationship with the business class today?

[Walesa] I am fully aware that it is not possible to build a market economy without capital—that is, without the business class. I appreciate its role in this process. At the Christmas meeting I held with Polish businessmen, I emphasized the significance of that particular group. After all, there is no way to ensure increasing wealth for the whole society other than by encouraging private enterprise. Consequently, if we want to go on developing our economy, more and more will depend precisely on Polish businessmen—on their business acumen and their ideas on how to ensure their firms' success, which, after all, means the success of the people they employ because, after all, not everyone can be an entrepreneur.

[Luczak] But Polish businessmen are less and less certain nowadays of what new ideas the state has in store for them....

[Walesa] For business to develop properly, we need a cohesive and stable legislation. It is hard to try to persuade people to invest and develop if there is uncertainty concerning tomorrow and if new legislative acts hold new surprises in store for us. It would also be good if people were to associate Polish business primarily with new job opportunities and good pay, rather than, say, financial fraud and a series of bankruptcies of one joint-partnership company after another. But it seems that this is yet another price we as a society have to pay as we learn our lessons in market economy. I am sure that in the course of time the frauds will be eliminated from the game. I hope they will not stand a chance in their own circles, either.

That is why I keep repeating: We need up-to-date, clear-cut legislation that will provide the framework for honest competition and for the development of business enterprise in our country. Let me remind you of the Economic Practices Charter, which was introduced under my patronage and which, among other things, attests to the fact that the president of the Polish Republic recognizes the role played by businessmen in the economic transformations taking place in our country.

Polish business is still at the start of its career. That is why I take every opportunity to encourage foreign entrepreneurs to invest in Poland, too.

[Luczak] It has been reported and is sometimes quoted in our part of the country that you are not particularly fond of the Wielkopolska Region.

[Walesa] If this is so, I do not understand why. I have never rated Poles depending on the region where they live, and I have no idea at all why such an opinion could have arisen. I must have visited the Wielkopolska Region even more frequently than other parts of the country, and I am full of admiration for your people for their traditional industriousness, good husbandry, and successes in very many fields—the development of local self-government structures, for example. These traits are one of the reasons I have always been so glad to visit here. So I cannot really treat the above charge seriously.

For the new year I wish all Wielkopolska citizens much good luck, many successes, and the realization of their dreams.

Tribunal Declines To Examine Walesa Tax Motion

LD1201143695 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After a half-hour deliberation, the Constitutional Tribunal announced a break in the discussion on the tax law for this year. Stanislawa Stec reports:

[Stec] Let me remind you what is contained in the tribunal's ruling concerning leading state officials. [passage omitted]

The other interpretation of the Tribunal provided in response to a motion by the civil rights ombudsman concerns a matter that is very important to those who have had accounts in banks covered by the State Treasury guarantees. The tribunal has ruled that, when cash payments by such banks are suspended, the State Treasury is under an obligation to pay out savings to account holders without delay. If a bank is officially declared bankrupt and the receiver is not willing to pay, it is also up to the State Treasury to honor the obligation, but this concerns only savings and not the interest incurred after the bank's bankruptcy. According to the tribunal, this arises from the principle of respect for law.

After the break, the tribunal decided that it did not think it possible to examine the president's extended motion with regard to the tax law because the president has only seven days, if he declines to sign the law, from the moment the law is passed to appeal. The seven-day deadline passed three weeks ago. Consequently, the tribunal will examine only the housing tax allowances.

Let me remind you that the president's motion concerned the freezing of allowances covering the construction or purchase of apartments—that is, the fact that they remained at the 1994 level of 511 million old zlotys. According to the president, who is being represented at the tribunal by Professor Lech Falandysz, this undermines the coherence of the law and its credibility. Also, the way it was announced proves that the law has been applied in a retroactive manner. This has been questioned by the tribunal many times before. [passage omitted]

Pawlak Says Tax Ruling Solves 'Emotional Doubts'

LD1301101195 Warsaw PAP in Polish 2359 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Warsaw, 12 Jan—According to Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, the 12 January ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal on the 1995 tax law solves "very emotional doubts" this law had caused.

Pawlak, who was the guest of the evening news bulletin (TVP 1), stressed that the tax rates were established by the law, which is the procedure required by the Constitution. According to the prime minister, it was not the government's or parliament's will to implement the law in this way but the fact that there were "widely known procedural problems."

The prime minister stressed that, when making the decision on tax rates, the government and parliament faced the choice of going back to old rates or maintaining higher ones for social reasons. "The parliament decided that higher rates are justified because of the social policy requirements that are financed from the budget," the prime minister said. [passage omitted]

Officials Must Return Money Paid by Companies

LD1201151195 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1337 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 12 Jan—According to Justice Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, top civil servants who received money for sitting on [boards of] companies that are co-owned by the Treasury should react appropriately and voluntarily return the money. "If people had doubts about the position of the law, they should not have any now," Cimoszewicz said on 12 January.

The interpretation presented by the Constitutional Tribunal confirmed clearly all conclusions and assessments that I presented on this matter, Cimoszewicz said. "Both the text of the ruling and its interpretation contain the same statements as my opinion, which I presented to the Tribunal at the time."

Military Poll on State Security, NATO, Reforms

WS1301122995 Warsaw GAZETA POLSKA in Polish 12 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by "P.B.": "The Army Also Wants To Join NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The majority of officers in the Polish Army are in favor of joining the North Atlantic Treaty and consider Russia the greatest military threat to Poland's security.

A poll carried out by the Military Institute of Sociological Research points to the widespread belief that military threats to Poland will continue to grow until the year 2000. The main source of those threats is the situation in Russia: Three-fourths of the military said Russia poses a danger to Poland, and 79 percent of those polled even stated that Russia intends to return to its empire policy (the poll was carried out before the conflict in Chechnya broke out). Eighty percent of the Polish Armed Forces cadres are for Poland's membership in NATO. This means that four-fifths of officers wish to break off with the tradition of the Polish People's Republic Army. This is hardly surprising inasmuch as, over the past year, the number of officers claiming that threats to state security are growing has increased almost twofold (44 percent in 1993, 77 percent in 1994).

The military is critical of the Partnership for Peace program because it believes it serves the interests of the United States, West Europe, and Russia, but not those of Poland. Only one in 10 respondents thinks participation in the project serves the interests of the Visegrad Group. Joining Partnership for Peace is no guarantee that Poland will be accepted into NATO, claims the military reasonably.

Despite a widespread belief that military threats are growing, the officers consider economics and politics a far more serious threat to the nation's sovereignty. In comparison with last year's results, the feeling that Germany poses a threat fell (from 76 to 51 percent), yet our western neighbor is still viewed as an economic challenge.

As many as 79 percent of those polled expressed positive opinions on Polish participation in NATO's military missions. Only 5 percent would agree to engage the Army in combating organized crime—for example, international drug rings.

According to the military, retaining a nonpolitical character by the Army causes acclaim for it to grow. The poll shows that officers wish the Army was excluded from internal political wrangles. Only 28 percent declared a will to defend constitutional order in the Republic of Poland. The cadres' spirits have risen as compared with the late 1980's: As many as 80 percent of officers claim the Army deserves respect. The cadres are very critical of current attempts at reforming the Armed Forces. More than 90 percent of officers acknowledge the need for restructuring and modernizing the Army, yet a mere 14 percent approve of the methods by which reforms are implemented.

OECD Requirements on Foreign Investments Viewed

95EP0031A Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 152, 20 Dec 94 p 1

[Article by Tadeusz Lamacz: "Closer to Membership in the OECD"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The question of Poland's membership in the OECD has long ceased to be paid mere lip service. At present, specific objectives are being accomplished with a view to our entry in 1996. By the spring of 1995, we are expected to present in Paris a report on the liberalization of capital transactions in our country. This concerns chiefly reviewing the existing regulations from the standpoint of adherence to the principle of not discriminating against foreign investors, a fundamental principle of that organization.*

The status of such liberalization in Poland will be greatly affected by the provisions of the new foreign exchange law to take effect on 31 December 1994. But that law itself cannot be implemented until the minister of finance issues an executive order concerning general foreign exchange permits. As known, a requirement for membership in the OECD is convertibility of the zloty as construed by Article VIII of the Statute of the IMF. Hence, the above-mentioned law and executive order will bring us closer to the OECD insofar as they broaden the scope of convertibility of the zloty. This concerns in particular broadening the possibilities for the free exportation of hard currencies.

From the course so far of OECD-Poland negotiations, it ensues that the discriminatory nature of our legislation (as interpreted by the West) is due chiefly to the restrictions on the transfers of funds deriving from the liquidation of investments, the possibility of blocking the funds of foreign entities (with the object of protecting the balance of payments), the constraints on borrowing and granting foreign credit, the inability of domestic entities to invest freely abroad, and the requirement of applying for permits to perform minor capital transfers (such as legacies, bequests, debt settlements, savings, etc.). In addition, the OECD insists on the liberalization of the sector of financial services as well as on granting foreigners considerable freedom in purchasing land and real estate. In the latter case, not just real estate purchases are concerned but also engaging in real-estate brokerage activities. Last, there is the open question of the participation of foreign investors in the privatization of state enterprises; it is worth noting that the OECD merely recommends such participation without requiring it.

It would be a mistake to interpret the OECD's reservations as a dictate imposed by stronger countries desirous of subordinating to themselves the market of the weaker partner. In practice, there exist many limitations on liberalization. For example, while Germany admits the possibility of farmland purchases by foreign nationals, it requires that they provide proof of their farming qualifications. This requirement, while not conflicting with the OECD's liberalization code, in practice eliminates investments of this kind in the FRG. Similar solutions are also possible in this country. The OECD's liberalization clauses are sufficiently general to warrant in practice, when such need arises, for a country to attend to its national interests without risking a breach of the accepted international order.

The process of attaining membership in the OECD requires determining the extent to which the reciprocal concessions within the framework of the European Union, with which we are associated, should be extended to all of the OECD countries. In solving this problem, we may lean on the precedent of Mexico, which has the combined status of membership in the OECD and NAFTA. That country has extended to all of the highly industrialized countries the rebates and concessions applied in the zone of free trade with the United States and Canada.

The process of negotiations with the OECD, and, in this connection, the review of restrictions on capital flow and direct investments, is of huge disciplinary importance to our country. The OECD imposes a specific pace of solutions and requires a more precise definition of the instruments employed to guide investments. This is aimed against the practice of delays in decisionmaking, which has taken root in the era of centralism and which weakens accountability. Furthermore, this is an opportunity for competent, decisive, and farsighted individuals.

Minister Calls for Closer Ties With U.S.

AU1301123495 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 9 Jan 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Mircea Cosea, minister of state and president of the Economic Coordination, Strategy, and Reform Council, by Liana Simion; place and date not given: "We Do Not Make Enough Use of the U.S. Administration's Political Opening Toward Our Country"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Simion] Mr. Minister of State, you will head our country's official delegation to the White House International Conference on Trade and Investments in Central and East Europe, which will take place in Cleveland (United States) between 12 and 13 January. What, in your opinion, is the significance of this conference?

[Cosea] The conference is the outcome of the promise made by U.S. President Bill Clinton during his visit to Warsaw. He said there that the United States should become more involved in the economic recovery of the countries undergoing a period of transition. The conference was scheduled for the end of 1994. However, for reasons unknown to me, it was postponed to January 1995. The conference, which will take place under the aegis of the White House and the patronage of President Bill Clinton, is directly organized by the U.S. Department for Trade.

In this connection, invitations were sent to the countries in Central and East Europe. In practical terms, the invitation was addressed to an official person, who was then entitled to set up the delegation of the respective country. However, our country's delegation was not put together only by me, in this office, as certain newspapers have claimed. I do not have the moral right to proceed in that way. Since each delegation represents an entire country, it should be set up in accordance with certain criteria, which I received from the U.S. officials. Those criteria stipulate that the delegation should consist of three categories of invited people: a group of officials, a group of businessmen from private firms, and a group of representatives of state-owned companies with big joint investment projects recently endorsed by their U.S. partners.

This conference has a particular significance for Romania. There was a period when the West's relations with our country were partially clouded. We are not a country that enjoys the greatest favors from the West. The Visegrad Group states have enjoyed greater attention from the West, more or less openly. Romania is labeled as a country with problems. The change that has taken place in the Western media's perception of our country, as of 1994, has become quite visible.

The number of individuals included in the delegation was increased from 15 to 28 persons by the U.S. side—which is yet another proof of the importance attached to us. The Ernst & Young consulting company endorsed nine basic projects and five supplementary projects of big and important investments in infrastructure, industry, environment, agriculture, health, and energy. We worked extremely well with the U.S. officials during the preparations for the conference, either through the State Department or through the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest and the direct contribution of new U.S. Ambassador Alfred Moses.

I think participation in this conference is quite an event, in the light of the new climate currently prevailing in relations between the United States and Romania.

Secretary for Trade Ronald Brown Will Have Talks With Romania's Delegation

[Simion] Have you any indications that, aside from the protocol side, the conference will also facilitate various direct meetings, which are so important for businessmen?

[Cosea] The conference is conceived in a specifically American style, with protocol meetings reduced to the minimum. [passage omitted] President Bill Clinton will deliver a speech on 13 January, during a working dinner. However, no meetings between the U.S. President and the delegations of Central and East Europe are scheduled to take place. On the other hand, we are informed that Commerce Secretary Ronald Brown will have talks with several delegations, including the Romanian one.

We Should Approach Our Economic Relations With the United States in a More Realistic Manner

[Simion] Do you think that this meeting, which is devoted to trade and investments, will have a definite impact on the Romanian economy in the medium and long run?

[Cosea] I am convinced of it. I think we should approach our economic relations with the United States in a more realistic manner. Romania has interests in all parts of the world. We signed the association accord with the Common Market, but we should give a certain priority to our economic ties with the United States, the strongest country in the world, with an advanced technology and a market economy that can be an example for us to follow. I believe that we do not yet make enough use—for objective or sometimes unexplainable reasons—of this political opening of the U.S. Administration toward our country. We should strive to capitalize on the existing opportunities in the sphere of economic relations. Our exports have not increased up to our expectations, after most-favored-nation [MFN] status was granted to us. I am convinced that Romania's presence at this conference will draw attention to the investment potential represented by our country. We go to Cleveland prepared for this meeting. The Romanian private companies and the private companies with U.S. capital operating in Romania are prepared to submit important projects for discussion. Our government is duty-bound to support the Romanian companies invited to the conference. As for us officials, we also come prepared, with projects of major interest for the reform process—particularly in the sphere of the recovery of the energy system in Romania, infrastructure, housing, health care, and environment. Another program has to do with increasing agricultural production and modernizing the distribution of agricultural products. When we find additional sources of financing, the U.S. technology and business mentality will contribute to the development of the Romanian economy.

We Must Project a More Open and Much More Attractive Image in the United States

[Simion] In view of your experience as minister of state and president of the Reform Council, how do you assess the evolution of Romanian-U.S. ties in the coming period?

[Cosea] I am extremely optimistic in this respect, because the relations between Romania and the United States are bound to improve further. I am not in a position to make suggestions about what should be done vis-a-vis Romania, but it is my duty to say that we must project a more open and much more attractive image in the United States. This means simplifying the way in which investments are being made in Romania, and it also means making real progress in the sphere of legislation—that is, the law on bankruptcy, the law on competition, and the rapid adoption of the law on accelerating privatization. Generally speaking, we should develop a more relaxed conceptual attitude, comparable to the U.S. procedure in the sphere of investments or credits. U.S. economic and financial capacity is huge, but the most impressive thing is the very open mentality they have in the sphere of business, which the Europeans sometimes find it hard to understand—particularly us Romanians—in the current stage of transition. The U.S. experience should drive away our terrible fear of figures with many zeros.

[Simion] Are you referring to money?

[Cosea] Of course! What appears to be a lot of money for us, is very little for the United States. This change in the relationship between the United States and Romania can also lead to changes in our mentality, as a result of the cooperation with a country where the market economy has reached a development stage close to perfection.

Article Summarizes 'Scandal' Splitting UDMR

AU1201211695 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 9 Jan 95 p 3

[Report by Andra Aurora Manta: "UDMR on the Verge of Splitting"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Saturday [7 January] in Cluj, in the halls of the Hungarian-language state opera, the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] celebrated, in a very strained atmosphere, the fifth anniversary of its founding. It was a cheerless ceremony because in contrast to the UDMR's five-year past—throughout which it has consistently acted as a disciplined, monolithic party without any major fissures—now it is on the verge of splitting. The scandal that principally endangers the unity of the UDMR was generated by the controversial personality of Reformed Bishop Laszlo Tokes, the honorary chairman of the UDMR.

The Core of Discontent: Laszlo Tokes

Accused by several publications of having been a Securitate collaborator, Tokes has kept denying these allegations over a long period of time. The publication of the "collaboration pledge" signed by Tokes with the Securitate has not affected the leaders of the UDMR—who, surprisingly enough, stated that they do not believe a word of the things revealed by the press.

On 15 December 1994, during a news conference held in the city of Timisoara, Laszlo Tokes declares that "the diversion by means of which they are trying to make me look like a Securitate agent is one of the harshest,"—but, paradoxically, he promptly adds that "hundreds of thousands of people wrote hundreds of thousands of declarations (...) and I have never denied that I have written declarations, the way all my colleagues did."

The Letter of a UDMR Deputy Accusing Laszlo Tokes Splits the UDMR Into Two Camps

On 20 December Benedek Nagy, a Chamber of Deputies member on behalf of the UDMR, formerly a political prisoner detained for five years at the Aiud prison, sends a letter to each UDMR parliamentarian, entitled: "Not Every One of Us Is Guilty." In his letter Nagy vehemently criticizes the casual way in which Tokes admitted that he had worked for the Securitate beginning in 1975, and strongly protests Tokes' Timisoara statement, as it implies that, actually, "every ethnic Hungarian used to be a Securitate collaborator."

"Money worth tens and hundreds of thousands of lei originally intended for the ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania living under the miserable circumstances of pressure and discrimination was secretly rerouted and vanished into thin air," the letter also says. In other words, it accuses the UDMR chairman of being an accomplice in an embezzlement affair.

Benedek Nagy's letter unleashes a genuine storm among the UDMR parliamentarians, who immediately split into two camps: one favoring Tokes; one opposing him.

After the bishop refuses to meet certain deputies to offer them explanations, nine of them—including Imre Andras, Sandor Konya Hamar, Zsolt Szilagyi, and Imre Borbely—sign another letter, which was sent exclusively to the eight members of the UDMR steering body, in which they ask that body to take a position against Nagy, "against the situation created within the UDMR due to the thoughtless letter" of Nagy. They set a 5 January deadline.

Laszlo Tokes Accuses the SRI of Having Staged the Entire Scandal

On 27 December in Cluj the UDMR Executive Presidium holds a six-hour explanation session with Tokes. The UDMR leaders ask Tokes to withdraw from political life for a while. During the session, which eventually degenerates into a brawl, the idea emerges that a former Securitate informer cannot be honorary chairman of the UDMR.

In reply, Tokes publishes in [the 4 January issue of] the daily ROMANIA MAGYAR SZO a letter entitled "In the Claws of the Securitate." "My moral and political annihilation is also directed against the ethnic Hungarian community and the UDMR," asserts Tokes. In his opinion "the Securitate, alias the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] is the absolute master of the entire situation"—that is, the SRI is the genuine initiator of the scandal that is threatening to demolish the UDMR.

At the same time UDMR Chamber of Deputies member Imre Borbely sends an open letter to the Hungarian national news agency in which he vehemently criticizes Benedek Nagy.

Laszlo Tokes Wins at Miercurea Ciuc But Loses at Cluj

In Miercurea Ciuc the local branch of the UDMR, following a 10-hour debate, which in the opinion of a local observer took place "the usual way Communist meetings did in the old days," excludes Nagy from its membership, under charges that he had tried "to discredit the UDMR's honorary chairman and sought to instigate a split in the UDMR."

Parallel to this in, Cluj Bela Marko, Attila Verestoy, Gyorgy Tokay, Csaba Takacs, Zoltan Dezsi, Gyorgy Csavossy, and Barna Bodo—that is, the members of the UDMR's Operative Council—hold a 12-hour discussion with Tokes. Verestoy and Tokay lead the hostilities against Tokes, who had imperiously demanded that the UDMR leadership take harsh measures against any party member who dares to contest his personality. Eventually Tokes loses the battle: the council requests the Ciuc local branch to suspend the expulsion of Benedek Nagy until the ethics committee of the party examines and draws up a report on his case.

The Former UDMR Chairman Accuses the Current Leadership

Following the symposium organized in Cluj to mark the party's fifth anniversary—on which occasion Bela Marko presented a document entitled "The UDMR Concept of Autonomy"—a celebration took place at the Hungarian-language opera house in that city. During this event, Geza Domokos, the former chairman of the UDMR, declared in front of the more than 500 party members attending the celebration that not a few of the party members have withdrawn from the UDMR because they feel the union has not fulfilled its most important pledges and that the defensive policy it is conducting is impulsive and lacks flexibility. Domokos also said that for the time being, the self-determination model is, unfortunately, impossible to achieve.

The President of Hungary Calls for Reconciliation, But the Scandal Continues

In a message sent by Hungarian President Arpad Goncz, the UDMR is requested to protect its own unity and "cherish it as the apple of your eye."

"It is to the historic merit of the UDMR that thus far its actions and projects have been dominantly thoughtful," says Goncz's message.

The Hungarian president also asserts that "mutual reconciliation is the sole alternative." However, Laszlo Tokes made the crowd freeze by saying that "the UDMR has nothing to celebrate" as long as its honorary chairman is under attack. Thus, the scandal is far from being settled, and the split between the so-called "radicals" and "moderates" is more obvious than ever.

Liberal Leader Expects UDMR To Break Up

AU1301104995 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 10 Jan 95 p 3

[AMPress report: "We Are Waiting for the UDMR To Break Up"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Referring to the presence of a liberal grouping within the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], Dinu Patriciu, leader of the PL '93 [Liberal Party '93], said: "We have known for a long time that there is such a grouping. It is called the Liberal Circle. We have close links with its members. To be honest, we are waiting for the UDMR to break up. We think the Hungarians in Romania will be able to defend their rights only if they are incorporated into political groups based on political doctrines, and not ethnic grounds. We have received signals to the effect that there are certain UDMR members who have already understood this. When the UDMR breaks up, we will see to it that the Hungarian liberals are brought into our party. I am sure that others will take care of the Christian-democrats, social- democrats, socialists, and others."

UDMR Sees Articles as Seeking To Divide It

AU1301104895 Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian 9 Jan 95 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Attacks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a communique sent to AMPress for publishing, the UDMR Operational Council states that it has noted that "Lately, the attacks against the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] and its dignitaries have intensified with the clear purpose of dividing the UDMR, imbuing distrust in its leaders, troubling the public, alienating the Union from the Hungarian community in Romania that it represents, and obstructing the assertion of the Union's policy of autonomy.

We think it is absolutely necessary for our central bodies, provincial organizations in provinces, and local organizations to work with maximum political and moral responsibility in order to unflinchingly implement the uniform program of the UDMR.

The Operational Council believes that the articles published in the Romanian press against the UDMR Honorary President have a diversionist purpose and considers that Bishop Laszlo Tokes has already answered, in written form, all issues in question."

Party Officials Reject Exclusion of PL '93

AU1201212095 Bucharest COTIDIANUL in Romanian 10 Jan 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "It Is Not Possible That PL '93 Should Be Excluded From the CDR"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Referring to the debate on the PL '93's [Liberal Party '93] disputed membership in the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], as well as to the request of Otto Weber, the chairman of the PER [Romanian Ecologist Party], to suspend the CDR membership of the young liberals, Nicolae Cerveni, chairman of the PNL-CD [National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention] told an AMPress reporter: "This proposal is bound to fail. It is inopportune, to say the least. Should it have been the case, the PNL-CD would have supported the PL '93 anyway—so it will support it even more now that the liberal protocol has been signed."

In addition to Cerveni's statement, Radu Boroianu, vice president of the PNL [National Liberal Party], pointed out: "The protocol we signed stipulates that the liberal alliance is to function within the CDR. Therefore it is not possible that the PL '93 should be excluded from the CDR. We will support the PL '93."

Dan Capatana, vice president of the PAC [Civic Alliance Party] added: "The leadership of our party has not discussed this issue. Nevertheless, I consider it unfit that now that the PNL has rejoined the CDR, the PL '93 should leave it. First we have to work out the CDR election protocol, and only afterwards can we establish whether this or that party is compatible with what we agree on."

Dinu Patriciu, leader of the political party in question, declared: "This is merely an obsession of Mr. Weber's. We are, and for the time being remain, a member of the CDR."

Paper Shortage Interpreted As Subltle Censorship

AU1201212295 Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian 6 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Ioan Margarit: "The Paper Crisis Is Political Blackmail"]

[FBIS Translated Text] True to itself, Letea Bacau, the only factory producing newsprint, has not produced anything since the beginning of this year. For three days the equipment has been under inspection, for there is no raw material anyway. According to the promises of the company managers, activity in the factory should have resumed today.

During a telephone conversation yesterday with Virgil Mireanu, commercial director of the company, he told us that in no way will activities resume. This is because the firms in charge of forestry operations in Romania, a right they won through auction, did not bother to deliver anything to the factory as promised. The forestry workers are still on vacation after the holidays.

Meanwhile, the print works and editorial offices stretch as much as they can whatever newsprint can still be found in storerooms. But there is no more paper.

The government's answer to the journalists' protests is a helpless shrug. The timber industry and the paper factory are autonomous, say officials at Victoria Palace [government headquarters]. So how come only yesterday in Resita, or in Jiu Valley before that, the executive found the saving solution in no time?

This is not a question of the autonomy of the enterprises, but a matter of clear-cut political blackmail. According to the principle that "if you do not let them die, they do not let you live," the three branches of the government reached the conclusion that they would have nothing to lose if the independent press died. Just like the previous ones, the current paper crisis is programmed. Isn't it a pity to bring the wrath of the West upon yourself by introducing censorship when, much more elegantly, you can simply deprive editorial offices of paper and leave the press to die a natural death? Well!

Army Reported Restructuring, Modernizing

Bucharest AZI in Romanian 23 Nov 94 p 13

[Unattributed article: "Restructuring and Modernization of the Romanian Army"; editor's note indicates that article was written with the help of the Army Directorate for Information and Public Relations]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Strategic Goals

To maintain an optimal defense capability on the part of Romania in keeping with the requirements of the integrated concept of national security and military doctrine.

To modernize the Armed Forces as regards their structure, appointments, instruction and equipment, in keeping with principles and criteria of effectiveness and compatibility with North Atlantic standards.

Stage of Army Reform

1. Legislation

The legislative framework needed to organize and operate Romania's military organs and to organize Romania's national defense has been worked out on the basis of the Constitution as follows:

—The draft national military doctrine, which has been forwarded for approval by the two houses of parliament, has been finalized;

—The law on national defense has been promulgated.

—The following laws are being forwarded to parliament and are at different stages of treatment: law on supplies; law on organizing Romania for defense; law on civil defense and protection; law on statutes of the military cadres.

A number of normative acts resulting from the new legislative framework have been worked out: a report on reorganizing the Romanian Army; a study on setting the size of the Romanian Army in peacetime up to the year 2000; a report on supplying the army up to the year 2000.

These documents have been subject to the approval of the Supreme Defense Council of Romania.

2. Reform of Structures

Restructuring of central organs has been concluded. Directorates with greater independence and responsibility have been established to replace certain departments.

The ministry leadership is civilian at the level of the Ministry of National Defense, and the State Secretary for Defense Policy and International Relations.

By virtue of its current duties and responsibilities, the General Staff has all categories of operative military forces under it. Staffs have been set up for the three categories of armed forces: the Land Troops staff, the Aviation and Antiaircraft Defense staff; and the Military Marines staff.

Commanders of the four armies are under the Land Troops staff. Also under this staff are the territorial troops commands.

Army Corps commands have been established.

Most of the brigade commands have been established.

New structures for the battalions (divisions) have been experimented with, via alarms, marches, applications and other military activities.

The sizes of the structures being completed or those being established for mobilization have been changed.

3. Reform in the Area of Supply

Modernization programs have been initiated in the area of aviation, antiaircraft defense, and artillery and tanks—through their own efforts and through cooperation with foreign partners. There still are financial difficulties in applying these programs.

The problem of cooperation in the area of military technology is being approached consistently in bilateral foreign contacts at the level of the ministry leadership. Initial contacts have been set up with industrialists in this sphere from the United States, England, France, Turkey and so forth.

4. Military Training

The idea of reorganizing and modernizing military training has been finalized. It should be mentioned that since 1989, the officers schools have become military institutions of higher education. The Mircea the Elder Marine Institute has become a naval academy, while the General Military Academy has become the Academy of Higher Military Studies; its former technical section become the Military Technical Academy. The Faculty of Military Medicine and the Military Sports Faculty have been reestablished.

Together with training the cadres needed for the Army within the country, up to the present approximately 162 members of the Armed Forces have been sent to military courses and schools abroad. Distributed by branch, the following is the situation of those sent to courses abroad: infantry—40; military marines—19; military aviation—23; military medicine—29; land and antiaircraft artillery—12; other branches—45.

By country, the distribution of officers who have graduated from, or who are still attending, courses is as follows: 27 in the United States; 11 in France, 26 in England; 45 in Germany; 30 in Italy; 12 in Russia.

Fewer have been, or are being, schooled at military institutions in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Israel, Turkey, Greece, Canada and Sweden.

The National Defense College, established in February 1992, has graduated three classes. This year newsmen, as well as an officer from the U.S. Army have taken courses here.

5. Restructuring of Battle Training

Structures have gone into operation for the mental, moral and cultural education of troops.

Training of military cadres has begun in order for them to meet the criteria for performance in their areas.

The increase in the number of cadres for coming years has been correlated with the Army's lesser needs and with the requirement for improving quality.

There has been a move to a new system for military training. For this purpose "The Concept for Troop-Training in the Period 1 May-31 December, 1994" has been approved as worked out by the General Staff. On the basis of this concept, the staffs of the Armed Forces categories have drawn up provisions for battle training that go into effect on 1 November 1994.

The innovative nature of the new concept lies in the fact that the 12-month military service (for land troops) is being divided into two parts: The basic training period is four months. This is being carried out on a centralized basis, with all recruits in sub-units and special units;

The period of sub-unit training is eight months. This training is provided in operational units, with the troops carrying out the jobs for which they were trained in the first period.

The frequency, complexity and quality of exercises and tactical applications have increased. Three very large tactical troop applications have taken place this year:

—the Siriu '94 application on the subject of "The Defense Operation of the Army in Crisis Situations"

—the Jubilee '94 application—of an operational-tactical nature, with a double action, on the map and in the field—by the staff. The goal of the field application carried out in the zone of responsibility of the 4th Transylvania Army was to train the commands of the big units, units and sub-units in preparing and conducting defensive and offensive battle actions in complex situations.

—the application of the Military Marines staff in Dobrogea (7-11 October 1994), called "Pontica '94", within which the following were carried out: a tactical sea exercise with a naval strike-force group; an application with battle firing in the field for the purpose of repulsing the landing of assault troops at the mouth of the Danube by the river ships and marine infantry; a Civil Defense exercise in Cernavoda with the subject being "Protection of the Civilian Population in Case of a Nuclear Accident at the Nuclear Electric Power Plant."

Conditions for hiring the military on a contract basis have been established with greater accuracy. Such military personnel is being selected with greater exactingness.

Approximately 45 percent of the army is comprised of military cadres, military personnel hired on the basis of a contract, and civilian specialists.

The program for implementing the START army transmission system has been finalized and approved. This system reduces dependence on the territorial transmission system and increases the degree of effectiveness and security of communications.

6. Social Protection

Cadres whose salaries were reduced due to reorganization are being given monetary compensation for a limited time.

Service housing is being built. Some 1,556 apartments have been put into use.

New garrison dormitories have been built, particularly to house those who have no housing.

7. Foreign Military Relations

There is firm orientation toward bringing the armies of democratic states closer together with a view to integration into the European Atlantic security structures.

The Romanian Army is participating in carrying out the duties assumed through the Charter of Paris, the CFE Treaty, the CSBMs Treaty and other agreements in which Romania is participating.

Romania has fulfilled its obligations precisely to reduce arms and number of troops in accordance with the provisions of the treaties and agreements of the CSCE that it is participating in and in conformity with the echelons established in the program.

More than 62 percent of international military relations in 1993 and 1994 were carried out with the armies of Western states and with NATO military structures.

Some 27 bilateral agreements have been concluded with the armies of other states, included in which are Turkey, Greece, the Russian Federation, the United States, England, France and so forth.

To date, the Romanian Army has concluded agreements with the armies of Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria, Moldavian Republic, neighboring countries.

The "Open Sky" agreement concluded with Hungary is developing under good conditions.

Through the ties with the armies in neighboring countries, we are seeking to create and maintain a climate of friendship, faith and clarity that should contribute to maintaining and consolidating security and stability in central and eastern Europe.

8. The Partnership for Peace

The main direction of action in foreign relations in the military sphere has been the steps to create conditions for integration into the military structures of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The Document To Introduce Romania into the Partnership for Peace and the Individual Partnership Program have been finalized. These documents have been agreed upon with the structures of NATO leadership and approved by Romania's Supreme Council for Defense.

Romania's Individual Partnership for Peace Program officially went into effect on 14 September 1994, in a ceremony in Brussels.

This year Romania had a campaign hospital moved to Somalia for humanitarian action under UN sponsorship. The hospital returned to Romania on 26 October 1994.

It got very good evaluations from the peacekeeping forces and the civilian population in the area.

Romania's Army was represented in peacekeeping applications and exercises, exchanges of observers in activities in other countries, and various missions carried out in conformity with the Individual Partnership Program.

Three peacekeeping batallions are being trained in the Army, in garrisons in Bucharest (this one is already operational), Timisoara and Iasi.

In September, a peacekeeping batallion participated with valuable platoon troops in a joint application in Poland. Romania participated with a military vessel in the joint Breeze '94, application on the Black Sea. It also participated in the joint Maritime '94 Sea Partner application, on the Black Sea.

Following the end of the Gulf War, starting in April 1992, Romania participated annually with seven military observers, as follows: Three on the UNIKOM Staff; Four on the observation and patrol bases.

9. Conclusions

Consistent with its reform program, the Army is being restructured, along with training for battle and maintaining its combat capabilities. The Army carries out the domestic and foreign military policy of the Romanian state.The main measures have been established and are being applied to conclude the first program to reform the Army by 1995 and to develop and consolidate its battle capability.

Article on Resigned Senator's Political Doctrine

AU1201210695 Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian 4 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Silviu Brucan: "The Gabrielescu Case"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Senator Valentin Gabrielescu's resignation from the position of general secretary of the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian- Democratic Party] as a result of his stand on the occasion of President Iliescu's hearing before the "December 1989" Senatorial Commission [in charge of examining the events of1989] has a significance more for the future of Romanian politics than for the present. I think this significance will be understood better in 1996 than in 1994.

Mr. Gabrielescu belongs to the old guard of the peasant party, which has maintained, and continues to maintain, center-left ideological positions and produced such well-known politicians as Ion Mihalache, Grigore Iunian, Dr. Lupu, Constantin Stere, and others. The other wing, the national bloc of Transylvania, was a right-wing group, conservative on social issues and straightforward in politics, its leaders having been influenced by Iuliu Maniu's personality. Mr. Gabrielescu knew how to distinguish, in politics, between hostility and adversity, and his sin was that he also applied this distinction in the confrontation with Mr. Iliescu. Upon closer examination, the peasant party senator showed unusual political ability when he asked President Iliescu to change his attitude and join the side of oppressed people of the transition period, and made it clear that this would be in accordance with the program of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR]. He even went so far as to make the astonishing statement that if Iliescu is ready for such a radical change "our party might even support your presidential candidacy." It is the first time that a PNTCD leader has made such a declaration of great and subtle political wisdom. It is subtle, first, because it was unexpected, and secondly, because it places the adversary in an uncomfortable situation.

Terming Senator Gabrielescu's stand as an "unfortunate occurrence" the PNTCD leadership did nothing but show that it did not understand the political dialectics of a statement that, precisely because it seems generous toward the rival, diminishes and disfavors him in the eyes of the public. In politics one should think not only of the effect of the blow but of its feedback as well.

I was saying that the significance of Mr. Gabrielescu's position will be adequately valued only in 1996. Why? For a political analyst it is clear that no party or Democratic Convention-type of political group will obtain a majority in the next elections; therefore, a coalition government will be necessary. I believe that the most fortunate formula for Romania would be the CD-PDSR coalition, that type of big coalition between the Christian democrats and social democrats who have ensured Germany's emergence from the post-war crisis. I pleaded for such a division of power also in 1992; however the electorate still turned toward the center-left wing, which led to the pentagonal majority [Social Democracy Party of Romania, National Romanian Unity Party, Greater Romania Party, Socialist Party of Labor, and Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania] that has been struggling with the economic reform for two years, taking each step toward capitalism panting and staggering and against its own feelings. The PDSR leaders must understand that the compromises made within the pentagon spoil their image, up to its complete disfiguration, while the Democratic Convention leaders should realize that their chances are limited by a constituency that does not want to give up on the state's paternity as regards the economy and the values of social justice—as the Resita protest rally [in December 1994] and its echo in public opinion fully proved. Thus, I think the formula of the big coalition could be accepted by the electorate only if it received a signal in this respect before the elections. Well, Senator Gabrielescu launched the first signal in this respect. Thus, he might still prove to be more farsighted in politics than [PNTCD president] Corneliu Coposu.

Contact Group Holds Talks With Serbs in Pale

LD1301115195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1057 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Pale, 13 Jan (TANJUG)—Members of the Contact Group had talks in Pale today with the leadership of the Srpska republic [RS] on the peace plan which should bring to an end almost three years of war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

RS president Radovan Karadzic stated that the shadow of last night's decision by the UN Security Council, which punishes Serbs in the RS and in the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] by banning oil deliveries from Serbia, hung over the meeting. He nevertheless expressed hope that progress will be made in the peace talks during the four-month cessation of hostilities.

The statements by individual members of the Contact Group, carried by news agencies, are also imbued with the expectation that the cease-fire period will be put to good use. [passage omitted]

Contact Group Member: Importance of Peace Plan

AU1201201495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] As we have already reported, members of the Contact Group arrived in Sarajevo today and held talks in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency building with a Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation that included the following people: Alija Izetbegovic, Kresimir Zubak, Ejup Ganic, Stjepan Kljujic, Mirko Pejanovic, Haris Silajdzic, and Irfan Ljubijankic. The talks will be continued tomorrow at 1000 [0900 GMT]. Here is a report by Nedzad Leko:

[Begin recording] [Leko] After the talks held this evening, William Herman, British representative to the Contact Group, made a brief statement for correspondents:

[Herman, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] The Contact Group is very pleased to be back here in Sarajevo today. We arrived at the beginning of the new year after the agreement on the cessation of hostilities had been signed. We want to make use of the time before us to make rapid progress in the peace process. We had very useful consultations with President Izetbegovic and his colleagues today. I would like to make one thing clear, so there will be no doubt about it: We, the Contact Group and our governments, stand very firmly behind the Contact Group's peace plan.

[Leko] President Izetbegovic said that it has been agreed that correspondents' questions were not to be answered this evening because the talks will resume tomorrow at 1000 and only confirmed what William Herman had said in his brief statement. [end recording]

UNHCR Accuses Serbs of Using 'Human Shields'

AU1201144795 Paris AFP in English 1424 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 12 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb police have press ganged 250 Moslems and Croats in southwestern Bosnia, using them as human shields, while the government army is threatening to attack UN peacekeepers at the Tuzla Airbase in the northeast, UN officials charged here Thursday [12 January].

Spokesmen in addition reported an early morning fire-fight between Serb and government forces in the Moslem enclave at Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia, triggered by a Serb attempt to advance one to 1.5 kilometers (nearly a mile) into the sector.

Major Herve Gourmelon said UN monitors recorded 19 explosions and 500 to 600 small arms bursts in violation of a cessation of hostilities that took effect January 1.

There were 10 violations across Bosnia from early Wednesday to early Thursday, he said, four attributed to the Serbs and six to the mainly Moslem Bosnian Army.

In the Livno region meanwhile Bosnian Serb military police are forcing 250 Moslems and Croats, aged 17 to more than 60, to dig trenches in front of Serb lines and they are in effect "human shields," according to Kris Janowski, Sarajevo spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. He said his information was based on testimony from 20 of the former detainees who were freed.

The men were reported to have been seized by Serb military police in Banja Luka on December 5 and 7, and some of them were later beaten and forced to work without food, Janowski said. "They were taken from their homes in the night or in the early hours of the morning and some were collected from the street," he disclosed, adding that according to some accounts six of the men had died in shelling while digging trenches.

"We have asked to talk to the people but all our requests have been rejected," Janowski said. In Tuzla meanwhile, UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel at the airbase there have been threatened and harassed by Bosnian Army troops protesting the presence at the facilty—under terms of the ceasefire—of a Serb liaison officer, UN spokesman Paul Risley said Thursday.

"The phone lines have been cut and specific threats of shelling and threats of violence have been made against UNPROFOR personnel," he charged. "We are very strongly concerned that a member nation of the United Nations is making threats against the UNPROFOR peacekeepers."

Risley noted that an exchange of liaison officers by the warring parties was part of the ceasefire accord signed by the Serbs and the Bosnian Government. Other UN sources said special United Nations envoy Yasushi

Akashi would be writing soon to Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic on the Tuzla showdown.

Serbs Suspected of Not Implementing Agreements

AU1201212895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Here is a report that we have just received about the meeting at Sarajevo Airport:

Complying with the conclusions of the document signed last night about the opening of blue roads in Sarajevo and around it, as well as implementation of other important issues in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, three meetings were held at Sarajevo Airport with a view to implementing the agreement.

Our side demands and expects UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] to announce the time of opening of the roads, 14 January 1994 [as heard], as was previously agreed and signed. There is an impression that the Serbian side has no intention of implementing the signed agreements, as it has not realized any activity by today. [words indistinct] were close to realization, the aggressor's negotiating team would say that, in their opinion, it is not the documents signed that matter, but the interpretation of the groups working on their implementation.

In this whole process, UNPROFOR is still behaving as a mediator, Dr. Hasan Muratovic said in a special statement for the B-H News Agency.

SDA, HDZ Meet in Mostar, Discuss Federation

AU1201212695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 12 Jan 95

[Report by Dzevad Dziho—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting between the delegations of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina was held in western Mostar today at which further implementation of the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was discussed. Here is a report by Dzevad Dziho:

[Dziho] After a meeting behind closed doors which lasted exactly three hours, journalists were given a public statement which says that the parties agree to do their utmost to have the work of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation which was convened for 16 January be as efficient as possible.

It was also agreed to demand of the Government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to start as soon as possible parliamentary procedures on the systemic laws that had been proposed by deputies and caucuses of the Bosniak and Croatian peoples, something that was accepted in the conclusions made by the Constituent Assembly.

The delegations also agreed to demand of the coordination body of the Federation a report on the activity so far on establishing the transitional organs of power in the Federation, particularly in municipalities and cantons.

Along with distributing this statement, after the meeting, heads of the delegations Edhem Bicakcic, SDA deputy chairman, and Dario Kordic, chairman of the HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina, held a brief news conference and assessed these talks as useful, above all in preparations for the forthcoming Constituent Assembly.

Dario Kordic said that the question of the president of the Federation, about which the HDZ also has its views, was also discussed. Above all, the transition period has still not ended and in that context, the coordination will continue at the next session that will be held immediately before the Assembly session in Sarajevo. One may expect agreements about changes to the Vienna Accord.

Edhem Bicakcic pointed out that today's session was held after an SDA delegation had been informed about the situation in Posavina and that talks were also held in Stolac, Capljina, and Mostar yesterday and today. It is to be expected that after the Assembly adopts systemic laws, the implementation of the Constitution of the Federation is to receive a new impetus, Bicakcic said.

Dario Kordic was also asked at the conference about unpleasant experiences members of the team had in these two days: In Stolac, a camera was taken away from a LJILJAN journalist and in western Mostar, Sarajevo license plates were forcefully taken off cars. The reply was that one cannot judge the overall situation on the basis of individual cases and excesses.

Let me also say that before these talks were held, the SDA delegation had met leaders of western Mostar, Mayor Mijo Brajkovic, and head of Bosnian HDZ Jadran Topic. The talks touched upon many topics ranging from the position of Bosniaks in western Mostar to problems in water and electricity supplies of the entire town. It is true that the situation in Mostar is complex and that Mostar cannot be kept isolated from the Federation, the hosts pointed out. Talks at a higher level are of a crucial importance; we want one town, Brajkovic said, albeit upon some other principles, so that national identity of both peoples can be preserved. Eastern Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic expressed pleasure about his colleague's view of a unified Mostar in which both peoples will keep their identity, without the communist idea of brotherhood and unity.

The talks also touched upon [word indistinct] of nine Bosniaks who were expelled from western Mostar within past few days and the visit to (Mezari) that was agreed but not realized.

More on HDZ, SDA Views

LD1201222195 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Yet another in a series of meetings was held in Mostar today between the leaderships of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina [HDZ] and the Party of Democratic Action [SDA]. The subject of the discussions was the upcoming session of the constituent assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the implementation of the Constitution of the federation and confederation with the Republic of Croatia. After the meeting a news conference was held by HDZ Chairman Dario Kordic and SDA Deputy Chairman Edhem Bicakcic, who led the parties' delegations. Anton Mrkonjic reports:

[Begin recording] [Mrkonjic] The agenda of the upcoming session of the constituent assembly in Sarajevo includes draft laws referring to local self-government, grand counties [vele-zupe], filling vacancies in the Bosnia-Herzegovina diplomatic missions abroad, and the functioning of the financial system, Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ Chairman Dario Kordic said at the beginning of the news conference. He then presented views which the Croat side defended at today's meeting. Chairman Kordic said that changes in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation's top leadership were discussed, which had earlier been requested by the Muslim side:

[Kordic] On behalf of the Croatian side, we presented the stands of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ, which was defended in Zenica at a session of the Constituent Assembly, to the effect that a transitory period is still in progress, and that a large number of things pertaining to the transitory period have not been achieved as planned. Therefore, we believe that Kresimir Zubak ought to remain the president of the federation. We coordinated our views on this today. We will continue coordinating views, with the possibility of some changes being introduced to the Vienna agreement. It should be done if certain things to this effect are to be coordinated, but this should be fully coordinated at a new meeting between the delegations of the HDZ and SDA, which is to be held on 16 January, ahead of a session of the Constituent Assembly.

[Mrkonjic] Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ Chairman Kordic added that the Croatian side warned of the extremely difficult position of Croats living in Usora and Posavina.

Assessing today's meeting, SDA Deputy President Edhem Bicakcic made the following statement:

[Bicakcic] We are expecting a speedier implementation of the federation during in the upcoming period, which will certainly improve things for the people living in the Federation—for Bosniaks and Croats alike.

[Mrkonjic] Edhem Bicakcic then announced the possibility of SDA leader Alija Izetbegovic taking part in the talks. The impression is that a compromise will be sought on numerous controversial issues on Monday, on the eve of the Constituent Assembly session. Apart from HDZ and SDA leaders, the session will bring together the leaders of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

SDA leaders tomorrow continue their visits to some municipalities of western Herzegovina. [end recording]

Pale Speaker Insists on Division of Sarajevo

AU1201172595 Paris AFP in English 1714 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 12 (AFP)—The Bosnian Serbs will insist on a divided Sarajevo in any Bosnian peace talks, retaining the areas of the capital still under their control, their parliamentary speaker said Thursday.

"Sarajevo must be divided," said Momcilo Krajisnik in an interview with Radio Jagodina, 100 kilometres (60 miles) south of Belgrade, cited by the independent Yugoslav news agency BETA. He also ruled out an exchange of territory elsewhere in Bosnia in return for the Serb-held areas of the city.

"There is no question of it, as 200,000 Serbs were living before the war in the Serb half of Sarajevo," Krajisnik said. He added that the Bosnian Serbs were awaiting the "modification of maps" carving up Bosnia between the warring parties.

"After the Contact Group meeting in Paris the situation is much better and we are waiting with some optimism for the end of the week, hoping they will visit" Pale, the 'capital' of the self-proclaimed Srpska republic 12 kilometres (eight miles) from Sarajevo.

Diplomats from the five-nation Contact Group of Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States said after their meeting in Paris earlier this week that they considered their peace plan, first proposed last July, was a "starting point" for negotiations on a solution to the conflict.

That approach was reaffirmed during a meeting here Wednesday evening between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Contact Group diplomats, who were due to return to Sarajevo Thursday, and are expected in Pale later this week. "It is time that the Contact Group understands that Bosnia is not a state. It is preferable to correct this error now, because the whole world knows that it can no longer deny the existence of the Srpska republic," Krajisnik said.

He also said that the Serbs would continue to insist on access to the sea, and were prepared to exchange land with the Croats in direct negotiations to achieve their aims in this regard.

'Numerous Provocations' Reported on Bihac Front

AU1301110695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 13 Jan 95

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the region is much quieter in comparison to recent days, numerous provocations have nevertheless been reported around Velika Kladusa, [words indistinct] and attacks on the troops of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps. The fiercest attacks by Martic's chetniks and Fikret Abdic's paramilitary forces were reported in the region of [name indistinct] where the enemy also attempted infantry breakthroughs.

Along the border with Croatia, or better said, along the border with the UN Protected Areas, from Hadzin Potok to (?Srpska Rastela), Martic's chetniks used mortars and antiaircraft machine guns, while the joint aggressors used 82-mm mortars against the 5th Corps defense lines in the region of the Klokot springs.

The remaining fronts in the 5th Corps and Croatian Defense Council for Bihac theater of operations were mostly calm in comparison with the past few days.

Ljubijankic Comments on Foreign Policy, Relations

AU1201215795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At the regular news conference of the Party of Democratic Action, Irfan Ljubijankic, minister of foreign affairs, spoke about the effects of the foreign policy of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here is a report by (Tahir Pejovic):

[Begin recording] Apart from the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the (?segment) of foreign policy is the most important factor in preserving our country. The effects of foreign policy represents a provocative topic about which a lot may be said.

The recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by 91 countries, admission into the United Nations, and establishing diplomatic relations with a large number of countries are only some facts that speak about our success in foreign policy.

One should not forget that these results have been achieved under extremely difficult conditions, at the time of aggressor's bestial attacks on our country and the time of a grave financial situation. Regardless of all difficulties, the position of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the international stage is firm and the ordinary man in the world feels much sympathy toward our country.

One of the problems that the Foreign Ministry has been facing is the situation in individual diplomatic and consular missions. More than 100 people used to work in the Embassy of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Croatia, therefore, many more than the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina can (?keep). This has been stopped and similar actions are under way in Slovenia and [word indistinct].

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also facing an insufficient financial control. Expenses in diplomatic-consular missions have been considerably reduced, albeit without harming their function. All that has been distancing diplomacy from its primary function, (?diplomatic) activity.

Regarding relations between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the Republic of Croatia, much effort has been exerted with a view to making them as good as possible. As the Republic of Croatia [words indistinct] hospitality to UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], our diplomacy has been analyzing possible repercussions [words indistinct]. We [words indistinct] negative element and think that this can only bring closer the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia.

Diplomatic activities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is focusing on establishing firm diplomatic cooperation with Russia [word indistinct] efforts resulted in an outstanding change in the Russian stand. The (?cause) for this are certainly the international relations and particularly the situation in Chechnya.

Relations between Paris, London, and Moscow on the one side and the United States and the Islamic countries on the other [word indistinct] that we have in Bosnia-Herzegovina so it happens that the most positive steps (?in solving the crisis) are neutralized.

Regarding Islamic countries, [words indistinct] enjoys great support. Diplomacy made a big step at the Islamic conference in Casablanca, which adopted a declaration on financial aid, [word indistinct] and humanitarian aid to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the (?coming) session of the Main Committee of the Party of Democratic Action [words indistinct] on all elements [words indistinct] the Federation on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Irfan Ljubijankic, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, said at the end. [end recording]

Delic on Agreement on Foreign Troops Withdrawal

AU1201170595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Jan 95

["Highlights" of statement by Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at news conference in Sarajevo on 12 January on the occasion of the agreement signed on 11 January at the Sarajevo Airport—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last night issues were initiated, the solution of which represents a condition for the implementation of the agreement and whose urgent solution has been required for the agreement to be determined properly. As regards our side, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we concentrated on two issues: the issue of Bihac, as the observance of the first agreement of 23 December 1994, that is, the cease-fire, has not been ensured, not to speak of the other agreement on the cessation of hostilities. The other issue is the opening of humanitarian roads for all (?sides). As regards the Serbian aggressor's side, it insisted on the issues of Mt. Igman and Mt. Bjelasnica. This is the central issue. During the talks, when one had to talk about Bihac and the solution of Point 9 of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities which defines the withdrawal of the foreign troops, the issue of Livno and Kupres, regarding which the Croatian Defense Council side imposed itself [words indistinct] side.

All in all, one has to say that these talks were long and painstaking and the aim we, I and this delegation had, was to have this agreement, that is, the document, as it is a part of the agreement and its implementation, be written unambiguously lest people later pick on individual words. Thus, when the withdrawal from Mt. Igman and Mt. Bjelasnica was involved, there was an effort to camouflage this through certain language, so that one could question later whether this or the other region was involved. We explicitly demanded that this should be the demilitarized zone that was defined by the agreement of 14 August 1993, and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] agreed with that. UNPROFOR even received an interpretation to that effect from New York, from the UN Security Council.

I demanded that the exact date and time be specified. If it is about the opening of blue routes, one cannot put it as: as soon as possible or when possible. One must specify the date: whether this will be on the 14th or 15th. It was defined as 14 January at the latest.

The same happened in the case of Bihac where I insisted that the key issue, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Bihac, be stated explicitly.

I may say that despite everything, when one adds up all the efforts we invested into this work, its result is the document that demonstrates cooperativeness in the work of drafting it. My personal assessment is that there is a will and approval for these tasks, that is, the part that has explicitly been defined by dates, to be realized. What remains are the tasks of more long-term nature within the realization of the agreement, above all the deployment of observers along the lines of separation and other tasks that are a part of the process.

Delic Assesses Army Achievements, Arms Embargo

AU1301101695 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jan 95 p 5

[Interview with General Rasim Delic, chief of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army General Staff; originally for PRVA LINIJA; place and date not given: "Theory of War Refuted"]

[FBIS-Translated Text] *The third year of war is now behind us. The results of various kinds of human activities are added up at the end of each year, so the members of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army can use analyses to determine their successes and failures, search for the reasons, and learn lessons for the future. Army General Rasim Delic, Supreme Headquarters commander, gave an interview on this to PRVA LINIJA, the journal of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Here is part of the interview:*

[PRVA LINIJA] What has been done about tactical-strategic innovations and how are they being applied?

[Delic] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army would not have achieved the results that it has without a clear concept and strategy, in the organizational development, preparation, and execution of combat activities. I can refer to those who are good at military theory, who kept up with or studied wars waged in the world after World War II or even before. As far as war is concerned, there are certain conditions that should be met in theory in order for certain results to be achieved.

Success Without a Chance

As far as this affects the issue of the balance of forces, both quantitative and qualitative, certain relations should be established. In order for a unit to attack, it should be stronger than the one that is defending. It should be technically superior, or at least equal, in order to have the least chance of success. It should also have more and better equipment. In a way, these are all military theory assumptions as set down by military theorists ever since the first war was waged. If we had abided by this and acted accordingly, we would not have had any chance to fight, considering the huge disproportion in heavy weaponry and the overall equipment of the aggressor in relation to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Therefore, we must put the emphasis on what our advantage is. Our advantage is our people. It should be noted that we did manage to liberate a large area—about 3 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina—with minimum losses, much lower than the aggressor's, while they were trying to stave off our attacks in these areas, which shows that we have refuted this theory, since, in principle, the attacker, who has to expose himself to the fire of the defender, should take greater casualties. I would point out that these operations were very quick. We liberated certain facilities that should have been almost impossible to liberate in such a very short time—15 to 20 minutes. Examples of these are, for instance, Zmajevac, Husar, Greda, Lisaca, and many others. We used the element of surprise, maneuver, and a new method of employing our units.

[PRVA LINIJA] Do you believe that everything that was possible in the two and a half years of the defensive war was actually done? Various institutions and organizations have started to make claims toward the citizens and the soldiers. Can this be viewed in the context of the price of the liberation war, that is, the price of its work?

[Delic] In my opinion, which I keep repeating, and I have probably started to bore some people with it, nothing important has been done to resolve the issue of the social status of the soldiers. In practice, much more could have been done, even though we are a country at war—even more so. The orientations are clear in a war and everyone is geared toward the war in the country, that is, toward support for those who are fighting it, the soldiers, the country's army. I do not think that these resources have been used up. We base the transformation of the army primarily upon the obligations that state bodies should accept.

Moreover, our soldiers should know what tomorrow has in store for them. The experiences following World War II in these areas should not be repeated. At that time it was very easy to prove that one was an early partisan fighter. It should not happen after this war that our soldiers are harassed by people who spent the war in cellars or were involved in blackmarketeering, crime, or war profiteering. We should not allow our soldiers to be bought by a war profiteer some time in the future because he had earned the money through the pain and blood of the people and the members of the army. There are ways to deal with this. We have submitted to the Presidency and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina several proposals on ways for the issue of the social status of the soldiers and the relevant institutions to be resolved. But there have not yet been any significant results. There are many possible solutions and we have to find the best ones. Even with all these solutions, our army will still turn out to be the cheapest army in the history of wars, since our army was built on morale and the aims that I mentioned earlier.

[PRVA LINIJA] Is there a realistic possibility for the arms embargo to be lifted unilaterally?

[Delic] I have said several times that I doubt it, primarily because it would require international agreement—in the United Nations and on the Security Council. We know that there are always people there who will vote against it. Even if you manage to persuade Britain and France, Russia will always be against. As far as a unilateral lifting of the embargo by the United States is concerned, I personally think it is unrealistic, because their political calculations will always cause this not to happen. This is why I have more expectations of some other countries, which are our friends, trying to lift the embargo.

Russians Are Supplying Weapons to the Serbs

The Bosnia-Herzegovina and foreign media should lay more emphasis on the fact that the embargo does not only apply to Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also to all the territories of former Yugoslavia. I expect that of the media. Unfortunately, media attention has only been directed at the embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus the fact that there is no such embargo operating on Montenegro or Serbia or their paramilitaries on Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia territory has been pushed a little into the background. The latest deliveries of Russian missile systems clearly shows that there is no embargo there. However, none of the official bodies, starting from the Security Council and the United Nations, has asked why the embargo has not been observed there. There was a solution connected with the lifting of the embargo, the Resolution on Removing the Heavy Weapons of the Former JNA [Yugoslav Peoples' Army] From the Territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but this was not observed, though it would have created a balance of weapons. I therefore think that our chance lies in our own production, because we do have the requisite conditions to produce what is necessary for an army. Our chance also lies in what we seize from the enemy. I would like to remind you that the 1st and 5th Corps managed to seize enough equipment to supply a mechanized battalion in less than a month. This is our chance and we must seize it. Therefore, we will continue to demand that the international community lifts the arms embargo and consider our other rights, but we will also continue to search for resources internally, which have not yet been exploited.

Mladic Views UNPROFOR, NATO, U.S. Role

AU1201124395 Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jan 95 pp 8,9

[Interview with Ratko Mladic, commander of the Srpska republic army, by B. Djurdjevic; place and date not given: "The Look of an Entangled Knot"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *General Ratko Mladic is, in the opinion of INDEPENDENT's journalists, a 1994 man of the year. We found him at his office desk, perusing the daily report from the front. Joyfully he shows us the section on the dead and the wounded, where it is stated that there are no casualties, because to him the lives of the soldiers for whom he is responsible are more important than anything else. On the other hand, this implies that fighting is less intensive these days on the former Bosnia-Herzegovina front. During our visit we came to know other aspects of the Srpska republic y commander's personality—that of negotiator and diplomat, strategist, fighter, open-hearted fellow traveler and friend of animals. Among other things, we went along with him to the cease- fire agreement negotiations and visited several Srpska republic army bases together.*

[Djurdjevic] Gen. Mladic, what do you think about predictions that the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] troops will withdraw early in the spring and that NATO troops will take their place?

[Mladic] I am inclined to assess the role of the blue helmets in this region in two ways: first, from the point of view of officers, soldiers and other staff of the UNPROFOR, and second, from the point of view of the real character of their mission, which often cannot be ascertained on the basis of UN resolutions proclaimed so far, but becomes obvious only in view of the actions taken by individuals and highly skilled experts.

In the first context I can say that a considerable number of blue helmets have performed their job and assignment in compliance with their mandate, honorably and conscientiously, while being exposed to many hazards on a daily basis. Regardless of whether the sides in the conflict are satisfied with them or not, I think that recognition should be accorded to those who have performed their jobs honestly in the first place, and then particularly to those who have been neutral, working in accordance with their mandate, and who have contributed to the cessation of war and peaceful settlement of the conflict. Unfortunately, there have not been many such people. On the other hand, some UNPROFOR members have been either killed or wounded in Bosnia. But I have to point out that not a single blue helmet has lost his life or been wounded on Serbian Republic territory, whereas a considerable number of UNPROFOR troops have been either wounded or killed during the conflict between the Muslims and the Croats, but one keeps silent about such data.

[Djurdjevic] And what about the second aspect?

[Mladic] When I mentioned the second point of view from which UNPROFOR's activity can be assessed, I meant that some of the troops, particularly expert teams disguised as humanitarian nongovernmental or government organizations, should be viewed as pillars on which the policy of violence of the new world order is being implemented. There are a great number of government and non- government humanitarian organizations in the region and some of them have posts throughout; certain media representatives occupy an important place in the realization of the aforementioned goals. They were an instrument used by certain forces to destroy a state that was not only one of the founders of the United Nations, but also of the League of Nations in its time. However, the crime committed on that state did not elicit any condemnation on the part of the international public. Rather, the flagrant violation of international law reflected itself in the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations.

Secession was legalized at different levels, instead of being penalized. Therefore the presence of those individuals, groups and organizations here has as its background the fact that the former Yugoslavia could not possibly have been attacked by open aggression and large scale intervention of foreign countries' military forces. Instead, they decided to deploy forces that are customarily used in special warfare. The main lever of state disintegration from within consisted of separatist forces that were generously supported by foreign financiers.

[Djurdjevic] Are the forces to which you refer as generators of this war interested in bringing it to an end in 1995, or can we expect the conflict to continue?

[Mladic] Everything depends on the international power structure. At this moment, in my opinion, the international community happens to be at a dead end, because the war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina has assumed unpredictable dimensions and because there is a danger that it might get out of control. There is a real danger, due to totally opposing great power interests, that it may spread to another region or that a new conflict may break out on some other part of the planet. In that case there are two possibilities: either the efforts to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be intensified, or two local conflicts, including this one, will continue with no end in sight. My experience from former Yugoslavia leads me to believe that the war in Russia, in Chechnya, is not a mere accident, and I am drawing a lot of analogies from that.

[Djurdjevic] At the same time as the cease-fire negotiations, behind the political stage, severe clashes are occuring between the warring factions on the ground.

[Mladic] That is true, and the most severe clashes right now are occuring between the Muslims themselves, that is, the forces led by Fikret Abdic and the 5th Corps of the so-called Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, Croatia is continuing its aggression against the Srpska republic. Let us not forget, Croatia has been present with its troops in this region ever since 1992. I have an impression that Croatia is trying to settle some internal problems of its own with the war in Bosnia, in the first place because the ruling party, the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], is an outgrowth of war that cannot survive or rule without it.

[Djurdjevic] Gen. Mladic, how did you come to lose Kupres to the forces of the Croatian Army in 1994 when you had defeated it as early as 1992?

[Mladic] First of all one has to say that the events surrounding Kupres and Bihac are a result of a synchronized Muslim-Croatian offensive from central Bosnia, western Herzegovina and Bosnian Krajina. It followed many actions taken by the enemy forces through which they wanted to establish the conditions and drag our forces into a quagmire. Croatia succeeded in that intention through various negotiations and deals, and because of the poor functioning of certain systems in the Srpska republic. Which is to say, many nonmilitary factors contributed to the success of Muslims and Croats. For instance, due to the nonfunctioning of some institutions in Livno, Duvno, Vukovo Polje and Bugojno, and the mass displacement of Serbs in this war as well as earlier ones, the defense ability of the remaining population there was weakened. Kupres is not the only Serbian locale in that region, there is also Vukovo Polje, situated much further east from Kupres, which also fell into the enemy hands, not to mention several villages in the Livno region such as the village of Rascani, or in the region of Duvno, where Serbs in several villages were slaughtered in World War II, and in this war were displaced by Croats. After such ethnic cleansing, about which the world knows quite little, Croatia justifies its aggression to the international community, citing "the protection of Croat-populated territories" in the neighboring Srpska republic!

[Djurdjevic] What is the current situation around Bihac like? Is the fighting still going on or is the cease-fire in force?

[Mladic] Two days after the cease-fire agreement between the army of the Srpska republic and the so-called Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina came into force, the cease-fire is being observed along the lines of demarcation near Bihac. Which is to say, no fire is being opened from our positions; the troops of the 5th Corps are aware that they stand no chance in a face-off with the units of the army of Srpska republic, so they have turned away from us and concentrated on the conflict with the forces of the autonomous province of western Bosnia [Abdic's forces]. However, according to our information, many soldiers originally from Cazin and Velika Kladusa are deserting the 5th Corps and joining the units loyal to Abdic. Many refugees from western Bosnia are coming back from their harbors in Kordun and Banija, where they were taken in by local Serbs, without any aid from the international community.

[Djurdjevic] You are mentioning the inter-Muslim clashes in Bosnia. Do you think that the clashes between the Croats and the Muslims could erupt again soon?

[Mladic] In any case, I believe that the Muslim-Croat Federation survives only thanks to the pressure exerted on them by special teams from those countries in whose interest it is to preserve such an artificial alliance. Among other things, U.S. General Galvin conceded to me that he was permanently assigned to inspecting the Muslim and Croat armed forces in order to prevent new clashes between them.... However, intentions are one thing and reality is another.... Furthermore, UNPROFOR's important role in settling the conflict between the Muslims and Croats, particularly in central Bosnia, should be emphasized. The blue helmets suffered many losses in that mission, but the international public knows little about it. Despite all this, I am convinced that if UNPROFOR were to withdraw from Bosnia, Muslims and Croats would immediately break up the alliance and start fighting each other again.

[Djurdjevic] Germany played a certain role in their reconciliation, at least in the region of Mostar, but now it is declaring a greater presence in former Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the NATO forces. What do you think about this?

[Mladic] The role of Germany in this war is unquestionable, but also clandestine. It accomplishes its interests in this region through Croatia, and to a lesser extent, through the Muslims. In Germany it was probably assessed that it would lose more than it would gain by open military involvement in the conflict, so the instruments of its involvement are concealed. I am not surprised at Germany's decision to take a more important role in NATO, as well as its determination to spread German influence in this region again. But we know very well from history how German experts on the Balkans fared here!

[Djurdjevic] Following the recent visit of Haris Silajdzic to Turkey, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller promised greater media and military aid to Muslims in Bosnia. Does that mean that there is a possibility of that country's direct military involvement in the region?

[Mladic] We already have the Turkish Armed Forces here, in the blue helmets contingent. Turkey has contributed considerably to arming Muslims in Bosnia, recently openly admitted by the former chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Army. It is not at all accidental that their forces are here, as well as the forces of other Islamic countries, and that the Muslims are endeavoring to have as many troops as possible among the blue helmets in Bosnia. In addition, according to the data available to me, Turkey is training special teams made up of Muslims from Bosnia, Sandzak and Kosovo, to infiltrate this region. However, any involvement by Turkey here would have fatal consequences, because it would provoke a global world war between Islamic and non-Islamic countries in the world.

[Djurdjevic] How do you assess the effects of the latest U.S. mediating efforts to end the war in Bosnia, after former U.S. President Carter's visit?

[Mladic] The United States is now trying to put the fire out because of the flare-up to which it contributed. I think that at the moment the U.S. Administration has adopted an encouraging course that could lead to peace. Yet, you see, the cease-fire agreement was first signed by the Muslims, then they gave it up; the second party in the Federation formed under U.S. sponsorship, the Croats, did not even sign it. All this makes our experts question what the real interests of the parties to the conflict might be. We are obviously interested in peace, the Muslims are interested in preventing their defeat in Bihac, while the Croats are interested in continuing the offensive.... What are the real intentions of the great powers? Have they grown a little bit tired of our conflict or are they still ready to generate new ones? This will be discovered soon.

[Djurdjevic] How is the Srpska republic army dealing with war profiteering and other problems that you face in this war?

[Mladic] The war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina is being used by some people to save their faces, some to wash their hands of something, and some others to launder money. Numerous interests, both of international and domestic factors are intertwined here, so sometimes they look like a tangled knot. Arms dealing is one of the most profitable businesses, but here one deals in all and sundry things, which is probably the case with all wars. As Ivo Andric [Nobel Prize winner for literature] would say: "There comes a time when wise people lapse into silence, fools begin to speak up, and the rabble gets rich." It seems that such a time has come now. We have a thousand individuals who have become so-called advisers or businessmen overnight, whereas in fact they are war profiteers. Our job is to fight rather than to make fortunes, and in that respect we, the soldiers, are closer to ordinary people. We, as well as they, are irritated by certain mimicries, and we are capable of quickly distinguishing between truth and lie, honesty and thievery.

[Box, page 9]

[Mladic] The NATO expert teams, under the cloak of humanitarian organizations, are here to carry out the plans drafted in accordance to the strategy of low-intensity conflicts, as well as the tasks of those powers that are responsible for the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, and that generate and instigate the war in this region. Those are not only the top experts of some foreign armies and services, but also primarily intelligence service experts, through which the governments of certain countries hope to accomplish their political and other interests in this region.

[Box, page 9]

[Mladic] We have endeavored to provide optimum work conditions for blue helmet personnel and various international humanitarian organizations, except for several cases when we were exposed to brutal airstrikes by NATO's air force, for no particular reason. Still, even at such times we treated the UNPROFOR troops correctly, although it was quite difficult for us to explain this attitude to our people when UN soldiers of one particular country received, on the same day, assistance from our troops in some of the Muslim enclaves, at the same time as their countrymen were flying NATO aircraft and soldiers.

Contact Group Requests Postponing Serb Meeting

LD1201210995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1956 GMT 12 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 12 (TANJUG)—A meeting between Bosnian Serb and "Contact Group" for Bosnia officials has been put off for Friday at the latter's request, a Bosnian Serb government statement said.

The statement, carried by the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA, said the meeting, which had originally been planned for late Thursday, had been put off because of the length of the meeting with the Bosnian Muslims and poor weather and travelling conditions.

The senior officials of the Contact Group states—Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany—will Friday morning discuss with the Bosnian Serbs ways and means of consolidating the current four-month truce and promoting the peace process.

Bosnian Serbs and Muslims signed an agreement for a four-month cessation of hostilities on Dec. 31. The agreement took effect on new year's day.

The Contact Group officials conferred in Belgrade on Wednesday with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic said that the maintenance of the truce in Bosnia and the consent of the Bosnian Serbs to take the Contact Group plan for Bosnia in all its points as the basis for further talks opened prospects for successful peace negotiations.

Karadzic Summarizes Serbian Achievements

AU1201131895 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 6 Jan 95 pp 3-5

[Interview with Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, by Drazenko Djukanovic on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Srpska republic; place and date not given: "Happy Birthday to You, Republic!]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Djukanovic] After three years, how do you feel about the creation of the Srpska republic, the establishment of state authorities, and the beginning of the constitutional state?

[Karadzic] The third anniversary of the Srpska republic will be marked on St. Stephen's Day, 10 January 1995. Its creation is the result of the will of the Serbian people from the former Bosnia-Herzegovina to constitute its own state. I would like to remind your readers that immediately before the unification in 1918, there existed a state of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes from the Austro-Hungarian empire for two or three months. Based on the Corfu Declaration signed in 1917, this state with Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene territories was then merged under equal conditions with Serbia. On behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, the Corfu Declaration was signed by Dusan Vasiljevic. After that, the Serbs [from the former Austro-Hungarian empire] and the Croats dissociated themselves from Yugoslavia—that is, from Serbia—and formed their national states, so that the Serbs—without knowledge of the Corfu Declaration or not relying on it and not calling upon their right from international legal and political documents but relying on their own will—formed two Serbian states, although it would have been more natural if they had formed one, but this will hopefully happen some day. We are a people that can endure much. We were treated like serfs by the Turks for more than 400 years, and then we were in the same position during the last 45 years of communism since our "stepbrothers" played tricks on us. Only some of us had the same rights as them, and in order to have an equal position and be as successful as the Muslims, the Serbs had to keep their people in so-called "dimis"—non-Muslim communities in Muslim countries. During the last four years—since St. Peter's Day in 1991 up to the present—we have shown the dignity that we had been hiding deep in our souls before because we wanted to retain peace in the former Yugoslavia. The Serbs have never been serfs in the real sense of the word; they suffered physically but they always had their dignity. This time, however, they have decided to retain their dignity in the best possible way—by shaking off the blame from themselves and by establishing a state they call the Srpska republic. The term Serbian was mentioned for the first time in "Gorski Vijenac," [an epic by

Petar Petrovic Njegos], admittedly not as Serbia but as Serbian land. We gave our state this name because we did not want to create the western Serbs or some new Serbs; we wanted Serbian [in the Srpska republic] to mean Serbian land. I can say that we who are going through this experience are not aware of how historic this process is, but our children will remember this event just like Karadjordje's uprising, with the difference that this event will not be celebrated as an attempt but as a final success in creating the Serbian state. Naturally, the Srpska republic is a reality, just like the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] is a reality, and we think that this is only a stage in the creation of a unitary Serbian state.

The SDS Achievement Is Eternal

[Djukanovic] What role did the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) play in the political struggle waged in the pre-war parliament of the then Bosnia-Herzegovina and during the preparation and organization of the Serbian people for the defense from the enemy?

[Karadzic] In the process in which the Serbs formed their consciousness and abandoned their subordinate role by creating their own state, the SDS played the most important role. When 2 or 3 percent of our people who are in power now make a mistake, we become desperate and allow a war to be waged against the SDS, in which our enemies blame the SDS for everything. I have to say, however, even though I am the president of the republic, that the historic achievement of this party is eternal. We have succeeded in creating a powerful party that gathers a large number of Serbs; it was voted for by 92 percent of Serbs from the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our deputies to the former Assembly were brilliant partners in the Muslim-Croat coalition, and television broadcasts showed our people what the Serbs would be facing. This period of political struggle was very successful, and the SDS and its deputies were moral winners in the then Assembly. We had a list of actions and moves we wanted to make, and we always waited for the Muslims to make a mistake. After one of their mistakes, we made an association of our communities, then we established a Serbian autonomous region, which was followed by the establishment of our assembly and the republic in the end. Whenever Muslim and Croatian representatives told us that we were breaking up the then Bosnia-Herzegovina, we told them that our moves resulted from their violation of our political rights. The SDS was also superior in military actions. Our people for the first time were aware of what was awaiting them. Since our defense was well prepared and organized, we saved most of our people and established front lines toward the enemy. We should always remember that it was the people and the SDS that were fighting alone setting the front lines for 45 days, from 5 April to 20 May [1992], since our army was being established at that time. Although the Srpska army was naturally not an organization of our party, and we still did not want to appoint commissaries from the SDS, we relied on the patriotism of every one of our officers and soldiers. Regarding political circumstances, this segment was also mastered by the SDS pretty well. We have led the country in a very liberal manner and we have given our citizens full freedom, which we are very proud of. For the first time, the Serbian people are not afraid of their own police or state security service. All this would not have been possible without the SDS' active and creative participation.

The task of this party is not to keep its political position but to serve its people. We have to be proud of the fact that only a very small number of our members has not justified their position. They will have to stay out of politics in the next election. A large majority of our members responded to their historic task. Our party is open toward its members, toward its people—that is, to the people who have recognized the truth. Even former communists voted for the SDS. People are entitled to change their opinion, to recognize the illusions, and I am proud that the best Serbs are our members. I can say that our party will remain open for all democratically oriented people.

No One Is Hungry

[Djukanovic] The SDS froze its activities for a certain period of time, stating that it was a priority to defend the people and the republic. After that, there appeared certain parties with the requirement to organize an early election, trying to come into politics in this way. There were rumors that tens of new political parties were established during the time the war was raging.

[Karadzic] The first government of the Srpska republic asked the SDS not to interfere with its work because of the war. The first government was not made up of [SDS] party members; it consisted of the most capable people we could find at the time. I accepted that requirement. I was later informed that 38 parties and political associations had been established. There is not such a ruling power or such a state that would allow the establishment of opposition parties as long as a war goes on. We firmly believe, however, that these parties are also patriotic and that it is also their aim to establish a Serbian state, so we did not try to prohibit them from using a state of war or the danger from a war as the reason for it. We are happy that a considerable number of these parties and associations is patriotic. Naturally, the time for political conflicts will come before the next election, but I think it should be an honor for many of these parties not to start political conflicts now because it is not an appropriate time. There were several initiatives to organize an early election during the war, but our assembly passed a decision in Prijedor to postpone an election until the war is over. It would not be fair to the opposition to organize an election now because it is clear that almost all the people would vote for the SDS again, since they would not want to miss the basic SDS aim—to establish a state and merge with other [Serbian] states.

[Djukanovic] In your opinion, how are the state authorities, the highest ranking institutions of the Srpska republic, functioning?

[Karadzic] The highest ranking institutions are functioning the best. I would rather not comment on the Presidency myself. The Assembly has had 48 sessions in two and a half years, which is a lot, and I can say that the government has been successful, since several ministers have stayed in power since the very beginning. They are excellent and successful and have important portfolios. The role of the government has been the most unpleasant, and that is why we have changed it. This is the third one we have now. We respect the earlier members of the government very much—former Prime Ministers Djeric and Lukic and their ministers—because they had a difficult task. The government always bears a heavy burden and it is always exposed to criticism; our governments have never had an easy task. We did not have a functioning legislative power and we still do not have a state administration. We are changing our political system; we are halfway through the transition from one system to another, and this is the basic problem in the functioning of our authorities. I can still claim that there is no such people in the world that could finance a three-year war almost by itself, regardless of the help we received and which we are very grateful for. We needed the help and, therefore, sold our commodities to those who helped us at very low prices, but this help was unavoidable. This is not the kind of help that other parties to the conflict receive. The whole international community is helping our enemies. There is no such nation that could be as successful as we are in waging a war for two and a half years without anyone being hungry, thirsty, naked, and without shoes. There are no epidemics and crime is decreasing. The number of crimes that have been cleared up amounts to almost 70 percent in certain regions.

It is impressive in peaceful times, too, if there is law and order in towns and if there are no fights or explosions. There are more problems of this kind in some European countries than here, and I can say that we have been leading our state with a very "soft" hand, and not relying on the police but on the enthusiasm and spirit of our people, on their wish to establish a state, which reduced many things to the right measure. It was the people who consistently prevented negative tendencies that enabled not only law and order but also the economy and the market to function. You must know that the inflation rate has always been lower in the Srpska republic than in Yugoslavia because our state is cheaper. Unfortunately, we have not been able to pay any wages lately. We can otherwise be proud because our economy has functioned in spite of the three-month blockade by Yugoslavia to the extent that it was possible to give food to the people and to the army.

An Army That Is Waging War With Its Heart

[Djukanovic] We are approaching the end of the third year of war. What can you as the supreme commander of the Srpska republic army tell us about its role, its readiness to fight, and its officers? How is the military situation in the whole of the republic?

[Karadzic] The Srpska republic army is the best army in Europe today. I am not going to tell you the number of mobilized soldiers or the number of soldiers we can mobilize without women, who would also be ready to fight if necessary. This is an army that is waging a war with heart and that has achieved numerous victories mostly in counteroffensive. We have not disciplined our army with disciplinary measures and drastic sanctions because each of our soldiers has disciplined himself with his patriotic enthusiasm. The number of those who should be disciplined is small. I am happy to claim that we succeeded in creating a state three years ago that we have been defending ever since without having to execute a single soldier. We have pronounced three or four death sentences, but they have not been carried out. We have applied very little disciplinary measures, there are no courts martial, although there are conditions to establish them, because we rely on the feeling of duty in our soldiers, and I can say that they are really devoted soldiers.

We do not have many officers compared to the size of the army. Many officers from our regions [members of the former Yugoslav People's Army] did not return to the Srpska republic, but many did, and there are many reasons to believe that those who came back or those who stayed here are much better than those who did not return. This is how we received our officers. Their number is not very large but their value is very high on the average because only the best came and stayed in our Army. They were led by their heart and by their decisiveness. Our most lethal weapon is not the artillery, but in the hearts of our heroes—soldiers and officers alike. Our enemies could not reach us in 20 years if we were to measure our soldiers' hearts and the capability of our officers. They can acquire the weapons they want to, but they do not have the commanders we have.

It would naturally be better if we had more officers, but we try to distribute those we do have in the best possible way. We shall soon begin to appoint new NCO's and officers among the soldiers who have been fighting up to now and among the students educated at the center in Banja Luka. We have made hardly any changes in the commanding personnel. We have only had to replace the officers who died on the very first front lines. It is irrational, of course, to place an officer on the first front line because his education will last a long time, and, apart from that, it is necessary to have talent for this profession. The Serbs, however, want to see their officer in front of them, that is just how they are. It happens very often that Mladic, Milovanovic and other generals are at first front lines. General Rajo Balac was killed on the Bihac front several days ago because it was him who led his soldiers forward. Many officers were killed, which is a big loss, but the Serbs are like that. We follow people according to what they do and not according to what they say. That is why it is difficult to be a Serbian officer, but it is honorable above everything.

We have not made considerable changes, except in two corps; we made these changes because fresh people were needed. Our enemies changed their commanders several times during the same period of time. I would like to point out that the speculations that the army does not obey our civil authorities are not true. As commander in chief, I am highly respected by all officers and soldiers and I would not like our officers to be as obedient and soft as grandmothers. I like it when they argue with me about solutions because this helps me reach good decisions, and after I have passed a decision, they carry it out in a brilliant way.

The West tries to separate the civil authorities from military commands trying to isolate their soldiers, scaring them with court martials as if soldiers were in charge of waging a war. In contrast, I as the president and the government, the Assembly and its deputies, the complete democratically elected civil power is behind our officers. Our officers carry out their duties according to our Constitution and laws.

There was speculation that the unlucky conflict with Yugoslavia would lead to a split among our officers. Our officers were very unhappy about our conflicts, but not a single one ever had the idea of changing his attitude and not being loyal to the oath he took for our republic and our people. There were no traitors in the civil leadership, so there was no one who could have persuaded an officer to leave the Army or behave in some other way than required. When I ordered the counterattack on the territory occupied by the Muslim army on the Bihac front and that army's destruction, I was absolutely certain our army would accomplish it. Many people in the West, as well as the Muslims and Croats, realized then that we were not bluffing and using empty threats. They saw that everything ordered by the supreme command is respected. In spite of NATO bombings, the counterattack was carried out brilliantly under the direct command of General Milovanovic and the indirect command of General Mladic. It was proven that Serbian soldiers and officers, our weapons, and most of all our Serbian hearts are superior.

It can be said now that this counteroffensive on the Bihac and Krupa front made the international community change its politics and its relationship toward the Srpska republic and its people. The international community hoped that a split would develop between the civil and military leadership, which did not happen, however. As commander in chief and president of the state, I can say that one can only wish to have assistants like I do: in the presidency, the assembly, the government, the generals I have in the army, such as Ratko Mladic, Manojlo Milovanovic, the members of the General Staff, corps commanders, commanders of special units of the ministry of internal affairs....

There Is No Solution Without the United States

[Djukanovic] What is your opinion on the peace initiatives made so far, the Serbian proposals for a solution to the crisis in this region, the Contact Group plans, the role of the current mediators.... Can you please comment on the latest contacts with Mr. Carter and the circumstances of the signing of a general agreement?

[Karadzic] The main problem in the area of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina was that there were not two or three parties to the conflict but five, because the negotiators and mediators were also parties to the conflict. They were extremely biased and personally interested in reaching a certain solution to the crisis. Such people cannot be mediators. They are an interested party. We explained this every time. In Jimmy Carter I met a personality I thought did not exist. I have never met a more honest man in my life, a man with moral dignity. People like him have eyes and ears that are open wide. They are ready to hear clearly what the other side is saying and change their opinion after learning new facts, in contrast to a multitude of previous mediators who were absolutely insensitive to the truth, who were led by their aims only. President Carter came to the Srpska republic without any personal aim; he came with only one wish: to reach a solution.

The United States is the main and only master in this world in which there is no balance; it is certain that Carter could not come here on his own, without having consulted at the highest level, since it is known that ordinary U.S. citizens cannot do anything in international constellations without having the approval of official authorities. It is usually considered that U.S. citizens can do what they want, but they are very loyal to their state, regardless of which political side they belong to. I came to this conclusion during the last few months when I tried to break the blockade and establish contacts with a famous American. It is a fact that this crisis cannot be solved without the United States, because we were close to a solution several times, but someone from the United States, perhaps not an extremely important person, encouraged the Muslims to go on with their attacks on the Serbian people and require more. I hope this political style is over in the United States and that the U.S. Administration has decided to contribute to the establishment of peace in this region. If it is this way, then the best thing was to send President Carter.

[Djukanovic] Could you please compare the cooperation and relations with the Serbian and Montenegrin leaderships before the Serbian-Montenegrin blockade was imposed on you? What are the present relations with the official institutions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] like, since it is more than obvious that the Serbian people east of the Drina River fully support their brothers across the Drina River, who were opposed by the whole world during a certain period of time?

[Karadzic] This is true. When someone asks what our relations with the FRY are like, we have to view two aspects: what are the relations with the people, and what are the relations with the Yugoslav establishment. There are no official relations with Yugoslavia, except for Minister Aleksa Buha, who sometimes has contacts with Minister Jovanovic. There were some contacts with

President Slobodan Milosevic recently, which we declared official. I have to say that our Red Cross cooperates very well the Red Cross of Yugoslavia and Serbia. Our minister of health has a good relationship with them; they have often helped him. We are grateful for everything that Serbia and Montenegro have done so far for us.

Measured by its size and economic power, Montenegro has really done a lot. It is clear they could not support us any longer, because the pressure exerted on them is very big. We were surprised by the brutality by which the sanctions were introduced against us, and especially by the vocabulary certain people who attacked us used. I think that many things are already over, that the situation has become more quiet, and that the people have realized that we cannot be blamed—neither the people nor the republic or its leadership—so we hope that our relations will soon improve. I think the international community expected Yugoslavia to deny us military and political support, but the Serbs wanted to be more clever and imposed the economic blockade against us. If the economic cooperation had remained intact, this would have played an extremely important role for the Srpska republic and Yugoslavia. Many Yugoslav companies are suffering because of this blockade.

I am convinced that the time will come when our relations will improve because high-ranking politicians from Yugoslavia said that, in the moment the Serbs resumed negotiations—it was earlier required that the Bosnian Serbs accept the [Contact Group] plan—the reasons for the blockade would no longer be effective. We resumed negotiations in the way we agreed with Carter, in a way that is completely safe for the people of the Srpska republic. The international community will obviously accept this, as well as the present four-month cease-fire that was also agreed upon with Carter. I think the sanctions imposed against the Srpska republic could be lifted in January, as well as those against the FRY. Although we have our own cooperation with the international community, we have never allowed that problems be solved without creating the conditions for the removal of the sanctions against the FRY. We have made this a condition for every solution, and this will be so in the future, too. The present "family" argument will have no big consequences in my opinion, and it is possible that national unity is even better after this disagreement.

Church Is the Connecting Tissue

[Djukanovic] The RSK has constantly been the focus of attention, too. Many things depend on Krajina, various international plans are launched [for Krajina], and at the same time, connections are established between the Serbs. Many people allow themselves to claim that the RSK is the key to war and peace and the formula for the preservation and the strengthening of the unity of Serbian people.

[Karadzic] The people of the Srpska republic and the RSK belong to one nation, and they very much rely on each other. We can survive only if we cherish this kind of relationship. The leadership of the RSK, especially President Milan Martic, had much understanding for us and strongly supported us when we needed support. I can say that the government and other institutions did as much as they could in order to attenuate the consequences the economic blockade had on us and especially on our defense. If I have to summarize, I would say that it is a fact that our relations are good and that they constantly develop in this direction.

[Djukanovic] A proof that the Serbs have gained full consciousness of their nationality is that the Serbian Orthodox Church is more than ever present in the life of the people in the Srpska republic. The church and its dignitaries, who are very intelligent people, are very often present in moments when important decisions for the people and the Srpska republic are taken.

[Karadzic] People seem to have forgotten that in earlier times, when there was not voting, it was known in the Serbian society who was the most intelligent and most loyal man in the village—the teacher and the priest. Their obligation was not to have their own interests but the interest of the village in mind. We think that the Serbian Orthodox Church is the most important connecting tissue that has preserved the unity of the Serbian people through centuries. The head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Pavle, told me that there were regions close to the Albanian border and in Kosovo in which the few Serbian families had forgotten the Serbian language, but that they had not forgotten that they were Serbs just because they had retained their religion. We do not think the Serbs are atheists. Even those who consider themselves atheists have religious attitudes toward various things. The Srpska republic is exposed to a big danger—the religious and national assimilation. We are exposed to the danger of being physically eliminated, only because we are Serbs and Orthodox. But since one must fight fire with fire, we think we can save ourselves only by remaining Orthodox. The Serbian church has never been inclined to clericalism and our Orthodox dignitaries are wonderful people of high moral values and sharp intellect who have never shown the tendency to interfere with political matters or the functioning of the political system. They have always waited for us to ask them for advice. We think that the church should always be asked for advice. It is an honor for us that they are with us, that they assess the steps we take and support us. We are happy that the unity of the Serbian people has been achieved based on the unity of the Serbian Orthodox Church. I think that our priests should always sit in the first and not the last row, as this was the case in the past 45 years.

I have profited very much from my firm connections with the church. I have heard many useful pieces of advice and received support for my decisions. I have also obtained suggestions for the moves I had to make decisions about. I think that the role of the church in the life of the Serbian people has always been important, so it is only natural that the church is important now when the destiny of the people is being decided. The fear from the church can have only those people who are intolerant and who are not interested in the opinion of the whole nation and those who feel animosity toward religion and spirituality. I am convinced that the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church will be increasingly important; I think that the time of big temptations is coming, the time to restore moral values, so I do not think we should face this risky and dangerous future without the church. We cannot go in that direction with political voluntarism and raw power.

We Preserved the Balance

[Djukanovic] When we have finally shown to the world that we really want peace and when really very influential and highly estimated people mediate in this war with the aim to reach a solution based on negotiations with the Serbs, the Croatian Army is destroying Serbian villages and burning down everything in front of it, but Croatia is still immune of any sanctions. They are not threatened with sanctions and the rage of the Serbs has reached the limits. As supreme commander of the Army, what will be your response to these crimes?

[Karadzic] Our behavior will correspond to the behavior of our enemies. We have achieved the biggest military success in counteroffensive actions. Our commanders were skillful and wise. They forced our enemy to leave his trenches and his defensive formations, so his soldiers became an easy prey for our extremely quick army. That is how we shall behave now, too. We warned the world and Mr. Butrus-Ghali that the Croatian Army invaded our territory and burned down our villages. The Croatian Army must leave our territory, either with or without the use of force. We shall not allow them to stay one footstep on our territory out of formal reasons—the border between us and the Croats in the Livno field was namely drawn between us and them. The Croats will be paid back for what they have done. It was us, the Serbs, who saved the Croats in central Bosnia. Without us they would have been eradicated by the Muslims. We preserved the balance, but after this treacherous attack, we might decide to help the Muslims occupy Croatian territories in a future Muslim-Croatian war. This would make the Muslims require less from us. If we do that, this will be a just punishment for the treason of Herceg-Bosnia. By the way, I am convinced that such an action would not have been done by the previous Herceg-Bosna political leadership presided over by Boban.

[Box p 4]

"There Is No Resurrection Without Death"

I would like to congratulate all of you on the third anniversary of our young republic. Our republic was born and began to walk fighting with one hand against the enemy. I would like our people to spend this Christmas and New Year's in abeyance—that is, without clashes, at least for four months. I hope this cease-fire will develop into permanent peace that will result in the recognition of our state, in its membership in the United Nations perhaps, or in its merger with Serbia. We are the party most interested in peace because we know exactly what we want—we want to organize a free democratic country, we want to transform the property and give it to our people: to the participants in this war first of all, because the participants in this war are not only our soldiers and officers but also those who work. We want to create a republic that is a state of businessmen who will possess something and who will know what they have fought for, who will know why they want to take care of this state. We want to make the economic, political and spiritual rebirth and we know how to make it; therefore it should be believed that we want peace. We are offended when someone accuses us of being a party to the war. I wish our people heavenly peace and good will; I do not want any Serbian people to make war again, in other words I would like this one to be the last Serbian war. I wish to establish good relations with our neighbors after the war. I would like to express my gratitude to our people for their patience, their sacrificing suffering, enthusiasm, for its confidence in its leadership and for its firm support without which we could not have made a single, let alone so many risky and brave, step on the international scene. I would like to convince our people that everything we have suffered for has its purpose—as Njegos would say "There is no resurrection without death." This is the guarantee for the future. We shall follow the great love we have in our hearts for our orphans who have lost either one or both parents. I would like to wish a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year especially to these children. I would like to tell them that they have lost their parents, but that they are not orphans. In the end, I would like to wish a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year to our soldiers. There are no words to describe how confident we are of our people and how thankful we are for everything they have done by having preserved our unity.

[Box p 4]

This Is a Free Country

We would not have achieved the result with a powerful security system, with drills, or by the use of force. Everything has been achieved exclusively because our people have had freedom, and that has given them power. Our people have shown a true historic enthusiasm, and there is no history without such enthusiasm. I am especially proud that ours is a free country.

Tudjman Terminates UNPROFOR Mandate

LD1201192795 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 12 Jan 95

[Address to the nation by President Franjo Tudjman from Presidential Palace in Zagreb—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Croatian anthem] Croatian women and men, citizens of Croatia, I speak to you at a historic moment when, in accordance with my constitutional powers, I have made the decision to end the UN peacekeepers' mandate on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, with effect from 31 March, the expiration date of the current mandate.

Today I informed UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali about this decision, and before that I informed the main international players via my special envoys. The decision is of crucial importance to the further and speedier settlement of the situation in Croatia's occupied territories. Three years ago we agreed to the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in order to end the aggression of the Yugo-Communist Army, Serbia and Montenegro, to prevent the further destruction of Croatian towns, and to avoid the loss of life on a larger scale.

Our decision at the time—to welcome the peacekeeping forces—turned out to be justified. The arrival of the peacekeepers initially and undoubtedly achieved positive results. Within the framework of our defense and political efforts, the open and destructive war in Croatia came to an end, the Yugoslav Army, Navy, and Air Force withdrew from all Croatian areas.

However, our acceptance of the UN peacekeeping forces was also significant, because in this way Croatia embraced a peaceful political solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia, thus meeting all conditions for the international recognition of its independent state. The responsibility for the fact that UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] has failed to carry out its tasks, and has failed to ensure the implementation of the Vance plan, and of all UN Security Council resolutions, is borne by the Serbian rebel leaders in the occupied territories, and even more so by the greater Serbian leaders in Belgrade, who want to include these territories in greater Serbia.

Such greater Serbian and anti-Croatian terrorist elements prevented the disarmament of Serbian paramilitary units, the return of refugees, and control over Croatian borders. Under the smokescreen of the peacekeeping forces they continued with the ethnic cleansing of the remaining Croatian and all non-Serbian people and the bestial killings of defenseless people. Even today, they are trying to prevent the peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories into the constitutional and legal system of Croatia.

They have taken advantage of UNPROFOR's presence and are opposing the UN Security Council's decisions and official statements by the highest ranking representatives of European and other world powers' governments, which confirm that the occupied areas are unquestionably a constitutent part of sovereign Croatia within its internationally recognized borders. These are the reasons why, under the current changed circumstances, Croatia has decided to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate.

In connection with this decision, I would like to express the Republic of Croatia's gratitude to all countries which have sent their troops to the peace forces in Croatia, all members of UNPROFOR and UN officials who have served here, often under difficult and dangerous conditions. We will remember forever all those who have unfortunately lost their lives while carrying out the peace-loving tasks entrusted to them by the United Nations and international humanitarian organizations.

Citizens of Croatia, while informing you about the termination of UNPROFOR's mandate, I would like to stress that by doing this, we are not departing from our dedicated aspiration to reintegrate the occupied areas into Croatia's economic and legal system by peaceful means. We will therefore continue our efforts in direct negotiations and within the framework of the international community's endeavors to normalize Croatian-Serbian relations. This implies the normalization of state relations between Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro—or rather, their Yugoslavia—on the basis of mutual recognition, which is in the interest of creating the conditions for a new international order in this part of Europe.

I will take this opportunity, too, to address all Croatian citizens of Serbian nationality, especially those in the occupied areas. On my own behalf and on behalf of the authorities and the public of democratic Croatia, I call on you to join the efforts directed at avoiding further conflicts, and at finding a peaceful political solution to the problem of the occupied areas, as well as to all political, economic, cultural, and social issues related to your ethnic community's life in Croatia. Democratic Croatia guarantees to you, the Serbs in Croatia, all human and ethnic rights in line with the highest norms of international conventions, and the United Nations and all international players urge you to respect the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia, the state to which you belong.

Men and women of Croatia, all citizens of Croatia, I am convinced that you will fully support this decision on terminating UNPROFOR's mandate, which I have reached in complete agreement with the demands of the Croatian Assembly, and at the unanimous proposal of the Defense and National Security Council, while bearing the full responsibility it entails. Our friends in the world and all the responsible international players can rest assured that Croatia will remain resolute in defense of its national and state interests, but it will also pursue its constructive and peaceful policy.

By implementing this decision, we would like to speed up the reintegration of the Croatian occupied areas in order to be able to dedicate ourselves fully to the economic and cultural reconstruction of our suffering country. The final restoration of peace in Croatia will give an impetus to a speedier solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as toward establishing peace and a new international order in this part of the world. Democratic Croatia has already become, it wants to remain, and will remain, a permanent element of peace and stability in the new international order, built on the ruins of the Yugoslav and communist system.

In order to ensure such a role for the sovereign Croatian state, the Croatian people must continue demonstrating full political maturity and resolution, and extreme wisdom and consistency in the implementation of the overall program, and all the decisions of national policy.

Mikelic Responds

LD1201145095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1345 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 12 Jan (TANJUG)—Borislav Mikelic, prime minister of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], said today that Croatia will be making a big mistake if it cancels its hospitality for the UN peacekeeping forces.

"We have made a positive assessment of the overall activities of the peacekeeping forces, believing that they have reduced tensions, and they have also initiated the negotiations. It would be a big mistake by Croatia and an absolute disaster if—at this stage, when negotiations are under way, and progress is obvious—the peacekeeping forces' mandate is canceled," Mikelic said.

"They are conscious of the serious problems which could arise if UNPROFOR leaves," the RSK prime minister concluded.

Mikelic assessed that yesterday's talks between the RSK delegation and that of Croatia passed in a working atmosphere, without any political connotations, and that they were constructive and important.

The talks on the implementation of the package of economic agreements signed on 2 December last year were held at Pleso Airport and the Croatian delegation was led by Hrvoje Sarinic. David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairmen of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, mediated in the talks.

Mikelic said there was heated argument yesterday over the formation of a joint mixed trading company for exploration and other work in connection with the oil pipeline, but it was nevertheless agreed that it will be opened on 23 January, if by that time the essential specialist work has been finished.

The RSK prime minister said a significant step forward has been made, although there are still plenty of controversial elements and contradictory opinions, especially with regard to the name of the company and how it might be run. According to Mikelic, those issues are not of a formal nature, but central and essential. Negotiations on these issues will continue and solutions will be sought which will satisfy and reconcile the interests of both sides.

Speaking about the highway, Mikelic said that it was agreed that all the necessary repair work on the road signs and the barrier on the road between Zagreb and Lipovac, or rather Belgrade, will be done in order to bring the highway in line with international norms and standards.

Under the agreement on establishing economic relations [between Croatia and Krajina], the opening of the highway is closely related to Croatia returning the parts for the Obrovac hydroelectric plant's rotor, so it was agreed that the parts will be repaired and returned to the plant as soon as possible.

According to Mikelic, progress was also made during yesterday's talks concerning repair of the water supply system, so that one water pipeline can be expected to be opened by 24 February.

Humanitarian issues were also touched on during the talks, which went on for seven hours: the position and status of refugees and the problem of pensions. Talks on these issues will be resumed in Knin and Split on 27 and 24 February respectively.

The Krajina side reiterated its demand that a meeting with the commander of the peace forces in the former Yugoslavia, General Bertrand de Lapresle, and the special UN envoy, Yasushi Akashi, will be held as soon as possible in order to clarify all misunderstandings about the implementation of the cease-fire agreement, especially concerning the line of separation and the buffer zone, Mikelic said.

Tudjman, Cochairmen Meet

LD1201183195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1757 GMT 12 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan. 12 (TANJUG)—International mediators on the former Yugoslavia Lord David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg met with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman here on Thursday. The meeting focused on the resumption of the process of normalizing Croatia-Serb Krajina relations and on results of the two sides' hitherto talks.

Owen told reporters after the meeting that headway was made in Croatia-Krajina talks on Wednesday and that, for the first time, concrete deadlines were set for implementing the Dec 2 agreement normalizing Croatia-Krajina economic relations.

Croatia and Krajina agreed at Wednesday's talks, also attended by Owen and Stoltenberg, to provide international standard on the Zagreb-Belgrade Highway, with solely international road signs set up by the United

Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR]. The two sides also agreed that an oil pipeline be opened on Jan. 23 if necessary repairs were completed by that time.

Under the Croatia-Krajina economic agreement, the highway, running in parts through the Serb Krajina territory, was, after three years, reopened to traffic on Dec. 21.

Owen said an extension of the U.N. Protection Force mandate was up to Croatia. Croatian officials, led by Tudjman, have renewed threats that Croatia will withhold its consent for an extension of the UNPROFOR mandate that expires on March 31. Under the Vance Plan, the U.N. peacekeepers are to stay in Krajina until a political settlement has been reached to the Krajina-Croatia dispute.

Serb Krajina Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic said Thursday that Croatia would be making a big mistake if it denied hospitality to UNPROFOR at a time when negotiations yielded results.

Owen said he had informed Tudjman about his and Stoltenberg's meeting with Serbian President slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade on Tuesday. Owen said a normalization of relations and a resumption of talks between Croatia and Yugoslavia were a key to peace in the former Yugoslavia. Croatia and Yugoslavia started the process of normalizing their relations in February 1994.

Granic Begins Talks With Kinkel in Bonn

LD1201153095 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Jan 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic has arrived in Bonn from Paris. His meeting with [German Foreign Minister] Klaus Kinkel, which began a few moments ago, is awaited with great interest.

Although the topics of their talks have not been made public, it has been learned from well-informed sources that the Croatian foreign minister has come here to inform Bonn about the situation in the region, especially in areas under the mandate of the UN Protection Force.

Before his meeting with Kinkel, Minister Granic had talks today in the Croatian Embassy for over an hour with Charles Redman, U.S. ambassador in Bonn and President Clinton's former envoy for the UN Protected Areas and Bosnia. Redman continues to deal with these areas as part of his work. [passage omitted]

New Paper in RSK To Promote Training of MUP

LD1301095395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0901 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Borovo Naselje, 13 Jan (TANJUG)—The first edition of the paper DRUGI MAJ 91 [2 MAY 1991], which is issued by the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] Internal Affairs Ministry's [MUP] department for Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem, came out today in Borovo Naselje in the republic of Serb Krajina.

The paper is designed to inform the public and promote the specialist training of members of the Krajina MUP.

For the time being, the paper will come out once a month and is called DRUGI MAJ 91 after the day the people of Borovo Selo first used arms to fight the Croatian police who raided their village.

Albanians Consider Withdrawing From Government

AU1201170495 Skopje MIC in English 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] "The Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] are thinking about withdrawing from the government, and later on, maybe from the parliament, too," the president of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] and vice president of the Macedonian Parliament Abdurahman Aliti told MIC yesterday. Aliti explains this opinion with dissatisfaction with the overall attitude toward the Albanians and the changed course in government policy, following the elections. "If the government continues along this course, we have no other option, as our actions within the institutions of the system are without result and the demands to do that are becoming louder and louder," said Aliti. [passage omitted]

Internationalization of Albanian Question Viewed

AU1101122695 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 10 Jan 95 p 8

[Commentary by B. Geroski: "'Kosovization' Here or 'Macedonization' There?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In February this year an international conference will be held in the United States entitled "Transformation of the Balkan Societies" and subtitled "The Political, Economic, and Social Changes in Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], and Montenegro." This means that the subject of the conference will be the Albanian question in the Balkans. For observers here it means that this will be yet another event in the series of events that confirm the theory about attempts to achieve a regional globalization of the Albanian question, and the participation of the Albanian politicians and intellectuals from Macedonia is here observed in particular.

The comments after the discussion in Pristina BUJKU a couple of weeks ago, when some controversial statements by Abdurahman Aliti and Arben Djaferi (extracted from the whole text) were reported, have been very animated and disconcerting.

Global Schemes

Nevertheless, although the wish of the Albanians to live in one state is openly expressed, we should be extremely careful in assessing the real bases and goals of these global concepts for the Albanian question. To a degree they are a result of the promotion of new global schemes for the Balkans, such as Milosevic's idea for a "Balkan Federation" of Serbia, Greece, and Macedonia. Kosovo leader Ibrahim Rugova responded with an idea for a confederation of independent Kosovo and Albania. No matter how deeply rooted these ideas are in emotions, it is hard to believe that they can be a method for changing constant positions of the international community (that borders in the south of the region are unchangeable) and that the Albanians from Macedonia will be included in this on the level of a political action.

We are familiar with attempts to internationalize the Albanian question—there has already been the idea to organize an international conference on the subject. There is also the theory that a possible lifting of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will be made conditional on the solution of the Kosovo problem and that Macedonia might be an influence. The latest strong reactions of the Kosovo leaders and the Albanian state regarding events surrounding Tetovo "University" and the deportation of approximately 20 Albanians (of Kosovo origin) from Macedonia suggest that Pristina and Tirana are lobbying internationally to place Macedonia in the same boat as Milosevic's regime and thus dramatize the situation with a view to a global solution. Normally, these attempts do not jibe with the Macedonian authorities' solid positions on this issue on the international scene, and the positions of Milosevic's regime are not to be compared.

Faith in "Intifada"

We can conclude, however, that these tendencies have and will have an unfavorable impact on Macedonia's internal plan. We can detect a measure of patronizing behavior toward these ideas, and even directly toward the Kosovo "personnel" by some Albanian intellectuals and politicians. For the sake of accuracy, there are also elements of natural affinity and concern for the fate of the repressed in Kosovo, but the problem becomes apparent when this concern is displayed more persistently—when it is believed that the recipe of the Kosovo "intifada" must be accepted and applied in Macedonia.

This is the worst thing that could happen to us in Macedonia—Kosovization of the situation. This trend is in contradiction with previous experience, and even with longer traditions, and it is definitely in contradiction with the commitments of the international factors that would prefer to see a "Macedonization" of the situation in Kosovo. Nevertheless, we have reason to believe that it is actually not a hellish scenario, but a series of circumstances that, as it is claimed, endanger the identity of the Albanians in Macedonia. This might be understandable with the general increase of xenophobia, but so long as we believe in rationality of policy, this cannot happen.

'Eye to Eye' Discussions With Greece Suggested

AU1301111195 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 12 Jan 95 p 2

[Editorial by Zoran Andonovski: "A Fiasco Can Also Be a Start"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Greek attempts to show Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and its President as not ready to make concessions are taking on new dimensions. After refusing, for several years, direct contacts with the Macedonian side, the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and the head of the Greek diplomacy Karolos Papoulias expressed readiness for such contacts in their recent statements, although they also expressed some reservations. Now Papandreou and Papoulias "do not oppose" meeting with the Macedonian colleagues provided that such meetings are well prepared. It actually means that the Greek side takes these meetings as the finalization of a longer process of negotiations needed to prepare the meetings, that is a process that can help level the differences and prepare possible documents that might be signed at such a summit.

We must recall that since the beginning, that is the time when Greece was obstructing the independence of Macedonia and its association with international organizations, Macedonia has always proposed a direct dialogue of representatives of both the countries for the purpose of viewing all the disputes. It was many times repeated that mediators cannot replace direct contacts that will certainly be more productive. President Gligorov is constantly repeating that he is in favor of negotiations and meetings with the Greek political leadership, but since the neighbor is blocking our southern border, this is quite impossible. It is abnormal to expect the Macedonian politicians to sit at a negotiating table under the pressure of the embargo and the caprice of the Greek border authorities.

It is probably important that the "offer" for direct discussions came just after U.S. President Clinton's statement for the Greek daily KATHIMERINI on Sunday, 8 January. In addition to the usual "I hope that the dispute will soon be resolved" Clinton called upon "each side to be more flexible in dealing with the legitimate concerns of the other side, in order to find a proper and balanced solution for the differences."

Did Clinton say this deliberately?

Do we have to understand his statement for the Greek newspaper as a message to both countries?

How can we otherwise understand "flexible" and "legitimate concerns of each side," and obviously these are the key expressions in these sentences?

Although there is a Balkan paranoia and need to look for a "message" in every statement and word, it is a fact that the Greek state machinery moves whenever it gets impetus from the outside, as was now the case with the statement of the U.S. President. On such occasions the Greek diplomacy reacts promptly and—it immediately offers a "proof" of good will, with the aim of showing that it is the other side's fault and that Macedonia is "not flexible," that it is stiff and not ready for concessions and that it is the one that has to be pressed. We need not go far back in history to see that there is no other alternative than direct negotiations when bilateral problems, disputes, conflicts, hostilities, and even wars have to be settled. Let us take the German-Polish agreement, which is now mentioned as an idea for the solution of the disputes between Macedonia and Greece. After 1000 years of disputes, three years ago the negotiations between the two countries were successfully resolved, and the Polish Prime Minister assessed for NOVA MAKEDONIJA that their present relations are "the best example of practical and reasonable thinking about the future of the nations and states." According to him, the "luggage of history is today no more an obstacle.... Germany is today Poland's biggest economic partner and one of its main political partners." The experiences of the direct negotiations between Poland and Germany are a good example. Although they started on an expert level and although they were interrupted several times and the negotiating table was left with a lot of emotion and big words, the negotiations—thanks to sometimes "boiling" (but still direct, eye to eye) discussions—brought results that please both sides.

The Macedonian-Greek impasse looks like a real impasse to all of us. Nevertheless, what we need now are brave decisions and some should forget their pride and start to look for a mutual outcome. We respect and thank the mediators, but we in the Balkans know each other in the best way, we know the best way to insult each other, to pardon each other, and we know our characters and mentalities in the best way. That is why there is no substitute for dialogue on an equal footing and without blackmail and it is the only way to resolve the situation in due course. Even if the start is a fiasco—it can be taken as a kind of a start.

Statistics Show Prices Rising, Salaries Falling

AU1101123595 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 6 Jan 95 p 1

[K.C.-attributed report: "Costs Are Rising—Salaries Are Falling"—all figures as published]

[FBIS Translated Text] In comparison with 1993, prices and the cost of living were higher last year. Statisticians have calculated that retail prices have risen by 121.8 percent, and the cost of living by 128.3 percent. The highest price increases occurred in the services sector—160.4 percent; beverages—143.8 percent; agricultural products—129.6 percent; food industry—115.3 percent; and nonfood industry—102.8 percent. According to the Republican Institute for Statistics, retail prices were 55.4 percent higher in December 1994 compared with December 1993. Statistical calculations show that the prices of agricultural products increased most—20 percent, which was due to a 33.5 percent rise in the price of vegetables and a 2.3 percent rise in the price of eggs. The prices of services rose by 4.5 percent. This was due to the higher prices for housing services—13.5 percent; transportation—4 percent; personal services—1.7 percent; and handicrafts—0.8 percent.

The costs of living was 37.7 percent higher in December 1994 compared with December 1993. Rents, water, and services showed the highest rise, 8.5 percent. The price of food rose by 3.6 percent.

Regarding prices and the cost of living, one should perhaps also mention the statistics on salaries. According to the Republican Institute for Statistics, last year salaries were 9.7 percent lower compared with the previous year. This figure for real net salaries was worked out on the basis of statisticians' reckoning of nominal net salaries and the cost of living. A drop in monthly salaries will be felt by those in the nonproduction sector, where salaries will be 18.8 percent lower, while the drop in the production sector will amount to 7.3 percent. The average net salary in our country in 1994 is estimated to be 7,817 denars. The salary in the production sector was 7,451 denars, while in the nonproduction sector it was 9,016 denars.

Decision on Founding of Albanian University

95P20363A Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 19 Dec 94 p 2

["Text" of the Decision on the Founding of the University]

[FBIS Translated Text] In light of the fact that education aims at the complete development of the human personality and the strengthening of a feeling of respect for human rights and basic freedoms and, at the same time, in order to promote understanding, tolerance and friendship of all peoples and other ethnic or religious groups in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]

On the basis of Article 13 of the General Declaration on Human Rights which specifies the right of every person to education at all levels;

On the basis of the initiative of the assembly of Albanian intellectuals on the university level, of other associations and of Albanian political subjects in the Republic of Macedonia, held on 4 June 1994;

In light of the decision of the assembly held on 26 November 1994;

In view of the indolent attitude of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia in regard to the request and plan for the establishment of a university with Albanian as the language of instruction;

In light of the constitutional basis found in Article 44 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia;

Representatives of the communal assemblies of the communes of Tetovo, Gostivar, Kumanovo, Debar, Kercovo and Struga; representatives of the Party for Democratic Prosperity, the People's Democratic Party, the Albanian Democratic League—Liberal Party, the Party for Democratic Action—Islamic Path, the People's Democratic Party—Party of People's Unity, the Union of Albanian Women in Macedonia, deputies in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, the Council for the Founding of the University, and other societies and associations registered in the Republic of Macedonia—all in the capacity of an Assembly for the Founding of the University with Albanian as the Language of Instruction, in Macedonia, at a solemn meeting held on 17 December 1994, issued the following decision on the founding of the university with Albanian as the language of instruction in the Republic of Macedonia.

Article 1: By this decision, the university with Albanian as the language of instruction is founded in the Republic of Macedonia.

Article 2: The name of the university is: the University of Tetovo.

Article 3: The university is located in Tetovo, at 68 "Gjorce Petrov" Street.

Article 4: The University of Tetovo is a legal person.

Article 5: The University of Tetovo has its own seal and emblem. The form and content of the seal and the emblem are stipulated in the statute of the university.

Article 6: Initially, the University of Tetovo has the following faculties; philology. philosophy, mathematical and natural sciences, law, economics and arts.

Article 7: The activity of the University of Tetovo is based on the juridical educational system of the Republic of Macedonia.

The teaching plans and schedules of the faculties of the University of Tetovo are coordinated with the teaching plans and schedules of the existing universities in the Republic of Macedonia.

Article 8: The university is directed by its senate, scientific- educational council and rectorate.

Until the bodies mentioned in the first paragraph of this article are set up, the university will be directed by the Council for the Founding of the University and the branch chiefs of the faculties.

The chairman of this council calls and presides at meetings.

Article 9: Until approval is given for financing from the budget of the Republic of Macedonia, funds for the operation of the university will be obtained from voluntary donations from the population and various donors.

The donations will be used in accordance with regulations on accounting and financial activity in the Republic of Macedonia.

Article 10: Within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision, the Council for the Founding of the University is obliged to issue the Statute of the University and other normative acts.

Article 11: No later than 20 December 1994, the Council for the Founding of the University will announce a competition for the admission and registration of students for the 1994/95 academic year.

Article 12: This decision goes into effect on the day that it is issued.

The Assembly for the Founding of the University With Albanian as the Language of Instruction in the Republic of Macedonia

[Signed] Prof. Dr. Fadil Sulejmani, Chairman

[Dated] 17 December 1994, Tetovo

Drnovsek Presents Foreign Policy Priorities

AU1101172795 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 11 Jan 95

[Report by Nadja Pengov on news conference by Dr. Janez Drnovsek, prime minister and acting foreign minister, in Ljubljana on 11 January—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Pengov] The prime minister said that a new cycle in our country's foreign activity is beginning with the new year. Regarding the recently often-voiced doubts as to whether Slovenia has a foreign policy strategy, Drnovsek replied that it has. Even in the future, the European Union [EU] will remain our chief interest and integration in the European Free Trade Association [EFTA] is a part of the efforts for economic integration within the European region.

Drnovsek admitted that there have been no major contacts with Rome recently, which he ascribed to Italian internal political affairs. However, there have been and are contacts with other politicians. For example, van den Broek, who is in charge of liaison between the EU and Slovenia, is coming to Ljubljana in the near future:

[Drnovsek] We will try to close the negotiations on associate membership within the French mandate, that is, the French presidency of the EU. Our feelings and expectations from this presidency are positive and our impressions are very good. Our assessment based on the contacts so far is that France will actively try to resolve this issue.

[Pengov] One of our major problems, Drnovsek believes, is the differences among the coalition partners in viewing the relations with Italy. For this reason, he finds it necessary to harmonize views and agree on an unanimous policy in Slovenia. In this sense, he will propose talks about relations with Italy and the EU succession, and relations with Croatia to all parliamentary parties in the next few days.

Regarding the relations with Italy, the Aquileia document suits Rome and we all know this. However, it is true, as he says, that at present Slovenia would have signed the document earlier than two months ago. Namely, the property is being sold off and when we count it again there will be significantly less of it.

The question of succession is gaining in importance. Namely, a belief is spreading in the world that, also from an economic viewpoint, Slovenia has paid too low a price for escaping from the Yugoslav crisis.

Regarding relations with Croatia, Drnovsek said that Slovenia will enter a new serious round of negotiations. In this sense, some time soon a special foreign ministry envoy will travel to Zagreb with a letter that should mark the formal beginning of new talks on all open issues. [passage omitted]

Kucan Seeks Support for EU Associate Membership

AU1001170395 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 10 Jan 95

[Report by Branko Maksimovic from Vienna]

[FBIS Translated Text] I did not come in Vienna to solicit Austria's support in the so-called Slovene-Italian dispute, but to explain my views in more detail, President Kucan said at noon, following the first round of talks with his host, Austrian President Thomas Klestil.

One could speculate about the reasons for this very hastily organized meeting, from the presence of Foreign Minister Alois Mock. Namely, at the end of last year, on various occasions, both Austrian politicians made statements that could imply that Austria fully supports its third neighbor, Italy.

However, President Klestil was perfectly clear in today's brief statement for reporters: Austria fully supports Slovenia in its way toward the European institutions, therefore, initially in signing the EU [European Union] associate membership agreement. Bilateral problems between individual states should not be an obstacle here.

President Kucan emphasized that Austria, through its EU membership, acquired a new positions in the international relations and for this reason its support was even more precious. Austria was among those countries that helped Slovenia the most during the process of gaining its independence. The current drawing closer to the EU is the continuation of this process.

President Kucan continued the talks in Vienna during a private lunch hosted by Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, which was also attended by Parliamentary Speaker Heinz Fischer.

Kucan: EU Associate Membership; Row With Italy

AU1201194695 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 12 Jan 95 p 5

[Interview with President Milan Kucan by Irene Miller; place and date not given: "Austria's Support for Slovenia Has Always Been Undisputed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Miller] President Kucan, people in Slovenia have talked of Austrian statements said to signal understanding for Italy's position in the controversy with Slovenia; was this the reason for your visit here today?

[Kucan] The only reason for my visit was the new quality of the position in which Austria has been since its entry into the EU [European Union]. Slovenia has always been supported by Austria and now we are hoping again for its active assistance regarding our efforts for associate EU membership. I wanted to see if Austria's interest remains as undisputed and if Austria supports Slovenia's view that bilateral disagreements must be separated from the associate membership talks. In talks with all my partners—Klestil, Mock, Vranitzky, and Fischer—I received positive answers to both my questions.

[Miller] What could Austria's support look like in concrete terms?

[Kucan] I think that Austria's commitment to Slovenia can only be looked at from the basis of Austria's and the entire EU's objective interest in expanding the Union to all of Europe. We want to be treated in the same way as those that already are associate members. We cannot understand why we are being discriminated against and asked to fulfill additional conditions. We are convinced that even now we fulfill the conditions for associate membership—in political and economic terms.

[Miller] Do you think that the dispute with Italy could be settled faster if a new government were to take over in Rome?

[Kucan] Pending problems are not good. They have to be solved. Our problem with Italy must be solved through the application of European law: We are planning to cancel the discriminatory clause in our constitution that prohibits the purchase of land by foreigners—for all foreigners, and not just for Italians. In addition, there are applicable treaties between Italy and Slovenia—those of Osimo and the Rome Agreements. This does not mean that one cannot change them, but one can do so only by mutual agreement and not by exerting pressure, or through an EU veto; not by requesting better conditions from Slovenia today than from Yugoslavia before. We will discuss this with any Italian Government; still, talking about a change of government in Rome would be mere speculation.

Not a Tenth Province

[Miller] Some have said that solving the dispute over property with Italy could create a precedent for similar claims from another side.

[Kucan] There are no other comparable claims. All others will be decided according to the Law on Denationalization. These procedures are very slow, which is actually inexcusable, but they are the same for all, Slovenes or foreigners.

[Miller] Has clarity been achieved meanwhile about the size of the German-speaking or old Austrian minority in Slovenia, which is being examined by a commission?

[Kucan] The commission has not yet provided a result. Yet, one should let it work in peace and not politicize the issue of the Austrian minority beforehand.

[Miller] Are there fears in Slovenia that your country might become Austria's tenth province?

[Kucan] Such fears do not originate from Slovenia. They are an echo of European speculations regarding the Balkans, an outgrowth of Balkan politics. Only a few days ago, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic tried to explain to me that we have become a third-class Austrian province. This belongs in the same category as accusations that claim that Yugoslavia has been annihilated by a German-Austrian-Vatican plot, accusations that were directed against Foreign Minister Mock in many cases.

Even the communists in Slovenia did not believe the Serb president. He is not a Slovene. And I add that he is not a communist, either. His totalitarian ideology only serves the strengthening of his own position. I have come from the communist camp and I would like to point out that many things included in the Communist Manifesto were based on Christian ethical teachings. Yet, that was a long time ago. It is probably the merit of our time to see the great ideologies end.

People in Slovenia have always considered Austria's position to be the result of a thorough knowledge of Yugoslav circumstances. Better than others Austria could understand why Yugoslavia had to fall apart. And Austria tried to make Yugoslavia disintegrate peacefully and prevent the tragic path of war.

Foreign Debt Strategy Debated at Closed Session

AU1201194595 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] As you may have heard, the official communique on the Slovene Government session does not mention the contents of the closed part of the session. According to our information, ministers devoted part of it to the relations with foreign partners.

In the presence of National Bank Governor France Arhar and Mojmir Mrak, the head of our negotiating team, they discussed Slovenia's relations with the foreign debtors of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. This was, therefore, a government debate about further negotiations with a group of commercial banks. Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek also indicated this possibility yesterday.

In the next few days, this problem will most probably be discussed by State Chamber deputies at an extraordinary closed session. This parliamentary session could take place as early as in the middle of next week.

As is known, the joint debt of the former SFRY to the group of commercial banks amounts to a little more than $4 billion. Our country is willing to pay the entire so-called allocated debt, that is, the debts used in Slovenia, as well as an appropriate share of the unallocated debt, that is, a share of the money whose end user cannot be established. It must be pointed out that the group of commercial banks in the Paris Club is the only group of foreign debtors with whom Slovenia has not regulated its relations yet. In the talks so far, Slovenia was willing to pay $500 million of the unallocated debt, however, the representatives of the group demanded twice the sum—$1.2 billion.

Slovenia must take action to gain complete financial independence as quickly as possible, otherwise our country will, due to the course that the Geneva talks on succession of the former SFRY have taken, ended up in the same basket as other countries that have emerged on its territory after the disintegration. In such a case, Slovenia will be forced to settle a corresponding share of its obligations to the group of commercial banks. The group of banks, despite the ruling of the Badinter commission, continues to proclaim the FRY to be the sole successor of the former Yugoslavia.

Rapid Breakthrough on Succession Issue 'Vital'

AU1101191395 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 11 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The parliamentary activity was bustling today as several committees and commissions held sessions. The Committee for International Relations primarily debated a report on a session of the Working Commission for Succession of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia. The above meeting took place in Geneva at the end of November. Today, the committee also adopted a stance on the Russian intervention in Chechnya and several initiatives for various laws and their ratification. Zvone Zorko reports:

[Begin recording] It transpired from a report by Dr. Miran Mejak, head of the Slovene delegation at the above meeting, that the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] delegation had returned the entire debate to the beginning by continuing to insist on the viewpoint that the FRY is the sole legal successor of the former Yugoslavia. This would mean, among other things, that it would acquire an exclusive role in relation to foreign debtors, which is absolutely unacceptable for Slovenia. Namely, if this viewpoint prevails, Slovenia would only be able to negotiate with foreign debtors indirectly, that is, via Belgrade, while the division of obligations toward foreign debtors would become a subject of internal negotiations under the dictate of Serbia and Montenegro. In light of the solidarity clause, the biggest share of this debt would fall on Slovenia.

A more or less unanimous opinion prevailed at the session of the committee that it is of vital importance for Slovenia to achieve a rapid breakthrough in the relations with foreign debtors by accelerating the negotiations with a group of commercial banks and the Paris Club countries, trying to find an agreement with them.

The question, of course, is what price Slovenia would have to pay for this? The fact is, however, that, by this, Slovenia would assert its financial sovereignty in international financial and economic relations and would, above all, escape from the so-called Yugoslav club in which some international financial and political circles would still like to see us.

The session explicitly emphasized that a national consensus must be reached on this issue, that is, that party differences must be overcome. They demanded that the government accelerate all the necessary preparations for these talks. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Article Views Political Control of Security Services

AU1301084895 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 6 Jan 95 p 2

[Report by Vinko Vasle: "Political Doctrine Prevailing in Our Security-Intelligence Services"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 5 January—At today's session, the Slovene Government appointed Drago Fers—the current acting chief of the Security-Intelligence Agency (SOVA)—who has many years of experience in this activity, to the post of director of this service. The appointment, of course, did not go smoothly as the Christian Democratic ministers, at a sort of telephone session, did not support Fers.

The SKD [the Slovene Christian Democratic Party] explained that the candidacy for the new director was not harmonized within the coalition, while the opposite side was proving that the session in question was not a telephone government session, but merely a debate in the government cadre commission. Regardless of this initial dispute, following additional talks and explanations, the Christian Democratic ministers also supported Drago Fers at today's government session. The entire incident was more about the well-known differences and conflicts between the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and the SKD, due to which the coalition agreement is not being observed at all, than about doubts in the candidate. An interesting question is that of how long Drago Fers will remain the director of the service. The question is justified not merely because Fers has, even so far, inspired some doubts (ranging from that he has been in the service for too long to that he lacks a sufficient party profile), but primarily because the latest SOVA director is the fourth since we have had a democratically elected government and parliament. Last year alone, the government replaced three directors. After the political showdown with Dr. Miha Brejc, director of VIS [the Security Information Service], the chiefs followed each other rapidly. The ousting of Brejc, who was not merely a victim of party and political conflicts, but also of his closest aide, deputy Roman Jeglic, proved that the continuity of the notorious State Security Service mirrors itself in at least one aspect: Namely, that a great number of politicians, parties, and officials view this service as their home turf and their property, at least for the time that they are in power. This is no guarantee (which is still lacking) that the cadre and especially the operations of SOVA will be depoliticized.

For this reason, on the day when SOVA, after having had acting chiefs for over a year, got its director, one cannot say that the service was consolidated in terms of its cadre and doctrine, depoliticized, and relieved of the burden of various current and future day-to-day political appetites and pressures. The absorbed of VIS into SOVA itself gave rise to various doubts and sparked open opposition. Namely, VIS fell under the authority of the Interior Ministry, while SOVA was "usurped" by the government. If this change took place also because of fear and criticism that the interior minister had too great power and authority, then the transfer of the security-intelligence activity under the government's auspices did not change such a ratio of powers either. The power was merely transferred from a minister to the prime minister, that is, the government, while the parliament's responsibility remained to only determine a sort of SOVA general policy and to supervise the legality of its work. It has transpired in the so-called Bucar's State Chamber commission on numerous occasions that this supervision was not possible because the commission was not sufficiently informed about the activity of this service.

The law on security-intelligence activity, which is supposed to give answers to many interesting and important questions and which was presented in parliament in July 1994, following numerous polemics and debates, has still not been passed to this very day. The law was drafted by the government, which even tried to rush it through the State Chamber in a summary procedure. However, the home commission for the supervision of the legality of the work of the security-information services dismissed this proposal with a very intriguing general remark that the law was good for the service and the state, but bad for the individual and for parliamentary democracy. This is, of course, the law that will not only regulate the authorities and the work of SOVA, but also the work of VOMO (a similar service in the Defense Ministry) and the Interior Ministry Crime Department. The law was supposed to draw a line between the activities of all three sectors, which it failed to do. This is also due to an intervention by the current SOVA director, who demanded that the law also allowed the service to act in the domestic sphere. Had the proposal been accepted, SOVA would have gained very great authority and even police powers, which is something its leadership was lobbying for, and so forth. Also of interest was the legal proposal that the service would inform the prime minister about all the most important findings first, and the other consumers only on the basis of his decision.

It is evident that the doctrine of our security-intelligence service primarily rests on the party and political interests of those who are currently in power, which is the biggest danger of a possible abuse of such services.

Federal

UN Extends Easing of Sanctions 100 Days

LD1301090195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0043 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] New York, 12 Jan (TANJUG)—The UN Security Council on Thursday evening [12 January] voted in favor of the resolution to extend the partial lifting of sanctions against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] for a further 100 days. There were 14 votes in favor, no votes against, and one abstention.

The only country to abstain was Russia, whose ambassador, Sergey Lavrov, stressed that the Council ought to show more understanding for Yugoslavia's contribution to the peace process and definitively lift the hitherto exceptional sanctions and consider easing the situation by taking other measures. [passage omitted]

Envoy Criticizes UN Decision

LD1301120195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1128 GMT 13 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Jan. 13 (TANJUG)-—Yugoslav Ambassador to the U.N. Dragomir Djokic has said that the Security Council decision to continue implementing most of the sanctions against Yugoslavia favours extremists in Bosnia and Yugoslavia and gives precedence to war over peace.

Ambassador Djokic said in the Security Council on Thursday—before the vote on the extension of the partial suspension of sanctions against Yugoslavia for another 100 days but under new conditions—that the decision strengthened the hard-line Bosnian Muslim leadership in its conviction that the continued sanctions against Yugoslavia and the Serb people as a whole were the shortest way of achieving their (Muslim) political goals.

He said that the sanctions favoured also Serb extremists who insisted that the sanctions would be implemented regardless of what steps Yugoslavia took and that war was therefore the right option.

Djokic said the partial suspension of sanctions under new conditions reflected a lack of will to evaluate Yugoslavia's constructive role in the quest of a peaceful solution to the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Yugoslav ambassador said the draft resolution on the extension of the partial suspension for another 100 days but under new conditions practically called for an end to all forms of economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Krajina Serbs.

Djokic said the draft resolution also tried to exact Yugoslavia's indirect recognition of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. He said the recognition was unacceptable to Yugoslavia before a comprehensive political solution was accepted by all sides.

Djokic said the Security Council had so far failed to abide by its resolution 943 under which the partial suspension of sanctions against Yugoslavia had gone into effect on Oct. 5 last year. He said Yugoslavia encountered problems in securing imports of humanitarian goods, medical supplies and heating gas because the U.N. Sanctions Committee failed to approve the respective deliveries.

Djokic said that, although the sanctions relating to air links had been suspended, the United States did not allow any information about flights to Belgrade to be given to potential passengers and did not allow the booking or sale of air tickets for flights to Belgrade. Djokic termed unacceptable any linkage of the continued partial suspension of sanctions against Yugoslavia to conditions other than those originally set for the lifting of the sanctions and conditions not related to the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Foreign Ministry Criticizes Kovacs' Remarks

LD1201164195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1502 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 12 Jan (TANJUG)—In connection with a recent statement by Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs about the situation in Kosovo-Metohija, which he made in his capacity as chairman of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], the Federal Foreign Ministry has issued a special statement rejecting the Hungarian minister's irrational claims of an alleged threat to human rights and freedoms in this part of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].

A press release issued by the Federal Foreign Ministry says the Hungarian minister described in an unfounded way the arrest of members of an illegal paramilitary and parapolice organization in Kosovo-Metohija, created with the aim of achieving the armed and forceful separation of this part of the FRY, as "repression" and "the violation of basic human rights and the fundamental principles of the CSCE."

The Federal Foreign Ministry believes that this ill-intentioned statement is an attempt to internationalize an internal question of the FRY on the pretext of concern for human rights.

The FRY mission at the United Nations handed the Yugoslav Ministry's statement to the General Assembly with a request that it be distributed as an official document.

Belgrade Denies Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo

LD1201205395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1914 GMT 12 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 12 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry on Thursday rejected allegations that human rights and freedoms were violated in Serbia's southern Province of Kosovo and Metohija.

The ministry said in a statement that allegations voiced by Chairman of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, former CSCE) Laszlo Kovacs were unfounded and ill-intentioned.

Kovacs has alleged that the arrest of members of an illegal paramilitary organization in Kosovo and Metohija was an act of repression and violation of the fundamental human rights and CSCE principles, the ministry statement said.

It said the illegal organization had been founded to carry out an armed secession of the province from Yugoslavia and its Republic of Serbia.

The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry said that under the pretext of concern for human rights, this ill-intentioned statement marked an attempt to internationalize an internal problem of Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav mission to the United Nations has submitted the Yugoslav ministry statement to the General Assembly, requesting that it be distributed as an official document.

Yugoslavia's ethnic groups, including ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija, have all rights guaranteed by international law, from the right to have schools and media in their language to the right to participate in the country's political life.

A strong separatist movement has been active in Kosovo and Metohija since 1981. It aims to secede the province from Yugoslavia and annexe it to neighboring Albania.

TANJUG on OSCE Request on Monitoring

LD1101173095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1720 GMT 11 Jan 95

[By Stevan Cordas]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 11 (TANJUG)—The request of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] that Yugoslavia accept OSCE missions which would 'monitor' the situation in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina is a new and dangerous game on the part of the international community.

The request reflects an unproductive and one-sided approach because it is not coupled with the intention to reintegrate Yugoslavia—whose status in the OSCE has been frozen—although it would only be normal to do so in view of Yugoslavia's engagement.

The situation was similar when the U.N. Security Council voted to introduce the sanctions against Yugoslavia, after which U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali conceded that sanctions were a dull instrument which did more harm than good.

In both the case of the U.N. sanctions and the freezing of Yugoslavia's membership in the then CSCE, now OSCE, precedents have been set—decisions were taken in both cases for political reasons and the so-called Yugoslav issue was stretched to the point of the absurd.

In the case of relations with the OSCE, there was reason for some optimism when a delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly recently arrived in Belgrade. However, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Frank Swaelen has said that the delegation left Belgrade disappointed because of Yugoslavia's alleged lack of readiness to cooperate with the OSCE.

It is obvious that what is desired is to get the ball into somebody else's courtyard because Yugoslavia has in fact been eliminated from the OSCE for purely political reasons. On the other hand, instead of the OSCE initiating the normailization of relations and cooperation, it has shifted the ball to Belgrade with the unacceptable explanation that technical impediments were involved.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on Jan. 1 this year under a decision taken by the Budapest summit in December. The impression is, however, that the change has been only cosmetic and not substantive.

One of the substantive changes should have related to the principle of consensus. Yugoslavia's reintegration into the OSCE would require a 'yes' vote from each of the 52 OSCE members. It is hardly likely that 'yes' votes would in the given situation come from Croatia, Slovenia, Albania, Austria and some others. To make matters even more absurd, an imaginary Bosnia-Herzegovina is not only an OSCE member but it, too, has the right to 'veto.'

The consensus principle in the CSCE was violated only once, when the decision to 'freeze' Yugoslavia's membership was taken. A new rule was invented at the time—'consensus-minus one'—to deprive Yugoslavia of the right to vote.

Many participants in the recent Budapest summit drew attention to the harmful effects of such a principle and even proposed that it be replaced with the principle of 'consensus-minus ten' in certain cases.

It was agreed at the Budapest summit, at which the CSCE became the OSCE, that the organization's future statute regulate the consensus issue. It is uncertain when the statute will be adopted and till such a time Yugoslavia has moderate chances of regaining its full membership in the organization, regardless of its wishes and the fact that the international community's view of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia has fundamentally changed.

Death Rate Increase Since UN Sanctions Imposed

LD1201163595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1526 GMT 12 Jan 95

["Pool" item; By Zorica Markovic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 12 (TANJUG)—The death rate in Yugoslavia has gone up eight percent since the international sanctions were introduced in May 1992, epidemiologist Dr Miodrag Djordjevic of the Institute for Radiology and Oncology of Serbia has told TANJUG.

Dr Djordjevic said that, according to his estimates, more than 9,000 patients in Yugoslavia would not have died in the respective period had it not been for the sanctions.

Djordjevic said the mortalitiy rate in Yugoslavia had stagnated before the sanctions.

The U.N. Security Council in late May 1992 imposed comprehensive mandatory sanctions against the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro because of alleged Yugoslav involvement in the civil war in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Djordjevic said his institute's department for biostatistics and epidemiology estimated that the number of new cancer cases for 1994 could be as high as 32,000. He said 20,000 people had died of cancer in Yugoslavia last year at a rate of seven a day.

Djordjevic said the entire Yugoslav population had been under great stress for more than two years which was expected to reflect in a great increase in the number of cancer patients in the coming ten years. He said the medical service, which was barely surviving as a result of the sanctions, would hardly be able to deal with the 'wave' of new cancer cases.

The institute figures show that cancer was diagnosed at an early stage, when cure is still possible, in 33 percent of the cases before the sanctions but that the figure has now dropped to 12 percent. Djordjevic said that, as a result of the negative response from the U.N. Sanctions Committee to requests for imports of the needed medical supplies, Yugoslav physicians had been placed in an unprecedented position of having to decide which patients should have priority. He said the uncertainty about the duration of the sanctions also seriously affected the health of the Yugoslav population.

Djordjevic said more than 400 refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had annually been treated at his institute since the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia. He said more than a third of the patients had been non-Serbs and their medical bills had been covered by the institute itself.

Kosovo

Officials View Possibility of Dialogue With Serbs

AU1201095495 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 10 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Intensive meetings and contacts of high-ranking OSCE officials recently held in Prishtina and Belgrade testify to the organization's determination to play a more active role in the Balkans.

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Frank Swaelen held talks in Belgrade last evening with Dr. Fehmi Agani and Edita Tahiri, leaders of the Kosova Democratic Alliance [LDK].

The OSCE delegation also held meetings with high-ranking Serbian officials. Skender Durmishi reports from Prishtina:

[Durmishi] Apart from discussing the grave situation in Kosova, Mr. Swaelen and LDK leaders Fehmi Agani and Edita Tahiri focused on the possibility of starting a dialogue with the Serbian side under the mediation of an international authorized body.

Publishing a communique on this meeting, the Kosova Information Center reported that Mr. Frank Swaelen had expressed OSCE's interest in the Kosova issue and assessed that the first step in this direction is to reestablish an international presence in Kosova and especially reinstate the OSCE mission there. OSCE's interest in reestablishing its mission and playing an active role in Kosova and in other areas in the former Yugoslavia was also observed in the meetings that OSCE officials recently held in Belgrade.

Of course, Kosova is an unavoidable subject in all talks, albeit the published communiques do not represent its real dimensions.

The Serbian mass media have reported that the OSCE delegation held meetings with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today.

Apart from negating responsibility for the breaking off of cooperation, the official communique provides no details about any further cooperation, but considers it important to express Belgrade's readiness to reestablish cooperation with the OSCE.

The same sources report that under the leadership of Deputy Chairman Willy Wimmer, the OSCE delegation held talks yesterday with other officials of Serbia and the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia.

At a meeting with Slobodan Ivanovic, chairman of the Foreign Policy Council of the Serbian Assembly, both sides expressed a readiness to boost cooperation.

At a meeting with Mrs. Margit Savovic [Yugoslav minister in charge of human rights and rights of minorities], Willy Wimmer particularly expressed an interest in the processes of populating Kosova with Serbs and Montenegrins. Savovic attempted to create the impression that it is not a question of colonization and considered the attempts to establish Serbs in Kosova by resorting to old and new formulas as a return of those who were violently evicted and a as their civil right to decide themselves on their domicile.

These intensive visits and statements by the high-ranking OSCE officials testify to the determination of this European institution to be actively and constructively involved in this area and in the Kosova issue.

All the meetings gave absolute priority to dialogue which, as Mr. Willy Wimmer stressed in an interview, has no meaning unless Kosova is held in the burden of repression.

At a meeting with President Rugova, the OSCE official told him openly about the key to efficiency—Serbia's road to Europe goes through Prishtina. Serbia, too, is already convinced of this testimony of conscience and political interest. As to when Serbia will publicly accept this is another question. The first and meaningful indication will be to stop the repression in Kosova.

OSCE 'Disappointed' With Milosevic Talks

AU1201095795 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 11 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Fehmi Agani, deputy chairman of the Kosova Democratic Alliance, who presided over the Kosovar delegation that held talks with the OSCE delegation headed by OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Frank Swaelen, declared to the Kosova Information Center that Mr. Swaelen was dissatisfied with the results of talks with Serbian President Milosevic.

Dr. Agani stated that the parliamentary delegation had gone to Belgrade to see about the possibility of an OSCE mediation on the Kosova issue and to discuss the issue of the OSCE observers' mission. The OSCE delegation was prepared for the meeting, following promises taken earlier from Serbian top officials Bozovic and Lilic at the European Parliament in Brussels.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly delegation is very disappointed following the meeting with Milosevic, Dr. Agani said. The delegation possessed complete information on the stances of the Albanian side taken during the visit to Kosova by Willy Wimmer, deputy chairman of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the meetings that were held in Belgrade.

OSCE Delegation: Regret Over Police 'Campaign'

AU1101210095 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 11 Jan 95

[Telephone report by Mehmet Haziri from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] While at a meeting with top Belgrade officials, the OCSE delegation expressed regret over the trampling underfoot of the rights of Albanians and demanded the establishment of an OCSE mission in Kosova. Serb police expeditions were continuing to travel in Kosova villages, raiding and plundering the unprotected Albanians.

The Kosova Information Center reports that as of 6 January, 11 peasants from Shtruzhe have been summoned to the Srecke police station in Prizren Commune under the pretext of searches for arms. Reports confirm that all were robbed of their passports.

Bedri Abazi and Abdulla Haxhiymeri, former policemen in Prizren, and Muhedin Bekeri, former chairman of the Rahovec communal court, are to be held in custody for another two months. These three persons were arrested during the fierce campaign against former Albanian policemen of Kosova that started on 17 November last year.

Under various pretexts, Serbian police expeditions recently raided dozens of families in Pllozhine in Skenderaj, Kernin in Istog, and Vushtrri. It is reported that, during the raids, many citizens were maltreated, some of whom were obliged to seek medical assistance.

Here is another more or less characteristic case that speaks of unlawful actions by the Serbian police. Naim Haxhiu, who was given the cruel status of an Albanian refugee by the Serbian authorities and who was evicted from Kosova on November 1993, recently went to Shtimje to visit his wife and children. On that occasion, the Serbs installed in the Shtimje court sentenced him to 30 days in prison. Reports confirm that he was immediately sent to suffer the sentence.

PKK Asks Geneva Council To 'Protect' Rights

AU1301084495 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Parliamentary Party of Kosova [PPK] has sent a memorandum to the interparliamentary union and its committee for the protection of human rights and those of deputies in Geneva, demanding that it take under its protection the Albanian deputies of both legislatures in the Assembly of Kosova who are being pursued, arrested, and evicted by the Serbian power. Ramadan Mucolli is on the line from Prishtina:

[Mucolli] The PPK memorandum first recalls the status of Kosova under the former Yugoslav Federation and the restriction of the autonomy and the arbitrary abolition of the Assembly of Kosova by Serbia. The memorandum also recalls the approval of the constitution of the Republic of Kosova by the legitimate deputies of the Kosova Assembly, for which Serbia rigorously banned the functioning of the parliament of Kosova and initiated criminal police actions against its members.

The PPK recalls the 1992 elections in Kosova, followed by the pursuit of the new deputies and the violent hindrance of their efforts in constituting the parliament of Kosova. The Belgrade authorities threatened, several times, that if the Albanians in Kosova proclaimed any assembly, the members of that assembly would bear responsibility before the law and that act would bring about war in Kosova, the memorandum reads, mentioning various kinds of repression against the Kosova deputies.

The violence against the parliamentarians of Kosova and the negation of the right of the Albanians to found the assembly expresses Belgrade's negation of the parliamentary democratic fundamental freedom, which makes a peaceful solution to the Kosova issue impossible, states the PKK memorandum addressed to the interparliamentary union and its committee for the protection of deputies' rights in Geneva.

Rugova: 'Further Commitment' From Trade Unionists

AU1301084995 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today, the president of the Republic of Kosova, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, received a delegation of the independent trade unions of education, science, and culture, and a group of donors from Prizren. Here is a report by Mehmet Haziri:

[Haziri] Representatives of the council of independent trade unions of education, science, and culture, comprising Bahatir Sheholli, as chairman, and Zenel Zeka, Qazim Oruci, and Bahri Mulliqi as members, briefed President Rugova on its work and efforts that this association is making to achieve a better organization in the field of science, education, and culture.

At the meeting, they stressed the need for a new organization of traditional musical performances, which promised to be successful both in Kosova and abroad.

President Rugova supported the activity and goals of the council of the independent trade unions of Kosova for education, science, and culture and demanded further commitment in organizing the work and activity in this field and establishing better cooperation among cultural institutions and associations in Kosova.

Latif Berisha, member of the Democratic League of Kosova [LDK] Presidency and secretary of the LDK's sector for culture, was present at the meeting. [passage omitted]

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